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The central purpose of this thesis is to develop a theory of 
scientific inquiry, or scientific method, within the context of a 
setting which is fundamentally sceptical. Thiis the thesis aims, 
among other things, to thoroughly explore, and show the dire conse- 
quences of, the rival justificationist approach to rational innui-rv. 
Moreover, the thesis has the rather. perverse p ograrnrme of attempting 
to avoid an anti-rational relativism as the indirect conspnuence of 
the attempt to defend scepticism (in one particular version - that 
is, the version which I call Socratic scepticism). Since, I claim. 
, 
justificationism itself leads to relativism, and since the Socratic 
sceptic can avoid relativism, and since the justificationist wa, -ts 
to avoid relativism euch a justificationist ought to join me in my 
Socratic scepticism. 
However, I have no illusions that this thesis will, or even can, 
produce any such result. 
The argument of the thesis basically rune in t'-; e following order: 
first, in the Introduction, I explain the difference between two fernes 
of evolutionary process ('coupled' and ' decoupled') and I sýý As' that 
the search for knowledge in science ought to be concao+,, alised as a 
'coupled' evolutionary process. This claim is made moo(. later it +re 
thesis, and particularly in Chapter 1- which aims tc siýoý zr T' P 
traditional divorce between the 'context of discovery' and the 'conto 
of justification' should be replaced by a iinitary ' cont-P-r`' fir our 
methodological theories - the 
'context of innuiry'. Before {nir, however. 
I investigate (in Chapter. 1) a number o" rival gene .l avproacr. es 1 
scientific method and scientific rationality, and try to def' nod ýrha' 
I call the 'normative am-roach'. The rlA''r-nse of this avproac? -, nr-Pý 
upon showing that it can avoid 'transcendentalism' - ýº, erg : rý ývP-r 
theory of method become rationally adoptable. This problem jr La^kled 
in Chapter 2- where, in particular, I show how it can be -ýossi1, le ; -o 
have 'synthetic', but non-natualistic, theories of scientfi- mr`rod, 
and where I develop a method for both critically aprraisin,, and developing 
such theories. This then leads, after Chapter 3 argues thR thes=_s that 
methodologir is 'about' the context of inquiry, to t%-, r-'n s-' dera-1- im- (in 
Chapter 4 of what I claim to be the fundamental problem o rational 
inquiry - the problem of Plato's Meno. In this chapter I develop a 
solution to this problem which is Socratic sceptical; and ', hi- solid Lon 
is then defended, in Chapter 5, against Michael Polan7ri's aei+ know- 
ledge' solution to the Meno. Finally, in Chapter 4, ; eongidP-r two 
further objections to the sceptical solution developed in Chav-;, 4T 1: - 
one of these, the Kuhnian objection, fails to hit the mark; mit the 
other, the problem of content, desiderates a search for a rePlaeement 
to our original theory. This replacement is -then developed in the 
rest of Chapter h. 
PGS/ABST 4- Use this side ; )nlv 
In accordance with Regulation 2.4.15 1 declare that 
this thesis has been composed by me and is my own 
work. 
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'IT IS BETTER TO TRAVEL HOPEFULLY, THAN TO ARRIVE' - 
Robert Louis Stevenson 
3 
IETRODUCTION - Two Type® of Evolution 
In its popular image, Darwinian evolutionary theory rune along 
something like the following lines: genetic mutations occur at 
random; some of these (a very small percentage) are advantageous to 
the organism, giving their bearer an effective advantage in the 
struggle for survival; such mutations are thus differentially 
transmitted to the next generation; and if the advantage is 
sufficiently great then the mutation comes to dominate the gene pool 
- the species has both adapted and evolved. This image, the image 
of evolution by natural eelection. and of the survival of the 
fittest, tends to be one-sided, emphasising the wy in Kin ch 
evolutionary developments adapt organisms to their environment. 
What is often left out is the extent to which organisms also adapt 
their envirormnents to themselves; and how, through their own 
behaviour, they modify the selection pressures to xhich they are 
subjected. 
1* 
What is striking about man, I suggest, is precisely the extent 
to which his own, recent, evolution has been characterised by such 
a process of 'reverse adaptation', of adapting the environment to hie 
own regvireadent9. It is easy to overlook the fact, because it is so 
prominent, that the world we live in is itself largely a world of 
our own making, populated with the artifacts of himman creation. Of 
course, this is not to say that the world we live in is exactly to 
* All footnotes in this thesis are collected together at the end of 
the chapter in which they appear. Footnote mmnbering is continuous 
within chapters, but not between them. I have tended, in footnotes, 
to give the full reference of any text cited, but in the main body 
of the thesis (and also sometimes in footnotes) I refer to works in 
an abbreviated foam - e. g., Popper (1959). These refer to the 
bibliography at the end. 
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our liking - for the artifacts of human creation themselves often 
have undeeigned or unintended consequences which we do not like at 
all (pollution is, here, a good example). Yet despite its warts 
the world we inhabit is, to a considerable degree, our world. 
Wherein lies our extraordinary ability to adapt our environment 
(warts and all) to ourselves? The answer, I suggest, lies in heran 
knowledge, and especially in its growth. The artifactual environ- 
ment within which most of us spend most of our lives is, by and 
large, the product of its application - the growth of our knowledge 
has led to the transformation of our world. We dwell, in other 
words, largely among the products of our own knowledge, and the 
growth of that knowledge is itself the basis of the 'behavioural 
spearhead' by which we select new 'ecologies' for ourselves. 
Mane ability to gain the knowledge required to tranefoxm his 
environment is, we may conjecture, itself the product of his 
organic evolution. Yet this very ability itself produces what marry 
consider to be a fundamentally new and more important evolution: 
the evolution of human knowledge and culture. Following Popper, 
2 
we may think of such knowledge, and in particular of scientific 
knowledge, as an exo-somatio 'organ' whioh we 'grow' in order to 
better cope with the world; and for man the evolution of this 
'organ' has apparently become more important for his continued 
survival than has the evolution of his genetic material. In a way 
this is not really earprising - for the genetic material is itself 
only an endo-Somatic means for storing knowledge. From this view- 
point the exo-somatic evolution of human knowledge simply becomes 
an extension of, and in many oases an improvement on, its endo- 
somatic (or genetic) evolution. This extension has, however, a number 
5 
of important advantages when ocmpared to its endo-somatic counter- 
part. In the first place, whereas endo-somatically encoded know- 
ledge can, if mistaken, only be eliminated via the death of the 
organism which bears it, exo-somatically encoded (or linguistically 
articulated) knowledge can be tested without necessarily putting the 
lives of its bearers at risk. As Popper ham put, we can let our 
hypotheses the in our stead. But secondly, once this exo-somatio 
evolution euperoedee the endo-eomatio one we appear to gain an 
enormous advantage in terms of adaptive speed - for while genetic 
evolution is, as a learning prooeee, in the main unbearably slow, 
the evolution of exo-somatioally encoded scientific knowledge has 
apparently proceeded at a remarkable pace. Our 'genetic distances 
from Western Europeans of the Middle Ages is, I oonjecture, really 
rather small, but our knowledge of the world seems light years from 
theirs. 
Part of the reason for the slowness of genetio evolution as a 
learning process may lie in the fact of 'decoupling'. 
3 All 
evolutionary processes require at least two elements: a source of 
variation and a mechanism of selection. Such a process may be 
described as tdecoupled' when the source of variation is causally 
independent of the mechanism of selection - that is, when the factors 
responsible for producing variation are unrelated to those res- 
poneible for their selection. Such a decoupled evolutionary process 
allows a virtually unlimited breadth of variation from which to 
select, but this 'freedom to experiment' is bought at a cost: for 
the overwhelming majority of the variations generated are going to 
be selected against (most mutations are, after all, lethal). A 
decoupled evolutionary prooeee is thus likely to be extremely slow, 
in that what is required for adaptive advantage is in no way 
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instructing (or even influencing) the process of variation. 
Alternatively, the elements of as evolutionary process may be 
'coupled'. This occurs when the factors responsible for selection 
themselves operate upon, or influence, the process of generating 
variation, so that these factors partially control this process. 
This allows the requirements of the selection mechanism to act as 
constraints on the production of variants, with the result that a 
large number of 'mistaken' variations will be ruled out in advance, 
and so will never come forward. A genuinely coupled evolutionary 
prooeee (if any exist) thus has the potential advantage of being 
much more efficient than a decoupled one, facilitating a much more 
rapid edaption to the demands of any particular selection mechanism. 
An illustrative analogy may be useful here. Imagine some 
mechanism (M) for shooting balls at a screen (S), where the screen 
has a characteristic 'mesh' - that is, only balls smaller than a 
certain diameter will get through the screen. In this example, 
we may imagine M to be o ur source of variation (i. e., balls of 
different diameters get shot out); S (with its characteristic 
'mesh') to be our mechanism of selection; and the selected variants 
are those balls which pass through the screen. As a decoupled 
process, the procedure by which M generates balls is totally 
unrelated to S's oharaoterietio 'mesh'; balls of all sorts of 
diameters get shot out and most never get through. But as a coupled 
process Ste characteristic 'mesh' itself influences, or partially 
controls, M's generation of variants, so that M behaves as if it has 
some sort of'pre-selection filter# which 'biases' its production of 
balls in the direction of M's characteristic 'mesh'. In this case 
fewer balle may emerge from M. but those which do will stand a 
better chance of getting through. 
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Coupled evolutioonaxy processes, if any exist, are thus 
rather similar to Lamarckian evolution, in which the individual 
organism's life-time adaptation to the eny' ant is itself 
transmitted genetically to the next generation (inheritance of 
acquired characterietice). If we imagine the members of a species 
trying to adapt themselves to an environment E. and if we further 
imagine that each of them is able to genetically transmit to its 
offspring every change in its morphology which has remAted from 
its attempts to survive in E, then euch a coupled evolutionary 
process - where the genetic source of variation is itself under the 
partial control or influence of E- will be much quicker than any 
decoupled process. Thus when Darwin learned of Lord Kelvin's 
thermodynamic argument concerning the age of the earth, which showed 
it to be much younger than Darwin's initial theory required, he 
modified it so as to include some Lemarckian mechanisms - precisely 
in order to speed evolution up04 
For our purposes the significance of this discussion is as 
follows: genetic evolution is, as far as we know, a decoupled 
process, in that the factors determining genetic variation are 
totally independent of the factors determining their selection or 
perpetuation. Adaptation to the environment by its means is thus a 
relatively slow affair. On the other hand, cultural evolution - 
and in particular the evolution of scientific knowledge - has been, 
in biological terms, remarkably rapid. How can we explain this 
apparent speed of the evolution of knowledge as compared with 
genetio evolution? The above ideas provide a possible clue: if 
the evolution of knowledge were a ooupled evolution then this might 
aooonnt for the apparent gain in tease of adaptive speed which seems 
z 
to distinguish it from decoupled genetic evolution. 
That the evolution of hi, nuin knowledge and culture shares some 
of the characteristics of a Lamasckian or coupled evolution ought 
to be fairly obvious - for by means of education, books, and so on, 
previous generations can transmit, by non-genetic instruction, 
what they have learned about the world (or thought that they have 
learned) to eucoeeding generations. Yet this aspect of cultural 
evolution may be capable of being incorporated within a Darwinian 
setting - for in genetic eimlution we also have instruction, what 
Popper (1975) has called 'instruction from within the system'. That 
is, the genetic material contains instructions - instructions for 
'buildingt a phenotype - and so from within the genetio system 
inetraotion exists. What doesn't exist from a Darwinian viewpoint 
in instruction from outwith the genetic system; from outwith this 
system there is only selection, not instruction. If we now imagine, 
with respect to the evolution of scientific knowledge, that the 
analogue of the genetic matetial is the current state of such know- 
ledge, then here too we will get instruction from within the 
system. In other words, the aspect of the evolution of knowledge 
which was previously noted as having a Lamarckian character - that 
is, its transmission by non-genetic instruction - can itself be 
Been as a non-Lemarckian instruction from within the knowledge 
system. Thus so long as our knowledge of the world is not itself 
instructed by that world, but only selected in interaction with 
it, the fact that what we have learned can be transmitted to 
euoceeding generations does not show that the learning process 
itself is non-Darwinian. 
Despite this, I want to claim that the process by which hlmmßa 
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scientific knowledge evolves mey nevertheless be a coupled one in 
an important sense, in that the very factors which require the 
evolution of knowledge (by making it necessary) can themselves 
provide criteria, or standards, for the evaluation of competing 
variations. These factors can thus provide important prior (or 
'pre-selective') constraints on the generation of euch variants. 
Thus, in science, the generation of new ideas can itself be under 
the partial control of the very factors which require them. This 
is quite unlike genetic evolution, where variation is, so far as 
we know, never 'required' at all, in that mutations occur 
independently of any requirements of the selective, environmental, 
situation. Thus I want to claim that the scientist, when he is 
searching for a new variant on current scientific knowledge, already 
has some clues as to some of the properties which such a variant 
should have if it is to meet the minimal req ents of the 
reelection situation'. In fact, if this were not the case then the 
scientist would have no idea as to what he was looking for, and 
thus no ability to recognise any variant as worthy of further 
investigation. 
ýýýýýý 
This thesis aims to present a theory as to how scientific 
knowledge ought to be evolved, and thus a theory of scientific 
method. One of its gaiding ideas is that of coupling - the idea 
that the generation of new ®cientifio theories can be, and often 
is, under the partial and plastic control of the very situations 
within, which they will be evaluated (positively or negatively 
eelected). 
5 
Thus I claim, in Chapter 3, that the modern divorce 
between *bat has come to be known as the *context of discovery, 
10 
and the 'context of justification' is untenable - for if the 
generation of new scientific theories (which is within the 'context 
of discovery') is, as postulated, under the partial and plastic 
control of the situations within vhioh they will be evaluated (which 
is usually thought of as within the 'context of justification') 
then the relationship between these two 'contexts' must be more 
intimate than is urnaelly asm med. In fact, I believe that it in 
more profitable to relinquish the idea of two toontexte' altogether, 
and to replace them instead with a single 'context': the context 
of inquiry. 
I aim, then, in this thesis to articulate a theory of 
scientific inquiry. More particularly, I aim to articulate euch a 
theory within a setting whioh may be broadly oharaoterised as 
sceptical - that is, which denies that we can ever have any good 
reasons for believing our scientific knowledge to be true (or even 
that it has got closer to the truth), and which thus denies that 
euch knowledge is to be identified with justified, true belief 
(or even with justified, approximately true belief). There may 
seem an immediate paradox here - for on the one hand I want to 
introduoe the idea of coupling in order to explain the apparent 
rapidity with whioh human scientific knowledge has evolved; while 
on the other hand I aim to produoe a theory of eoientifio inquiry 
which is fundamentally eoeptical. But how can a seoptio aim to 
explain the apparent rapidity of the evolution of eoiesoctifio 
knowledge without, at the same time, denying his scepticism? 
This prima f_ paradox disappears as soon as it is 
realised that, for me, the coupled evolution by which scientific 
knowledge develops results from our good fortune in dieoovvering 
problune, or difficulties, in our current scientific knowledge - 
it is the discovery of such problems which requires the evolution 
of scientific knowledge; and it is the desiderata which such 
problems generate which provide important prior constraints on the 
generation of novel variants. Thus, it is precisely because we 
cannot know, in the sense of having good reasons for believing 
our scientific theories to be true (or even approximately true), that 
we must not aim our inquiries at trying to find euch reasons 
(since they do not exist). Rather, we must aim our inquiries at 
trying to discover problems, or difficulties, in our current 
ecientifio 'knowledge' (or theories), and thus at trying to 
discover not simply that we Damnot know but where we do not know. 
In other words, the idea of coupling which I want to introduce 
into the theory of inquiry crucially depends upon that theory being 
fundamentally sceptical. 
One final point is in order here. The title of this thesis 
obviously alludes to Larry Laudan's recent book Progress and its 
Problems (1977); and it shares with that book an emphasis on the 
idea that science is a problem-solving activity. However, I 
diverge fr m Laudan in an mmber of important respects. Firstly, 
for me science is as much a problem-fin=din activity as it is a 
problem-solving one. Seoondly, whereas Laudan seems to identify 
the aim of eoienae as that of problem-solving, I identify its aim 
as the discovery of the truth, and hold that the attempt to find, 
and then to solve, problems is the best method we have for pursuing 
this aim. Thus, whereas Lauäan is able to say that in solving 
problems science is definitely making progress (in that it is 
achieving its goal), I only claim that the method of finding and 
i2ý- 
solving problems is the best method we have for discovering the 
truth in the setting of a fundamental scepticism. It follows, of 
course, that there can be no good reasons for believing this claim 
to be true (for then the setting wouldn't be sceptical); but that 
there can be no good reasons for believing this claim to be true 
if; no argument against the troth of the claim itself. Thus, unlike 
Wan, I do not aim to guarantee science's progress by assuming 
'a goal which (unlike truth) is not intrinsically transcendent and 
henoe closed to epietemic access' (Laudsrx (1981), p. 145). On the 
contraxy, f om the sceptical viewpoint adopted here the choice of a 
goal for science which was open to eepistemic access would eliminate 
the need for trying to disoover problems and then to solve them - 
for it is only incumbent upon us to try to discover problems in 
our current theories because we cazmot have good reasons to think 
that they have achieved their goal (of truth). Thus, it is the 
lack of epietemio acoess to our goal, and not the openness of auch 
access, which requires that the method of science be one of finding 
and solMing problems. 
This whole issue of the relation of our theories of scientific 
method to the achievement of scientific progress will be taken up 
again in Chapter 2. For the moment I only wish to stress that I 
neither aim to offer a sufficient explanation for the progress of 
science in teems of a methodological theory, nor do I aim to 
guarantee its progress in tens of such a theory. Thus although I 
see the method of science as one of finding and solving problems, and 
also see euch problems (and the desiderata they generate) as providing 
the basis for a coupled evolutionary process in science, I do not 
wich to identify the aim of science as one problem-solving any more 
13 
than I rieh to identify it with that of problem-finding. Finding 
and solving problems in the me of science, not its aim. But a 
hitherto noticed characteristic of the application of this method 
is that it can lead to increasingly more stringent, and hence 
demanding, constraints on further acceptable problem-solutions, and 
thus to increasing guidance in the search for them. In this way 
the ervolution of scientific knowledge is coupled one; but this 
oontpled evolution need not necessarily be taking us towards our 
epistemologically transcendent goal of truth. A. n& while I do not wish 
to derer the claim that this evolution is progressive, I do not 
think that any good reasons can be given for believing this claim 
to be true. 
IH 
Introduction - Footnotes 
1. The idea that changes of behaviour patterns can modify or 
re-orient selection pressures is central to the so-oeilled 
'behavioural spearhead theory'. See, for example, Sir Alister 
Hardy, The Living Stream (London: Collins, 1965); as well 
Sir Karl Popper's Herbert Spencer lecture (1961) 'Evolution 
and the Tree of ! nowleäge t, reprinted in his Objective Knowledge 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) - see especially the new 
appendix t The Hopeful Behavioural Monster', pp. 281- 84. 
Popper succinctly summarises this viewpoint, -which attempts to 
incorporate some Lamarckian insights into the neo-Darwinian 
framework, as follows: 'Once a certain lattitude of behaviour 
has been attained ... the initiative of the organism in 
selecting its ecology or habitat takes the lead, and the 
natural selection within the new habitat follows that lead. In 
this way, Darwinism can simulate Lamarckism,, and even Bergson'e 
"creative evolution". ¶ (The quotation is from Popperle 
'The Rationality of Scientific Revolutions' in R. Harre (ed. ), 
Probleme of Scientific Revolutions (Oxford: O. U. P., 1975), 
pp. 72 - 101; reprinted in I. Hacking (ed. 
)' Scientific 
Revolutions (Oxford: O. U. P., 1981), pp. 80 - 106. The 
quotation is at footnote 12, pp. 86 -7 of the reprint. ) 
2. See, especially, the essays 'Llpistemology without a Knowing 
Subject' and 'On the Theory of Objective Mind' in Orb ective 
Knowledge,, oT. cit.. 
3 For the distinction between tdecoupled' and 'coupled' 
evolutionary processes, and a discussion of them in the 
context of the theory of knowledge, see Stephen Toulmin, 
Humag VaQerstanl, Vom, (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1972), 
Asp. PP. 337 - 340. For a critical discussion of Toulmin's 
book, see my tToulmin's Evolutionary Epistemologyt, Philosophical 
terl , 2n1 




As it turned out Kelvin's argwaeaat contained an important flaw, 
in that it did not take account of the heat which the earth 
generates via radioactive processes (these were only discovered 
much later). Thus the earth's present temperature is compatible 
with it being much older than Kelvin thought possibl% and so 
the need to introduce Iýamarckian mechanisms is thereby 
obviated. Nevertheless, at the time, Darwin thought Kelvin's 
argument to raise a serious problem for his theory of 
evolution by natural selection, a problem which he attempted 
to solve by modifying that theory in the direction of 
Lamarckism. For a discussion of this episode, together with 
an attempt to draw some philosophical lessons from it, see 
J. N. Hattiengadi, 'Alternatives and Incommenelxrablee: The 
Case of Darwin and Kelvin', Philosophy of Science, )8 
(1971), PP. 502 - 7. 
The notion of 'plastic control' is due to Popper - see his 
'Of Clouds and Clocks', in Objective Knowledge, 22. cit., 
pp. 206 - 255 - and can be contrasted with the notion of 
'cast-iron control'. In a 'cast-iron' control the controlling 
system is relatively unaffected by changes in the controlled 
system (an example would be a gas in a closed iron container). 
As against this, in a 'plastic' control the controlling system 
is much more sensitive to changes in the controlled system - 
thus it is a control with feed-back. An example would be a 
child's balloon, which controls the system of air inside it 
but which is relatively sensitive to changes in that system 
(e. g., changes of temperature) - sufficiently 
sensitive so that such changes can enable the air to 'overcome' 
the control. Despite this possibility the balloon still acts 
as a relative control over the system of air, since without the 
balloon the air inside it would soon cease to be a physical 
system at all. 'Plastic' controls are highly characteristic 
of the social world. For example, current tax law controls the 
tax liability of income earners, but if accountants discover 
important loop-holes in the tax law then this may very well 
lead to a change in the law itself. Thus, the tax laws (and 
lb 
Footnote 5 contd.. 
law in general, as well as most social rules) function as 
plastic controls - they are sensitive to feed-back from the 
results of action undertaken within theca. 
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Chapter 1: The Rationality of Science 
For many philoeophere, science is the paradigm of rationality - 
of socially organised rationality - and its rules of procedure or 
method the fundamental rules of rational inquiry. Just as Quine 
was wont to ask 'If sheer logic is not conclusive, what is? '1 , so the 
majority of philosophers of science might echo: if pure science is 
not rational, what is? Moreover, given the apparently etmming 
success of science in providing us with a continuously more 
detailed knowledge of nature and her workings, how can anyone 
seriously doubt the existence, and effectiveness, of rational 
scientific methods for obtaining euch knowledge? - for if euch 
methods did not exist, or were not effective, then science's 
continuing euoaee® in providing euch knowledge would have to be 
thought of as a rationally inexplicable miracle. And in this day 
and age few philosophers are willing to countenance the existence 
of miracles, especially when they seem to repeat themselves with 
almost gruelling regularity. 
1.1: The 'Initial' and 'Transcendental' Strategies 
Yet despite all this, all is not necessarily plain sailing - 
for many philosophers of eoienoe would acknowledge that the various 
philosophical attempts to characterise science's rational methods, 
the various philosophical theories of scientific method, all run 
into difficulties of one sort or another (viz. the notorious problem 
of induction). But the overwhelming majority resolutely resist the 
conclusion that the failure of these attempts might constitute 
evidence that science is not, after all, rational - or that effective 
rational methods for obtaining scientific knowledge do not, after all, 
0 
exist. For just as one can distinguish between arithmetic and 
Prege' e theory of arithmetic - so that Russell's discovery of 
paradoxes in Frege'e theory did not necessarily set arithmetic 
itself 'epirniing'2 - so too can one distinguish between science's 
rational methods and the philosopher of science's theory of those 
methods. But then, by parity of reasoning, the disoovery of 
diffioultiee in the various philosophioal theories of scientifio 
rationality does not necessarily upset the rationality of science 
itself. So the former, it might be argued, certainly come and go; 
but the latter remains nevertheless a hardy perennial. 
3 
This apparent philosophical commitment to the rationality of 
science itself, or to the existence of effective rational methods 
for obtaining a knowledge of nature, is not without its attendant 
dangers, as we shall see. In the first place, however, it needs 
to be remarked that it does seem true enough that one nennot 
validly conclude to the irrationality of science itself, or to the 
non-existence of effective rational scientific methods, directly 
from the failures of any particular philosophical theories of 
science. For any such inference will, presumably, always depend 
upon the additional assumption that we have already articulated all 
the possible theories of rational method, and olearly we will 
always be free to attempt to refute this additional assumption 
by developing new theories of method. Thus, the failure of any 
particular set of theories of rational, scientific, method can 
never by itself logically force us into concluding that science 
itself is irrational - for we are always free to try again. Thus 
at any point in time the theory of scientific method may appear to 
be as dead as a duck, but the logical space will apparently 
continue to exist for the quacks to see if they cannot get some more 
k9 
mileage out of the old girl before ehe runs out of steam. 
Nevertheless, euch an approach (which I shall call the 'initial' 
strategy) is not without its dangers - for if the continued failures 
of philosophical theories of rational scientific method do not 
provide any evidence against the assumption that euch methods exist 
then, one wonders, how could euch an assumption even be critically 
evaluated? Thus, in refusing to allow that the failure of particular 
theories of scientific rationality might constitute an argument 
against the claim that science is rational, philosophers of science 
are in danger of turning the thesis of science's rationality, or 
the thesis of the existence of effective rational methods for 
obtaining a knowledge of nature, into an uncriticae able dogma. 
More worrying, however, is the possibility that they may even be 
tempted to turn their own theories of scientific rationality into 
unoriticis able dogmas (and thus adopt what I shall call the 
ftranecendental' strategy). 
The ease with which this may happen can be seen as soon as one 
asks the following questions if the failure of partioular theories 
of scientific rationality does not entail the non-existence of 
scientific rationality, then what is it which we have failed to 
show does not exist? The answer is, presumably, scientific rationality. 
But what does this consist in? In the absence of any defensible 
theory, either descriptive or prescriptive, of science's rational 
methods, we appear to be unable to any very muoh as to what it is 
which we have failed to show does not exist. But in that case the 
temptation must be very great to simply identify scientific 
rationality with one's own favoured theory of scientific method, 
and then to argue - 'transcendentally' as it were - that since 
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science itself is rational, the difficulties which appear to confront 
one's favoured theory of its rationality simply must be 
prima facie, and thus answerable. In this setting philosophers 
may even remain quite unperturbed if, despite persistent efforts, 
they are unable to discover any mistakes in the arguments which 
appear to raise problems for their favoured theory - for since, 
given the 'initial' strategy, they 'know' that science itself is 
rational and since, Taute de mieux, they identify its rationality 
essentially with their favoured theory of its rationality, they 
conclude that it must be the case (despite appearances to the con- 
trary) that the difficulties facing their theory of rational method 
must be overcomeable, so that their theory must at the very least be 
'essentially correct', requiring at most a few 'technical modi- 
ficatione of detail' before being totally satisfactory. 
In order to see more clearly why it is that philosophers may be 
tempted to identify scientific rationality (per ) with their own 
favoured theory of that rationality, let us return to the 'initial' 
btrategy - that of refusing to allow that the failures of particular 
theories of rational scientific method provide any argument for 
the non-existence of euch methods, or for the view that science 
itself is irrational. This strategy appears to make perfect sense 
if one assimilates the task of a philosophical theory of science to 
an explanatory task, one in which such theories aim to offer a 
meta-scientific explanation of the rationality of science. For 
imagine a parallel case from soience itself. Aeevme that we went to 
develop a theory to explain, say, the characteristic spectral lines 
of hydrogen; and assume further that every available theory of the 
hydrogen atom either fails to explain these lines or else does 
explain them (i. e. entails statements describing them) but is known 
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to be false on independent grounds, (in the latter case martr 
philosophers of science, following Hempel, would assert that 
since these theories are false they do not explain the spectral 
lines either, even although they entail statements describing them) 04 
In these circumstances it is quite clear that the failures of the 
various explanatory theories would not normally be taken as 
evidence that hydrogen's characteristic spectral lines do not 
exist, or that the statements describing them are themselves false. 
In other words, in the context of a scientific explanation the 
failure of a variety of explanatory theories would not normally 
be taken as an argument against the truth of the explanandum. 
Thus if we assimilate the task of a theory of rational scientific 
method to that of a meta-scientific explanation then here too it 
will appear to be reasonable to refuse to accept that the failures 
of a variety of philosophical theories of rationality provide any 
argument against our explanandum - that is, against the rationality 
of soience itself. 
But this a8similation. is, I submit, highly problematic. For 
in order for it to be successful it must be possible to specify and 
describe one's explanandum independently of one's explanatory 
theories. Whenever this is not the case one's 'e xplanandum' will, 
in reality, be no more than a place-holder, a kind of blank to be 
filled in with whatever follows from one's best 'explanatory' 
(or, better, 'erplioatory') theory. In other words, whenever one 
is unable to specify and describe one's explanandum independently 
of one's theories, one is unable to argue that the failures of these 
theories pose no threat to the existence, or truth, of one's 
'ezplanandum'. Now many common-sense requests for explanation are 
in fact of precisely this 'explicatory' kind. Thus if a boy of 
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twelve were to ask for an explanation of the rules of chess he 
would not be taken to be implying, on the one hand, that he knows 
the rules of oheee and requesting, on the other hand, an explanation 
of why these rules are as they are (which is how he would be inter- 
preted if he Were to request an explanation of the sky's blueness). 
On the contrary, he would be taken to be implying that since he 
does not know the rules of ohess he needs them explained to him. 
In this context the phrase 'the rules of chess' is, for the boy, 
a mere place-holder, waiting to be given descriptive and/or 
prescriptive content by whatever 'explanation' (or, better, 
'explication') is offered. If, in these circumstances, the proffered 
'explanation' is mistaken then the boy hasn't yet learnt the rules 
of chess. So too, I submit, with the rationality of science - in 
the absence of any descriptive and/or prescriptive theory of rational 
scientific methods, the phrase 'the rationality of science itself' 
is a mere place-holder, waiting to be given content by our beet 
theories of rational method and inquiry. But in that oaee, like the 
boy, we do not know what the rationality of science oonsiete in 
until we have a defensible theory of its rationality (that ie, 
until we have a defensible theory of scientific method). If all 
this is correct then perhaps we should not be too surprised if we 
find philosophers simply identifying the rationality of science 
itself with their favoured theories of scientific rationality, for 
it is precisely these theories which may be giving the phrase 'the 
rationality of science itself' whatever content it possesses. 
Such a move of identifying one's apparent 'explanandum' with 
one's own theory of it can, I suggest, be found among many of the 
followers of probabilistic inductive logic. Convinced that empirical 
science can only be rational if it is possible to learn from 
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experience, inductive logicians often came to identify learning 
from experience with their own probabilistic inductive logic - so 
that learning from experience became aynonomous with being able to 
raise the probability of universal scientific hypotheses on the 
basis of empirical evidence. When arguments came forward (for 
example, from Popper) to suggest that all universal soientifio 
hypotheses always have probability zero, no matter how much 
empirical evidence we may have amassed in their favour, many of the 
proponents of probabilistic inductive logic concluded that despite 
appearances there simply must exist a method for assigning non- 
zero probabilities to universal hypotheses on the basis of empirical 
evidence - for otherwise learning from experience would be impossible, 
and so empirioal eoienoe oould not be rational. As Popper put it, 
many of the advocates of probabilistic inductive logic were simply 
unable to 
consider the possibility that we may learn from 
experience more and more about universal laws without 
ever increasing their probability; that we may test 
and corroborate some of them better and better, thereby 
increasing their degree of corroboration without altering 
their probability whose value remains zero. (Pý per 
(1959) p. 383) 
But of course, if learning from experience is simply identified 
with raising probability values, then the possibility which Popper 
envisages is no possibility at all. 
5 
ýý2; Philosophy as Explication: Critical Remarks 
It is perhaps surprising to see rationally inclined philosophers 
of science - like the proponents of probabilistic inductive logic6 
- finding refuge in euch an apparently dogmatic, and thus irrational, 
'transcendental I strategy. But this surprise abates as soon as one 
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recalls how Carnap, the leading modern proponent of probabilistic 
inductive logic, viewed his own enterprise. According to Carnap 
((1950); (1953)) the task of a theory of probability is to provide 
an exact explication for the lees exact, common-seneical, notion of 
probability (the on2lioatya). Carnap saw this explicatwm as it- 
self an indistinct amalgam of two quite separate explicate - which 
he labelled as 'probability, ' and 'probability 21. Probability2 
Carnap identifies with the empirical notion of relative frequency; 
probability, with the 'logical' notion of degree of confirmation. 
It is then not surprising that for Carnap empirical confirmation, 
which is required for learning from experience, is to be identified 
with a probability function (namely, a probability, function) 
since for him degree of confirmation just equals probability,. Given 
this, Carnap is then unable to seriously consider the possibility 
that empirical confirmation, or learning from experience, might not 
involve probabilities at all (in the sense of some notion which 
satisfies the axioms of the formal calculus of probability). Even 
worse, inherent in this approach is the temptation to view any 
alternative non-probabilistic theory of learning from experience 
(such as Popper's) as aiming to explicate a totally different 
explicatum - for since such a theory is non probabilistic it cannot 
be a theory of empirical confirmation (since the eaplicatum 'degree 
of confirmation' just equals probability, ). In fact, in his reply 
to Popper's contribution to the Carnap Schilpp volume (Schilpp 
(1964)), we find Carnap explicitly reasoning in precisely this 
manner, concluding from the fact that Popper and himself seem to have 
important disagreements that they must be attempting to explicate 
quite different explioata. 
7 But in that case their two theories, 
rather than being competitors, are in reality 'incommensurable'. 
Z6 
All of this ought, I suggest, to stand as a warning against 
that approach which sees the business of philosophy as being that 
of 'conceptual analysis', or of the 'explication of concepts'. For 
if you and I offer different explications or analyses of what 
appears to be the same 'concept', how are we to judge that we are 
not in fact each offering 'correct' analyses, but of different 
'concepts'? In so far as we see philosophy as starting from 
'concepts', and then proceeding to their 'explication', we run 
the risk of making all philosophical theories incommensurable with 
each other, in that prima facie disagreements may then be taken 
as evidence that our theories are really concerned with different 
'things' - and thus not in öonfliet at all. In fact, I want to 
claim that this is bound to happen if we propose to start merely 
from 'concepts', for unless we are prepared first to make assertions 
using a term (terms being the linguistic representations of 'concepts'), 
we can have no idea whatsoever as to what it is which we propose to 
'explicate'. But once we have a set of assertions, then we can 
simply dieouee them, and forget about 'concepts' and their 'explioation' 
altogether. To adapt a phrase of Karat's, concepts without assertions 
are empty and thus provide nothing in the way of constraints on 
potentially satisfactory 'explications' of them. But in the absence 
of euch constraints there is simply no way of telling whether 
different 'analyses' are competing explications of the same 'concept' 
or non-competing explications of different 'concepts'. 
It might be thought here that the fact that two 'explications' 
start from the same linguistic term will be of considerable help in 
deciding this issue; but this would be a mistake. For example, the 
Marxist political philosopher and the liberal political philosopher 
both employ the term 'freedom'; yet clearly they have quite different 
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theories of political liberty. If, with the conceptual analyst, 
we interpret these theories as proposed explications of 'the 
concept of freedom', then we seem forced to maintain that it 
really must just be obvious - since they both use the term 
'freedom' - that they are offering competing explications of the 
same 'concept'. But this is not obvious at all. In fact our 
natural inclination will be to work in the opposite direction, and 
to read their 'concepts' of freedom off their theories of freedom. 
Thus we will conclude, quite correctly in my opinion, that the 
Marxist and the Liberal have different 'concept s of freedom'. If. 
therefore, we want to make sense of how the Marxist and the Liberal 
could be disagreeing with each other, or of how their theories 
could be in competition, then we had better not see them as 
attempting to explicate 'the concept of freedom' - for there simply 
is no single 'concept of freedom' somehow independently 'out there' 
waiting to be 'explicated'. The idea that there is is simply an 
anachronism, a relic of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. 
Moreover, in so far as it is only possible to identify someone's 
tooncept' of e. g., freedom via their political theories it 
immediately follows that if we interpret such theories as attempted 
explications of 'concepts' them every such theory must be a 
'correct' theory - for no theory could then fail to 'correctly 
explicate' its own boncept of freedom'. 
Thus, while it may seem surprising that rationally inclined 
philosophers of science, like Catnap, would adopt the inherently 
dogmatic, and thus irrational, 'transcendental' strategy of identi- 
Eying scientific rationality with their own theory of it, this 
surprise abates as soon as one understands that this is bound to 
happen if scientific rationality is thought of as a 'concept' 
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waiting to be 'explicated' - for in that case one's own 'explication' 
(or theory) will provide the sole means by which to identify one's 
explicatum, and thus the only means by which to identify 'the 
rationality of science'. But in that oase one is bound to adopt 
the 'transcendental' strategy, and thus hold that unless one's 
own theory is correct (or, at least, 'essentially correct') science 
nennot be rational. 
1,3 : Methodology - Normative or Naturalistic?, 
To return to the main theme: if we want to be able to make 
sense of how differing theories of scientific method or rationality 
(euch as Popper's and Carnap's) can be alternative or competing 
theories then we had better avoid the 'transcendental' strategy. 
Moreover, if we hope to be able to critically evaluate any such 
theory then we must avoid. this strategy as well - for if we identify 
scientific rationality with our theory of it then our theory of 
scientific rationality must be a 'correct' theory. But in that 
case every theory of scientific method or rationality can be 
transformed into a 'correct' theory by the adoption of the 
'transcendental' strategy, and so no theory can be ruled out as 
'incorrect'. But if no euch theory can be ruled out as 'incorrect, 
then it becomes impossible to critically evaluate any such theory. 
Now remember that the 'initial' strategy - that of refusing to 
conclude to the irrationality of science itself, or to the non- 
existence of rational scientific methods, from the failures of 
various theories of scientific rationality - made perfect sense 
if one could assimilate euch theories to explanatory ones (as 
opposed to 'explicatory, ones). For in that case we would be able 
to speoifY and/or describe our explanendum independently of our 
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explanatory theories, and so the failures of euch theories would 
indeed not have to be taken as threatening the existence, or truth, 
of our explanendum (in this case, of the rationality of science 
itself). Thus if we could, unlike the conceptual analyst, specify 
or identify what our theories of scientific method or rationality 
are to be about independently of these theories themselves then it 
becomes possible to both pursue the 'initial' strategy and yet 
avoid the 'transcendental' one - for in so far as we are able to 
provide euch an independent specification it then becomes possible 
to make sense of the idea that differing such theories can be 
alternatives or competing ones (since they will compete as competing 
attempts to explain or systematise our independently specified 
'referent'); and moreover, it also becomes possible to make sense 
of the idea that some of these theories can be 'correct' while 
others are 'incorrect'. 
It is, I suggest, in precisely this context that what might be 
called the naturalistic approach to methodology seems appealing. 
According to the naturalistic methodologiet,, theoriee of scientific 
method or rationality are to be thought of as empirical theories, 
and their object is to describe and systematise the actual 
methodological practices of scientists. Now since these practices 
can be thought of as existing independently of our theories of 
them, it appears to immediately follow that the naturalistic 
approach to methodology can avoid the 'transcendental' strategy. 
More particularly the naturalistic methodologist, unlike the 
conceptual analyst or explicationiet, has available to him a means 
for critically evaluating, or discriminating between, competing 
theories of scientific method or rationality. That is, he can employ 
what I shall call the teat of congruence - he can try to see 
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whether or not some proposed theory of scientific method or 
rationality is actually congruent with, or consistent with, the 
actual practices of scientists. In so far as it is notit must, 
from the naturalistic methodologist'a viewpoint, be an 'incorrect' 
theory of scientific method or rationality. Thus the naturalistic 
approach to methodology, by treating theories of scientific method 
or rationality as empirical theories, appears to offer a means for 
escaping from the 'tranedendental' strategy - for since the 'object' 
(or 'referent') of euch theories has now been apparently specified 
independently of them, it becomes possible both to see differing 
such theories as alternatives or competitors, as competing 
attempts to describe and systematise the same 'referent', and also 
to see how we could go about attempting to evaluate critically euch 
competing theories. 
It is, however, important to realise that while the naturalistic 
approach does, on the surface, appear to offer a means for avoiding 
the 'transcendental' strategy, it is of necessity whole-heartedly 
äommitted to a version of the 'initial' strategy - for if the 
acceptability or otherwise of a theory of scientific method or 
rationality is to be ascertained by use of the naturalistic 
methodologist's test of congruence, it must immediately follow that 
science - as she is practiced - is indeed rational. Indeed, unless 
this is already presupposed the naturalistic methodologist's test 
of congruence makes no sense whatsoever. Thus, by employing the 
test of congruence as a means for avoiding the 'transcendental' 
strategy the naturalistic methodologist firmly commits himself to 
the 'initial? strategy; that is, to the refusal to conolude from 
the failures (or 'incorrectness') of any set of theories of 
scientific rationality to the irrationality of science itself (as 
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practiced). We thus reach the following result: while the 
naturalistic methodologist appears to offer us a means for avoiding 
the 'transcendental' strategy he does so in such a way as to neces- 
sitate his adoption of the 'initial' strategy. 
Now this result is, I think, rather interesting in the following 
senses while it may have been surprising to see a rationally- 
inclined philosopher of science, like Carnap, adopting an anti- 
rational 'transoendental' strategy, it must be even more surprising 
to find naturalistically-inclined philosophers of science, who are 
widely regarded as 'irrationalists', nevertheless adopting the 
'initial' strategy, and thus being in effect committed not to the 
irrationality of science but rather to its rationality. A case in 
point here is Thomas Kuhn, whose classic book The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions was widely condemned as giving a picture of 
science as an irrational enterprise, one in which changes of 
theoretical viewpoint (or 'paradigms') were assimilated to a kind 
of religious conversion. Imre Lakatos summed up this interpretation 
of Kuhn's view as follows: 
For Kuhn scientific change - from one 'paradigm' to 
another - is a mystical conversion which is not and 
cannot be governed by rules of reason and which falls 
totally within the realm of the (social) psychology 
of discovery. Scientific change is kind of religious 
change. (Lakatos (1970), P. 93) 
How extraordinary then to see Kuhn insist, in his comments on a 
later paper of Lakatos' (Lakatos (1972)), that 
I do not for a moment believe that science is an in- 
trinsically irrational enterprise. What I have perhaps 
not made sufficiently clear, however, is that I take 
that assertion not as a matter of fact, but rather 
of principle. Scientific behaviour, taken as a whole, 
is the beet example we have of rationality. Our view 
of what it is to be rational depends in significant 
ways, though of course not exclusively, on what we take 
to be essential aspects of scientific behaviour. 
(Kuhn (1972), pp. 143-4) 
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And Kuhn concludes with the suggestion that no amount of empirical 
inquiry could even shake his conviction that science is rational, 
for 
if history or any other empirical discipline leads us 
to believe that the development of science depends 
essentially on behaviour that we have previously 
thought to be irrational, then we should conclude 
not that science is irrational but that our notion of 
rationality needs adjustment here and there. 
(Kuhn (1972), p. 144) 
We confront here, I suggest, a quite remarkable situation. 
Aside from Feyerabend (see, for example, his (197M, no single 
oontemporery philosopher of science has been taken to produce 
arguments which challenge the traditional theories of scientific 
rationality half as much as has Kuhn. Yet like the probabilistic 
induotiviste Kuhn himself refuses even 'for a moment' to consider 
that perhaps science may not be rational. 
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On the contrary, he 
appears to be suggesting that we should actually define rationality 
in terms of science, so that the thesis of science's rationality 
becomes an impregnable one, or a matter of 'principle'. Moreover, 
Kuhn seems to be recommending that we adhere to something like the 
test of congruence, in that whenever we discover a clash between 
our current theory of rationality and our current empirical 
knowledge of science's past or present practice, a clash which 
would lead us to declAre that practice as irrational, then we 
should resolve the problem by adjusting our theory of rationality 
rather than by adjusting our scientific practice. Such a rule will, 
of course, if consistently employed, make it relatively cheap for 
us to buy science's rationality, but the goods thus purchased may 
become progressively lees valuable. 
The fact that even Kuhn, one of the chief contemporary critics 
of traditional philosophies of science, nevertheless continues to 
s-Z. - 
adhere to the 'initial' strategy, and thus refuses to countenance 
the possibility that science may fail to be rational is, I euMest, 
highly instructive. For it shows how science, as an historically 
developed cultural enterprise, has virtually kidnapped the mantle 
of rationality - so much so that the naturalistic methodologist's 
teat of congruence seems almost a matter of course. Such an 
attitude - that of taking actual science as the testing ground for 
theories of rationality - is by no means restricted to Kuhn, in 
that some of his erstwhile critics, like Lakatos, seem equally 
infected by it (see Lakatos (1972)). Yet it is crucial to 
realise that this attitude has been, and could only have been, a 
comparatively recent development - for at the birth of modern 
science, in the so-called 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth 
century, philosophers could not possibly have adopted euch an 
attitude, for there was as yet no unoontrovereially recognisable 
'actual science' against which to teat their theories of rational 
method. Thus, for example, Bacon and Descartes would never have 
dreamed of seeking to tailor their theories of rational method to 
the then current Scholastic practices of the Aristotelians. Quite 
the contrary, they criticised these practices, and in particular 
sought to criticise the then current, unsatisfactory, state of 
knowledge as being itself the resultant of the application of 
these incorrect methods of investigation. Moreover, Bacon and 
Descartes hoped actually to contribute to the development of 
genuine scientific knowledge by articulating effective theories of 
rational method, effective theories of how we can search for that 
knowledge of nature which, they were convinced, had so far eluded 
ue. In other words, in the context of the attempt to develop 
science - to get it started - philosophers of knowledge could not 
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Possibly find refuge in that naturalistic version of the 'initial' 
strategy which seeks to test theories of rational method by a post 
hoc comparison with actual scientific practice. For such a 
strategy clearly takes the rationality of actual scientific 
practice ae a given; and in the context of the attempt to get 
science going no euch given can, it would be claimed, be found. 
A second important point emerges at this juncture - for in so 
far as one holds that theories of rational method are to be tested 
via their congruence (or lack of it) with actual scientific 
practice, one ha® come to see the task of such theories as merely 
that of articulating, and thus making explicit, the previously 
implicitly followed rules of actual scientific conduct. But in 
that case one debars oneself from trying to explain in any manner 
Whatsoever the apparent, putative, success of science in reaching 
a knowledge of nature on the basis of its adoption of the most 
effective rational methods for seeking a knowledge of nature - for 
any euch explenationtould now have to be circular. That is, since 
we are using congruence with actual scientific practice as the 
test of our theories of rational method, we cannot now turn around 
and explain whatever success science may have achieved as having 
been the result of the application of independently ascertainable 
rational methods. To put this point another way, Bacon and 
Descartes hoped that by first identifying the best, most effective, 
rational methods for obtaining a knowledge of nature, and then 
consciously (and conscientiously) applying these methods, we could 
come to obtain a genuine knowledge of nature. But if our only 
means for identifying these methods is via an empirical investigation 
of actual scientific practice, then rather than the adoption of 
rational methods explaining the apparent success of science, the 
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'rationality' of any method would be 'explained' by its having been 
adopted by science. 
Given these considerations it follows that if we are to have 
any hope of giving a methodological explanation for the putative 
success of science, then we cannot proceed naturalistically. More- 
over, if we hope to provide a theory of rational method which could, 
in principle, have been of use in the establishment of science - 
in getting it off the ground - then we equally cannot proceed 
naturalistically. So given these hopes we seem to have to return 
to the tradition of Bacon and Descartes, wherein one attempts to 
investigate - independently of actual scientific practice - the 
questions of rational method, in the hope of identifying such 
methods without recourse to any empirical investigation of actual 
science. If euch an enterprise can be successful then not only 
does it offer the possibility of achieving the above two hopes, 
it would also ensure that the theories which emerged from it 
could potentially be made the basis for a reform, and hopefully 
an improvement, of actual scientific practice. Such a possibility 
is, quite clearly, ruled out by the empiricist or naturalistic 
approach for any theory of method which could be made the basis of 
a reform of scientific practice would ipso facto have to be 
incongruent with at least some aspects of current scientific 
practice and thus, for the naturalistic methodologist, unacceptable 
as a theory of rational method. In other words, if we want the 
theory of rational method to be able to fulfill the further 
traditional role of providing normative stand-points from which to 
criticise, reform, and improve current science then we shall have 
to find some way to investigate the questions of rational scientific 
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method independently of current scientific practice. 
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It is, perhaps, precisely here that the proponents of the 
empirical or naturalistic approach to the theory of scientific 
method may find a difficulty: for if one hopes to investigate the 
theory of rational scientific method, or the theory of rational 
inquiry, independently of science's current methodological practices, 
then what is one's investigation going to be about? Given our 
earlier strictures on conceptual analysis, we can here rule out 
at least one possible answer - namely, that our theories of 
rational method will be about 'the concept of scientific method', 
in that they will attempt to explicate this 'concept'. But this 
result simply seems to make the naturalistic methodologist's 
challenge that much more worrying - for if our theories of rational 
scientific method are neither about science's actual methodological 
practices nor about the idealised 'concept' of scientific method 
then, to repeat, what are they about? Later in this thesis I 
shall propose an answer to this question. To anticipate it here 
briefly, and as controversially as possible, I shall propose that 
theories (in general) are not to be understood as being about any- 
thi , in that sense of 'about' in which a theory is about that 
to which it refers. That is, I will claim that theories - if they 
are the product of rational inquiry - are to be understood neither 
as being about the facts which they explain, nor as being about the 
'entities' to which they appear to refer, nor as being about 
'concepts' which are assumed to exist independently of them and 
which they aim to 'analyse' or 'explicate'. Rather theories are 
to be understood as aiming to offer solutions to problems (and 
thus, in one sense of 'about', are about these problems, although 
they do not refer to them). Thus, I shall claim, the theory of 
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scientific method, or of rational inquiry, has as its aim the 
attempt to solve the fundamental problem of rational methodology - 
the old Platonic problem of the Mono. 
At this point, however, let us return to the naturalistic 
methodologist's worry as to what the theory of scientific method 
will be about if it does not aim to investigate, and describe, 
the actual methodological practices of scientists. In this context 
we should, I suggest, note two important facts. First, the notion 
of 'about-ness' which the naturalistic methodologist needs in 
order to express his worry is not at all unproblematio. For example, 
what is the claim that all swans are white about? One's immediate 
intuition might be to answer: swans. But this wontt do, since 'all 
swans are white' is logically equivalent to 'all non-white things 
are non-swans' which, by the same immediate intuition, is not 
about swans at a11.10 Moreover, what, for example, are false 
theories about? - like the phlogiston theory. If one's immediate 
intuition is to answer 'phlogiston', then one admits that theories 
can be about that which does not exist. But then there is no 
objection to investigating the theory of rational scientific method 
independently of actual scientific practice on the grounds that 
in so doing one's theory would not necessarily be about anything 
which actually exists. On the other hand, if one's intuition 
is to reason from the non-existence of phlogiston to the conclusion 
that the phlogiston theory therefore can't be about phlogiston, then 
we are owed an explanation of what false theories can be about. In 
other words, the apparent difficulty which the naturalistic 
methodologist seeks to raise against those who desire to investigate 
the theory of rational scientific method independently of actual 
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scientific practice - namely, that it would then not be clear what 
euch an inquiry could be about - may be more the result of dif- 
ficultiee in understanding the notion of 'about-ness' than of any 
difficulties in the enterprise itself. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the empirical or naturalistic 
approach to the theory of scientific method is not itself without 
its own difficulties. Some of these emerge rather clearly if one 
carefully examines the above-cited passages from Kuhn. For example, 
Kuhn writes that 'scientific behaviour, taken as a whole, is the 
best example we have of rationality' (my emphasis). Now this seems 
to imply that some aspects of scientific behaviour may not be 
good examples of rationality. But which are these? In the absence 
of an independent theory of rational method - independent, that ie, 
of actual scientific practice or behaviour-- it is difficult to see 
how this question could be answered. Equally, Kuhn writes that 
'our view of what it is to be rational depends in significant ways 
9.. on what we take to be essential aspects of scientific 
behaviour' (again my emphasis). But which aspects of actual 
scientific practice or behaviour are essential, which inessential? 
Presumably the 'essential' aspects will be those which are crucial 
to the development of scientific knowledge; the 'inessential' ones 
those which are not. But then our view of 'essentiality' will 
depend, in considerable measure, on our view as to what sort of 
knowledge science aims at (for example, behaviour which may be 
'essential' if we aim in science at a realistic description of the 
world may be 'inessential' if our aim is merely to develop useful 
instruments of prediction). But given that there can be genuine 
disagreements about this matter, both among philosophers and among 
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scientists themselves, it is hard to see how any empirical 
investigation of actual scientific practice can settle the question 
of what we shall take to be the 'essential aspects of scientific 
behaviour'. 11 
This last point raises further difficulties - for an empirical 
or naturalistic approach to the theory of scientific method will 
only make sense if we assume, or presuppose, that actual scientific 
practice or behaviour is relatively monolithic and coherent. If 
it is not then employing the test of congruence will be totally 
devastating, since it will only succeed in eliminating as uneatie- 
factory every coherent theory of rational method. Moreover, if 
within science itself there are disagreements as to the correct 
normative theory of scientific method, and if such theories actually 
affect scientific practice, then an empirical inquiry into euch 
practice will not in the least help to settle these disagreements; 
on the contrary, it will merely help to expose them. But in that 
case the test of congruence becomes totally useless as a means for 
settling our normative methodological disagreements. Moreover, 
this difficulty is still fur her compounded by the fact that any 
empirical inquiry into scientific practice will already have to take 
as settled important philosophical or evaluative questions such as 
which cultural enterprises are to be called 'ecience' (for example, 
dove include Christian Science? ) and who deserves to be called 
s 'scientist' (for example, do we include Mary Baker Eddy? ). Thus 
an empirical or naturalistic approach to the theory of rational or 
scientific methods, rather than enabling us to criticise our 
normative theories of euch methods, will simply have to take some 
such theory for granted before it can get off the ground. But in 
that case the exclusive adoption of a naturalistic approach will 
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simply result in the insulation from criticism of euch presupposed 
normative theories - for one cannot employ the test of congruence 
in the critical evaluation of the very theories which are used in 
the determination of which actual practices, and whose actual 
practices, are to be included within it scope. 
To conclude this section: we have, on the one hand, the 
traditional normative approach in the philosophy of science, an 
approach which aims to investigate the questions of rational or 
scientific method independently of actual scientific practice, 
and which in consequence hopes to satisfy or achieve three main 
desiderata. Firstly, it hopes to'obtain a theory df rational 
method which could, in principle, have been of use in the estab- 
liehmnent of science, in getting it off the ground; secondly, it 
hopes to obtain a theory of rational method which could, in principle, 
help us to explain the apparent success of science in achieving 
a knowledge of nature; and thirdly, it hopes to obtain theories of 
rational method which can, in principle, function in the reform 
and improvement of actual scientific practice. On the other hand, 
we have the empirical or naturalistic tradition which aims to 
study actual scientific practice in order to determine which theory 
of rational or scientific method is the correct theory and which, 
ae we have seen, cannot satisfy any of the three desiderata of 
the normative tradition. Moreover, I have argued that the natural- 
istic tradition itself has a number of genuine difficulties in that 
(a) normative disagreements can be expected to filter into scientific 
practice, so that an empirical study of such practice will not 
enable us to settle them; and (b) the naturalistic viewpoint cannot 
be pursued autonomously or independently of some (often implicit) 
normative viewpoint. Thus, the adoption of a naturalistic approach 
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to the exclusion of the normative approach will simply have the 
effect of removing our normative disagreements as to the theory of 
rational or scientific method from the arena of critical discussion. 
It will not, however, make them disappear. 
Nevertheless, the naturalistic methodologist does lay down 
a challenge to the normative tradition - for if our theories of 
rational or scientific method are to be conceived as being 
independent of actual scientific practice, then what are these 
theories about? More particularly, if we are unable to specify 
anything independent of them of which they can be about, how are 
we to avoid the 'transcendental' strategy? - wherein our normative 
methodological disagreements become equally unarguable, since 
every theory of rational scientific method becomes 'self-verifying' 
or 'self-referring'. Thus the naturalistic methodologist is 
tempted to see the normative approach as lacking a distinct initial 
subject-matter, and thus as lacking any firm constraints on the 
acceptability or otherwise of its theories which euch a subject- 
matter would provide. I have already tried to suggest that this 
criticism may be lese than compelling in that alternative, non- 
subject-matter (or 'non-referential') sources of constraint may be 
available. 
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But until this suggestion can be further fleshed out 
the naturalistic methodologist's challenge has to be acknowledged 
and, if possible, met. 
1.4; The Two Strategies and the Naturalistic Approach 
At the cost of some repetition it will, I believe, be valuable 
to try to tie together the various strands of argument so-far 
presented in this chapter. We began by seeing the way in which 
many philosophers, although willing to acknowledge the difficulties 
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which confront a variety of theories of rational scientific 
method, are nevertheless unwilling to conclude to the non-exis- 
tence of euch methods, or to the irrationality of science itself. 
This unwillingness (which we described as the 'initial strategy'), 
although not illogical, is nevertheless fraught with dangers - 
the most serious of which is the temptation to move from the 
'initial' strategy to the 'transcendental' one, wherein one's 
unwillingness to conclude to the non-existence of rational 
scientific methods becomes in addition a refusal tc conclude to the 
incorrectness of one's own theory of such methods. This shift is, 
I suggested, facilitated by two factors: firstly, the difficulty 
of identifying the rationality of science as an ezplanandum, or of 
giving descriptive content to the phrase 'the rationality of science 
itself', in the absence of any theory of rational scientific 
method. Secondly, it is facilitated by the fact that many phil- 
osophers (in agreement with Carnap) have tended to see the aim of 
philosophy as that of the explication or analysis of 'concepts'. 
But since, as we argued, concepts without assertions are empty, it 
then becomes a virtual necessity to identify one's concept of 
the rationality of science (and so one's explicatum) with whatever 
one proposes to eia about it (and thus with one's own theory, or 
explication, of it). Given both these factors, it then appears 
to follow that science can only be rational if one's own theory is 
correct (which ought to come as no surprise since the rationality 
of science has been identified in terms of one's own theory). So 
if, in line with the 'initial' strategy, one then insists that 
science in rational, one immediately includes (by a typical 
'traneobndental' argument) that one's own theory of rational method 
must be correct (or, at least, 'essentially correct'). Such a 
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'transcendental' strategy undoubtedly brings a warm glow to those 
who practice it, but unfortunately it can bring an equally warm 
glow to anyone who disagrees with them - for as already pointed out, 
any theory of rational scientific method, or of the rationality of 
science, can be 'shown' to be 'correct' by its adoption. 
If then we hope to be able to make rational discrisinations 
between competing alternative, theories of rational scientific 
method - indeed if we even hope to make sense of the notion of 
competing theories of rational scientific method at all - then we 
must renounce the 'transcendental' strategy (and also the view of 
philosophy as 'conceptual analysis' which necessitates it). But 
this in itself is not enough, for unless we can find some way of 
specifying the issue of the rationality of science, or the questions 
of rational scientific method, independently of our theories of 
them we shall have no oth®r option but to embrace the 'trane- 
oendental' strategy. In the next chapter we will begin to explore 
in more detail how euch an independent specification might be 
realised. For the moment, however, let us assume it can be realised. 
It world then become an open question as to whether or not we can 
achieve an adequate, or defensible, theory of rational scientific 
method. If we cannot then, I suggest, we ought to conclude that 
there is no such animal as the rationality of science (whose 
existence thus becomes an open question as well). However, this is 
not to say that the 'initial' strategy can itself ever be refuted 
- for no matter how inadequate our current theories of rational 
scientific method may be, their inadequacies do not entail that we 
cannot find an adequate theory; they only entail that we have not 
found one yet. Thus the 'initial' stratgey always remains open, and 
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those who desire to pursue it are free to do so. 
It in, however, important to realise that the 'initial' 
strategy can itself be employed in two very different ways. On 
the one hand, it can be employed as a merely defensive manoeuvre, 
Whereby one simply refuses to conclude to the non-existence of 
rational eoientificmethode from the failures of all theories of 
such methods. On the other hand, it can be employed as an impetus 
to philosophical research, wherein one tries to take advantage of 
the 'logical space' left open by it in order to articulate and 
develop new, hopefully adequate, theories of rational scientific 
method. As a merely defensive manoeuvre the 'initial' strategy 
leads to its own form of empty dogmatism, whereby the issue of the 
rationality of science becomes unarguable simply because one in 
unwilling to say anything about it. (This is in contrast to the 
'transcendental' strategy wherein one is willing to say something 
about it, but where one then identifies 'it' with whatever one 
Manta to say! ) So if the employment of the 'initial' strategy is 
to lead to anything interesting then we must not employ it as a 
merely defensive manoeuvre, but must rather capitalise on the 
'logical space' it provides by trying to develop new theories of 
method whenever our present ones are shown to be inadequate. 
We time reach the following result: the 'initial' strategy, has 
two rather different faces. The first of these is negative or 
defensive, while the second is positive or forward-looking. If 
we exclusively adopt the negative face then the inadequacies of our 
present theories of reationality, or of rational scientific methods, 
will simply lead u8 to keep quiet - so that the issue of the 
rationality of science becomes unarguable because we refuse to say 
anything about which we could argue. But in this case we treat 
the 'initial' strategy not as providing a temporary breathing apace, 
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but rather as providing a permanent home. On the other hand, if 
we also adopt the positive face then we can at least hope that we 
shall, in due course, hit upon an adequate or defensible theory 
of rational scientific method. But if we are lucky enough to do 
this, then we need no longer rely upon the 'initial' strategy at 
all, for the rationality of science will then be secured not 
negatively - by simply refusing to relinquish the (increasingly 
empty) assumption that science in rational - but rather positively 
- in so far, that is, as science actually adheres to a defensible 
set of rational methods. And it is in this latter, positive, 
context that it becomes crucial to avoid the 'transcendental' 
strategy - for by its means we will close down the possibility of 
critically discussing the very theories of rational scientific 
method which might emerge from the pursuit of the positive face of 
the 'initial' strategy. 
It is, I suggest, precisely because both the merely negative 
face of the 'initial' strategy and the 'transcendental' strategy 
are so objectionable that the naturalistic approach to methodology 
might be thought appealing. For this approach appears to promise 
a way of adopting the positive face of the 'initial' strategy 
without adopting the 'transcendental' one. For if we are natural- 
iatic methodologiata then we hold that we can indeed critically 
discuss proposed theories of rational scientific method, or proposed 
theories of scientific rationality, since we can test them by their 
congruence (or lack of it) with actual scientific practice or 
behaviour. Three, by insisting that theories of rational scientific 
method, or of scientific rationality, are to be taken as being 
'about' an independent 'subject-matter' (i. e. the practices of 
scientists) we appear to provide ourselves with a 
MIe for 
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avoiding the 'transcendental' strategy. On the other hand, 
whenever we find our current theories of rational eoientific 
method to be inadequate (by the teat of congruence), we can try to 
develop new theories of method which hopefully are adequate (by 
the same teat). Thus the naturalistic approach appears to provide 
us with a way of combining the positive face of the 'initial' 
strategy with a renunoiation of the 'transcendental' one. 
This appearance is, I have, in effect, argued, largely 
illusory. In the first place, since the test of any theory of 
rational scientific method is to be its congruence with actual 
scientific practice it immediately follows that the naturalistic 
approach must take the rationality of science as practiced as a 
given. But this entails that the question of whether or not 
actual science (as practiced) is rational becomes unarguable. 
Time the naturalistic approach in fact secures the rationality of 
science negatively - since the rationality of science as practiced 
is secured by the fact that any theory of rationality inconsistent 
with that practice is declared to be ipso facto inadequate. Thus, 
the naturalistic approach is unable to see the issue of the 
rationality of science as a genuinely open question, one which is 
to be decided by first seeing whether or not we can articulate a 
defensible theory of rational method, and only then seeing whether 
or not science as practiced actually meets up to the demands of 
this theory. In other words, the naturalistic approach in fact 
incorporates merely the negative face of the 'initial' strategy - 
since given its method for discriminating between competing 
theories of rational scientific method we must already 'know, in the 
absence of any adequate theory of rational scientific method, that 
science (as practiced) is rational. But in that case we don't need 
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an adequate theory of rational scientific method in order to be 
able to 'know' that science as practiced is rational, and so the 
negative aspect of the 'initial' strategy suffices. To put this 
point another way, it is the naturalistic methodologist's test 
of theories of rational scientific method which ensures that 
science as practiced is rational; so he does not need any theories 
of r0ional method to do this job for him. 
Secondly, we argued (in effect) that the naturalistic approach 
in and of itself cannot avoid the 'transcendental' strategy. For 
this approsch will have to presuppose, before it can begin to 
employ its test or congruence, some independent theory of science 
- since it will need to identify whose practices and, more impor- 
tartly, which aspects of whose practices, are to be taken as 
providing the material for its test of congruence. But in that 
case the naturalistic approach needs to rely upon an independently 
given normative theory of scientific rationality, and it itself 
will be unable to employ its test of congruence to teat this 
theory. In other words this theory will, within the naturalistic 
approach, take on the characteristics of a 'transcendental' theory 
of rationality - since we will have to assume it before we can 
test (by congruence) any theory of rationality. Thus the naturalistic 
approach only appears to give us a handle for critically discussing 
our normative theories of rational scientific method; whereas in 
reality it will have to remove from the area of critical discussion 
at least one euch theory. So if we wish to avoid adopting the 
'transcendental' strategy with regard to every theory of rational 
method, then we must find some method for discriminating between 




Thirdly, we also noted that the naturalistic approach must 
not only take the rationality of science as practiced as given, 
it must also presuppose that that practice is relatively monolithic 
and coherent - for if it isn't, then our test of congruence will 
not enable us to discriaLnate between alternative theories of 
method each of whose sets of rules is actualised in scientifio 
practice. In fact, in euch a cane a severe application of the 
test of congruence will simply lead us to reject every coherent 
theory of rational scientific method (eine no euöh theory oonld 
be o ng . nt with the whole of scientific practice). Thus, if 
scientific practice is not relatively monolithic and coherent 
then the naturalistic approach will be unable to achieve its aim 
- i. e., it will not be able to use its test of congruence to 
discriminate between alternative coherent theories of scientific 
rationality (since it will lead to the rejection of all such 
theories). 
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On the other hand, if this practice is relatively 
monolithic and coherent, then it is difficult to see why we need a 
naturalistic methodology at all - since, at least from the point 
of view of science, there will then be no methodological disa- 
greemente which are required to be settled by its test of congruence. 
Thus the naturalistic approach to methodology is, if needed, 
useless; while if it is useful it isn't needed. Of course, this 
in not to say that a naturalistic approach may not be useful in 
so far as it enables us to detect actual methodological disagree- 
ments within science, but the usefulness of this can only be 
appreciated from the point of view of the normative approach - for 
it in only in this approach that we hope to be able to settle issues 
of rational scientific method independently of scientific practice, 
so as to then be able to guide, reform, or modify that practice. 
4% 
"5: Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter: if we want to avoid turning the 
claim that science is rational into an empty one, then we must be 
trilling to articulate theories of rational scientific method. 
But this means that we must renounce the merely negative face of 
the 'initial' strategy. Having done so, we shall then quite 
naturally want to be able to rationally discriminate between the 
alternative theories of rational scientific method-which may as a 
reenlt be forthcoming. But this means having to renounce the 
'transcendental' strategy. Having done both, the naturalistic 
approach to methodology might then appear to beckon - but as we 
have seen euch an approach is, in fact, unable to offer us a 
satisfactory method for discriminating between genuinely rival 
theories of rational scientific method, and this for three 
reasons. Firstly, euch an approach in fact constitutes a retreat 
back to the merely negative face of the 'initial' strategy, since 
it secures the rationality of science (as practiced) not via its 
meeting up to the demands of an adequate theory of rational scientific 
method but rather merely through its proposed test for such a 
theory. Secondly, euch an approach also constitutes a retreat back 
to the 'transcendental' strategy, since some theory of rational 
scientifio method must be employed in order to determine whose 
practices and, more importantly, which aspects of whose practices, 
are to be taken as supplying the material for its test of congruence. 
But in that case, this 'background theory' of rational scientific 
method cannot be tested by congruence, and so becomes an 
uncriticiSable 'transcendental. ' theory. Thirdly, the naturalistic 
approach is useless precisely when it is most needed - that is, 
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when there are genuine methodological disputes within science. 
If, then, we want our methodological inquiries to play a role 
in helping to guide science's methodological practices; and if we 
hope, via euch inquiry, to be able to secure the rationality of 
science (as practiced or, more plausibly, as it will be practiced) 
via its meeting the demands of an independently adequate theory of 
rational scientific method; then we must renounce the naturalistic 
approach to methodology in favour of the normative approach. But 
euch a renunciation will cut no ice unless the normative approach 
can itself avoid the 'transcendental' strategy (that it can avoid 
the merely negative face of the 'initial' strategy is, I think, 
unproblematic). For if the normative approach cannot do this then 
each normative theory of rational scientific method will, in 
effect, become an uncriticiSable 'self-fulfilling' one, so that we 
Will then have no hope of making any progress in our normative 
methodological inquiries. And so the following problem beckons: 
how, within the normative approach, can we secure the avoidance of 
the 'transcendental' strategy? In the next chapter we shall begin 
to make some progress towards an answer to this question. 
r , 
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CHAPTER 1: Footnotes 
1. Quine raises this question in the context of his discussion of 
deviant logics - see his The Philosophy of Logic 
(Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), chapter 6, pp. 80-94 (the quotation is 
from p. 81) For criticism of Quine's views on this issue, see 
Susan Haack, Deviant Logic (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1974); for extended 
criticism of Haacke book see my 'From Logic to Logics (and Back 
Again)', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, )I 
(March, 1982), PP - 77-94. 
2. In his lectures Popper used to tell the anecdote that Frege, upon 
hearing of Russell's discovery of paradoxes in his own and 
Russell's theories, exclaimed 'Die Arithmetik ist in's Schwanken 
geraten! ' (roughly, 'Arithmetic has been set spinning! ). Popper has 
christened this remark 'Frege's mistake' - according to him 
it was Frege's theory of arithmetic which was set spinning, not 
arithmetic itself. W. W. Bartley III tells this story in his 
'Rationality Versus the Theory of Rationality' in Mario Bunge (ed. ), 
The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (Glencoe, N. Y.: 
The Free Press, 1964)9 PP. 3-31. 
3. For example, Bartley, op. cit., appears to take this kind of tack 
when he writes: 'The blame for continued failure by rationalists 
to answer skeptical and fideistic arguments should, in fact, be 
placed on the inadequacy and primitive character of our theories 
of rationality ... rather than on our rationality or reasoning 
capacity itself' (p. 9). In fairness, however, Bartley does not 
simply rest content with this manoeuvre, but rather tries to develop 
a new theory of rationality - one in line with Popper's falsifi- 
cationist philosophy of science. See also in this connection 
Bartley's The Retreat to Commitment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc., 
1962), an well as Section 1.4. 
L. See Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's classic paper 'Studies in the 
Logic of Explanation'. Philosophy of Science, j (1948), pp. 135-75; 
reprinted in Hempel's Aspects of Scientific Explanation 
(New York: 
The Free Press, 1965), pp. 275-90. Hempel and Oppenheim lay down, 
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as a material requirement on explanation, that 'the sentences 
constituting the explanane must be true' (p. 248 of the reprint). 
Popper, in line with his falsifioationist viewpoint, requires 
that the explanane 'ought to be true, although it will not, in 
general, be known to be true; in any case, it must not be known to 
be false even after the most critical examination' (from Popper's 
'The Aim of Science', Ratio, 1 (1957) , pp. 24-35; reprinted in 
Objective Knowledge, op. cit. The quotation is at p. 192 of the 
reprint). The point here is that if one incorporates into one's 
definition of explanation the demand that an explanation start from 
true premisses, then explanations starting from false premisses are 
not explanations at all. For my part, I prefer to say that the 
notion of a true or correct explanation does not contain a 
redundancy, so that false or incorrect explanations are possible - 
although we will of course, prefer explanations starting from true 
premieees to those starting from false ones. For a similar point 
see Alan Musgrave's 'Constructive Empiricism versus Scientific 
Realism', Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (July, 1982), pp. 262-71; 
see esp. p. 267. 
Popper has noted the 'transcendental turn' on the part of many of 
the advocates of probabilistic inductive logic in appendices 
*vii and -viii of The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: 
Hutchison, 1959); see also his contribution to the Carnap Schilpp 
volume 'The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics' reprinted 
in his Conjectures and Refutations (London: RKP, 1963). Imre 
Lakatos has brilliantly traced the historical development of 
probabilistic inductive logic, and especially of Carnap's viewpoint, 
in his 'Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic' in I. Lakatos (ed. ), 
The Problem of Inductive Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing 
Co., 1968), pp. 315-417. It should, perhaps, be said here that 
Carnap'e 'transcendental' response to the problem of the zero 
probability of universal hypotheses was to relinquish the idea 
that such hypotheses can be probabilified. But he nevertheless 
continued to identify learning from experience with raising 
probability values, and in consequence proposed the so-called 
'qualified instance confirmation' (q. i. c. ) wherein not universal 
hypotheses themselves, but singular hypotheses stating their future 
- 
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instances, could have their probability raised by empirical 
evidence. In Carnap'a theory of q. i. c., however, there remains a 
free parameter 
A which, if we set it to zero, results in the 
impossibility of raising even the probability of singular hypotheses 
as to future instances. Carnap'a only argument for not setting A 
to zero in that if we did we could not learn from experience! 
For Carnap'a turn away from the attempt to probability universal 
hypotheses, see his Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 570 ff. 
6. I should point out here that in the context of this thesis the 
terms 'rational', 'rationalism', 'rationally inclined' etc. are 
not to be taken as denoting classical Rationalism in the sense of 
Cartesianism - that is, the view that knowledge ultimately has 
its foundation in our God-given Reason. The proponents of 
probabilistic inductive logic are, of course, empiricists in the 
traditional sense, holding that ultimately knowledge has its 
foundation in experience. Nevertheless, euch philosophers are 
rationalists in that they believe in the existence of rational 
(inductive) methods for discriminating serious, credible claims 
about the world from non-serious, worthless ones. Thus from the 
viewpoint adopted here both traditional Rationalists and traditional 
empiricists are 'rationaliste'; and I shall in general refer to the 
Cartesian doctrine as 'intellectualism' in order to avoid confusion. 
7. In this context it is worth pointing out that Carnap, in his 
writings, also explicitly adopts what I have previously labelled as 
the 'initial' strategy - i. e., that of refusing to conclude from 
the failure of any set of theories of scientific rationality to the 
non-existence of scientific rationality itself. Only in Carnap's 
case this strategy is couched in terms of his view of philosophy 
as offering 'explications', so that it becomes the refusal to 
conclude from the failure of any set of proposed explications to the 
non-existence of the 'corresponding' explicandum. Thus, Carnap 
writes, 'It would be . ... unjustified to reject the concept of 
probability, as an explicandum merely because the attempts so far 
made at an explication are not yet quite satisfactory' and 'there 
is no reason for doubting that an adequate explication will be 
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cbveloped in time through further attempts'. The quotations are 
from pages 444 and 145 of Carnap's 'The Two Concepts of Probability', 
in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds. ), Readings in the Philosophy of 
Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953), pp. 438-455. 
8. Is it worth noting here that the strategy apparently advocated by 
Kuhn in his (1972) is in some ways rather different from that 
adopted by probabilistic inductive logicians - for whereas the 
latter reason from the rationality of science itself to the essential 
correctness of their own theory of rational method, Kuhn appears 
to reason from the rationality of science as practiced to the 
incorrectness of any theory of rational method which is in 
conflict with actual scientific practice. Thus two differences 
emerge: first, Kuhn does not use his strategy 'transcendentally', 
to defend any specific theory of scientific method, whereas the 
probabilistic inductive logicians do. Second, the probabilistic 
inductive logicians do not identify 'science itself' with 'science 
as practiced' - they identify it with the results of the rational 
method for obtaining a knowledge of nature ( which they then 
identify with their own theory of rational method) - whereas Kuhn 
does appear to identify 'science itself' with science as practiced. 
This latter difference reflects an ambiguity in the term 'science', 
which may be taken either to denote (e. g. ) a) that largely Western 
cultural enterprise which has historically developed from the work 
of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler or b) that knowledge which results 
from the application of effective, motional, methods for 
investigating nature. The first notion of science is that of the 
rather empirical cultural historian (like Kuhn) while the second is 
that of the rather more 'idealistic' philosopher. It is, given this, 
perfectly possible that what the cultural historian would denote 
as #science' the philosopher would declare as 'non-scientific'; 
and equally possible that what the cultural historian would 
declare as 'non-science' the philosopher would adjudge 'scientific'. 
9. Paul Feyerabend has noted that the tradition stemming from Bacon 
and Descartes, which sees the philosopher of science as a potential 
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refs r of scientific practice, was still alive earlier in this 
century (Popper and Bridgman are modern examples). He writes: 
'In about 1925 philosophers of science were bold enough to stick 
to their theses even in those cases where they were inconsistent 
with actual science. They meant to be reformers of science, and 
not imitators ... In the meantime they have become rather tame 
(or beat) and are much more prepared to change their ideas in 
accordance with the latest discoveries of the historians, or the 
latest fashion of the contemporary scientific enterprise. This is 
very regrettable, indeed, for it considerably decreases the number 
of rational critics of the scientific enterprise. And it also 
seems to give unwarranted support to the Hegelian thesis (which is 
now implicitly held by many historians and philosophers of science) 
that what exists has a 'logic' of its own and is for that very 
reason reasonable. ' See Paul Feyerabend, 'How to Be a Good 
Empiricist', reprinted in P. H. Nidditch (ed. ), The Philosophy of 
Science (London: O. U. P., 1968), pp. 12-39 (the quotation is from 
p. 24). 
10. The argument here does, of course, rest upon the further 'intuition' 
that if two assertions are logically equivalent then they are 
'about' the same thing. If this assumption is granted then, as 
far as I can see, something like Frege's theory of the reference 
of declarative sentences has to be accepted. That is, sentences 
are 'about' their truth-value. But this, again as far as I can 
see, is just a rather awkward way of saying that declarative 
sentences are not 'about' anything - they are simply true or false. 
11. It is perhaps worth remarking here that Kuhn himself appears to 
acknowledge, in the passage cited in the text, that there is a role 
for a theory of rational method which is independent of any 
empirical investigation of actual scientific practice - for Kuhn 
remarks that 'our view of what it is to be rational depends in 
significant ways, though of course not exclusively, on what we 
take to be essential aspects of scientific behaviour' (my emphasis). 
But if our view of what it is to be rational does not depend 
exclusively on scientific behaviour then it must be possible to 
have theories of rationality which are independent of such 
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behaviour, and which can time function as normative stand-points 
from which both to evaluate it and to judge which aspects of it 
are 'essential' and th ich 'inessential'. 
12. One of the reasons for the less than compelling nature of the 
naturalistic methodologist's objection is that no department of 
knowledge has an initial subject-matter. The idea that each 
branch of knowledge starts with, or is constituted by, its own 
subject-matter is Aristotelian, and this idea is then coupled with 
the view that each branch of inquiry must therefore have its own 
methodology - namely, a methodology Baited to the nature of its 
subject-matter. The trouble with this view is that prior to 
inquiry we do not know what the nature of our 'subject matter' is, 
so that the general theory of inquiry (i. e., the general theory of 
method) must be independent of 'subject-matter' (or 'topic- 
neutral'). The basic difficulty with the idea that each science 
has its own subject-matter can be seen as soon as one asks, for 
example, whether the fact that the moon appears larger on the 
horizon than it does when overhead is part of the subject-matter 
of astronomy. It is impossible to see how, independently of inquiry 
(into, say, the causes of the appearance), one can say whether 
the fact belongs to the subject-matter of astronomy, or of optics, 
or as we now think, to the subject-matter of perceptual psychology 
('moon-illusion'). But this means that 'subject-matters' are the 
products of inquiry, not the starting-points for inquiry (as the 
Aristotelian doctrine has it). Thus it should not be surprising, 
or disconcerting, if the theory of rational method also has no 
initial 'subject-matter'. (Incidentally, in much contemporary 
philosophy of science the old Aristotelian idea of each science 
having its own 'subject-matter' survives in the doctrine that 
empirical facts came neatly pre-bundled in domains, no that it is 
clear - prior to theoretical inquiry - which types of theories 
ought to explain which 'domain of facts'. ) 
13. It should be noted in this context that few naturalistic method- 
ologieta ever do actually apply the test of congruence in a 
severe manner, perhaps because they realise that if they did then 
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the non monolithic character of actual scientific practice would 
lead to the rejection of all theories of method (considered 
naturalistically). Thus, for example, actual scientific practice 
includes the Lysenko affair; but who in their right mind would 
want to insist that an acceptable theory of scientific method be 
congruent with it? No wonder then that Kuhn includes the 
cavaet that 'our view of what it is to be rational depends in 
significant ways, though of course not exclusively, on what we 
take to be essential aspects of scientific behaviour' (Kuhn (1972), 
p. 144). But to admit this is to admit that there is a place for 
non-naturalistic methodological inquiries. 
Si 
Chapter 2: SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
As we saw in the last chapter (Section 1.3) the normative 
approach to methodology has traditionally had three inter-related 
aims or hopes. Firstly, it has hoped to contribute to the 
establishment of a genuine science via the independent discovery of 
effective methods of rational scientific inquiry (this was the 
hope of 17th century methodologiets euch as Bacon and Descartes). 
Soeondly, it has hoped to contribute to the progressive reforms of 
science's actual methodological practices via the independent 
critical discussion of normative methodological issues (this has 
been the hope of modern 'reformist' methodologiste such as Popper 
and Bridgman). Thirdly, it has hoped to explain the supposed 
success of science in attaining a knowledge of the world on the 
basis of its adoption of the beet (or of progressively better) 
methods of rational inquiry. As we saw, moreover, the naturalistic 
approach to methodology is unable to deliver on any of these three 
aims. The question I want to concentrate upon in this chapter is 
whether or not, or to what extent, the normative approach is able 
to deliver on its third traditional aim - that of explaining the 
supposed success of science on the basis of the effectiveness of 
its methods. In other words, I propose to discuss the vexing 
question of the relationship between theories of scientific 
method and the idea of scientific progress. Moreover, in doing so 
we shall begin to make some headway with the problem of specifying 
independent constraints on acceptable theories of rational 
scientific method. 
St 
2.1: The Problem of the Justification of a Method (or, 
The Generalised Problem of Induction) 
Let me begin with a brief preliminary. We may, I suggest, 
take it as analytic that the goal of scientific inquiry is to 
attain, or at least to improve, scientific knowledge. It 
immediately follows from this that in specifying a notion of 
'scientific knowledge' we are simultaneously specifying a goal 
of scientific inquiry. 
1 
For example, if we identify scientific 
knowledge with 'justified true beliefs regarding the laws of 
nature' then the goal of scientific inquiry is the production of 
justified true beliefs regarding the laws of nature. On the other 
hand, once we have specified a goal of scientific inquiry then we 
have also specified (indirectly) a notion of scientific success or 
scientific progress - for success will consist in achieving the 
goal of scientific inquiry, while progress will consist in getting 
closer to that goal. Time, in specifying a notion of 'scientific 
knowledge' we will simultaneously specify both a goal of scientific 
inquiry and a notion of scientific success or progress. 
Recall now that the normative approach has traditionally 
hoped to explain the supposed success of science in obtaining 
knowledge of the world - or, at the very least, in improving our 
knowledge of the world - as being the result of science's having 
adopted what can be independently ascertained as the best, most 
effective, methods of rational inquiry (or, at the very least, 
good effective ones). Since the effectiveness of these methods 
is assumed to be ascertainable independently of actual scientific 
practice, one is then able to argue that science ought to adopt 
these methods if it hopes to succeed (or, at the very least, if it 
hopes to make effective progress). Given all this, hv ever, one 
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appears to run into a serious difficulty - for either one specifies 
one's notion of scientific knowledge in terms of the application 
of rational scientific methods or one does not. If one takes the 
former path, then scientific knowledge simply becomes whatever 
emerges from the application of rational methods of scientific 
inquiry. But in that case these methods can, it would appear, no 
longer be independently ascertainable as being good effective ones 
(let alone as being the best, most effective, ones). The reason 
for this is simple: effective methods of rational scientific 
inquiry will, presumably, be those methods which enable us to 
attain scientific knowledge (or at least to attain the progress 
of euch knowledge); while the best, most effective, methods of 
rational scientific inquiry will be those methods which maximize 
the attainment of scientific knowledge (or, at least, maximize 
the attainment of the progress of such knowledge). But if our 
notion of 'scientific knowledge' has been specified as that which 
results from the application of rational scientific methods of 
inquiry' then there appears to be no independent way of identifying 
which euch methods are effective methods of inquiry. Or, to 
put this point another way, any methods of inquiry will appear to 
be 'effective' methods of inquiry - for any euch methods will be 
guaranteed to lead to the attainment of 'scientific knowledge'. 
Thus, if we define 'scientific success' as whatever 
emerges from the application of a method M, then the application 
of M is guaranteed to achieve 'scientific success'. But since, by 
the same procedure, we can guarantee the 'effectiveneset of ax 
method of inquiry the fact that we can so secure the 'effectiveness' 
of M can be no argument for preferring M to any other method of 
inquiry. 
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To thus adopt the alternative of specifying our notion of 
'scientific knowledge' (or the goal of scientific inquiry) in terms of 
the application of a method of inquiry is, in effect, to retreat 
back to the 'transcendental' strategy, wherein each theory of 
rational scientific inquiry becomes an uncriticisable 'self- 
fulfilling' one. Moreover, it is important to see that the 
procedure of specifying one's notion of 'scientific knowledge' 
in terms of the application of a set of methods of inquiry is, 
in fact, the very procedure adopted by those who advocate the so- 
called 'analytic justification of induction'. Such 'justifications' 
run along something like the following lines: it is rational to 
prefer the methods of inductive inference to any other method of 
'reasoning from experience' because this method yields probable 
conclusions, and it is always more rational to adopt probable 
conclusions than improbable ones. But how do we know that the 
methods of inductive inference yield probable conclusions? The 
'analytic' answer is that 'built into Cthe7 normal sense of the 
word "probable" is a commitment to the practice of induction' 
(Barker (1974), P. 59)" But in that case 'probable conclusion' 
just means 'reached by the methods of inductive inference', and so 
the claim that these methods yield probable conclusions simply 
becomes the tautology that the methods of inductive inference 
yield conclusions which are reached by the methods of inductive 
inference. How this triviality is supposed to provide a rationale 
for employing the methods of inductive inference, and more 
particularly for preferring euch methods to other, alternative, 
methods of 'reasoning from experience', is totally beyond me. 
2 
Given our decision to avoid the 'transcendental' strategy, and 
given the fact that the procedure of specifying our notion of 
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'scientific knowledge' in terms of the application of a method of 
inquiry leads to precisely euch a strategy (in that it leads to 
the 'self-fulfilling' character of any theory of method, since 
every euch theory will become 'effective' given it), it follows 
that we must renounce such a procedure. In other words, rather 
than specifying the notion of 'scientific knowledge' - or identifying 
the goal of scientific inquiry - in terms of the results of 
applying a not of methods, we will want to specify the notion of 
euch knowledge independently of method, in order to be able to use 
this specification to discriminate between proposed methods of 
inquiry. -But then we apparently confront a further difficulty: 
for if we hope to establish the claim that a proposed method of 
rational scientific inquiry is indeed an effective method of 
inquiry then we shall need to establish a connection between the 
application of the proposed method and the achievement of scientific 
knowledge. Since the notion of euch knowledge - or of the goal 
of scientific inquiry - has now been specified independently of 
the application of a method we shall, in other words, have to 
establish claims of the following form - (*) The application of 
method M in effective for attaining scientific knowledge I. Now 
a claim like (*) is, quite clearly, a synthetic claim - since ! 
has been specified independently of the application of any method. 
To begin with, let ne aeense that K has been specified as 'the 
truth'; then (*) becomes the claim that the application of method 
M in effective for attaining the truth. If we now hope to 
establish this claim, in order to establish that M is an effective 
method of rational scientific inquiry, then we need some  eene 
of doing no, and we then seen to be confronted with only two options: 
either we attempt to establish (*) by employing M or we attempt to 
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establish it by employing some other method of inquiry 
(say, M*). 
If we employ M in the attempt to establish 
(*) then we beg the 
question, sinus we shall have to asewae (*) in order for our 
inquiry in accordance with M to establish (*). In other words, 
if we hope by the methods of M to establish the truth of (*) then 
we shall have to presuppose that the application of M is an 
effective Beane for attaining the truth - which in precisely what 
we had hoped to establish. Alternatively, if we hope to establish 
(*) by employing some other method of inquiry (say, j*) then we are 
landed in a regress - for the application of M* will only establish 
the truth of (*) if we assume the truth of (**) : namely, that the 
application of M* is an effective means for attaining the truth 
(or, if not the truth in general, then at least the truth as 
regards to which methods are effective for attaining the truth). 
But () is, in its turn, a further synth tic claim, and so we 
need some method for establishing it. In other words, our initial 
difficulty has simply shifted from (*) to ( ), and so we are at 
the start of a regress. Conclusions on pain of either circularity 
or infihite regress we cannot establish the truth of any claim an 
to the effeotiveneee of any method for attaining the truth. 
Now the above ardent can, I Biggest, be generalised - for 
notice that what in shown by it is that we cannot establish the 
truth of (*) where K has been independently specified se 'the 
truth'. Thus, by exactly parallel reasoning, we must be equally 
unable to establish a knowledge I of (*) no satter how ä is 
independently specified. For imagine that we hope to establish 
a knowledge I of the claim that M is an effective means for 
attaining knowledge K (ca11 this claia (*)). In order to do so 
we once again require some means of doing so, and once again we 
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seas to have only two options: either we attaept to establish 
a knowledge I of (*) by mployina M or wo attempt to "itatilish it 
by employing soae ether  etyoi of inquiry (say, y). If Me eapley 
M then we bg the question, eines if we hope by the Bethode of M 
to establish a knowledge I of (*) then we shall have to presuppose 
that the application of M is an effeetive weans for attaining 
knowledge ä (which is precisely what we had hoped to establish). 
Alternatively, if we hope to establish a knowledge I of (*) by 
employing some other method of inquiry (say, M*) then we are landed 
in a regress. For the application of M* will only establish a 
knowledge I of (*) if we can aesnae a knowledge 1 of (**): namely, 
that the application of M* is an effective means for attaining 
knowledge ä (or, if not knowledge I in general, then at least a 
knowledge I as regards to which methods are effective for 
attaining knowledge 1). But then we require some means for 
establishing a knowledge I of (**), and so our difficulty has 
simply shifted and we are at the start of a regress. Conclusion: 
on pain of either circularity or infinite regress we cannot have 
established knowledge I of the effectiveness of any proposed 
method of inquiry for attaining knowledge t; and this result holde 
no matter how we specify it so long as our specification is 
independent of any proposed 'ethod of inquiry. 
Now the above difficulty for the normative tradition ie, in 
fact, a variant of what is usually known as 'the problem of inductions 
- that is, the problem of providing a non-vacuous justification 
for the effectiveness of the rules of inductive reasoning (or 
of inductive method). The provision of euch a justification in 
problematic precisely because the rules of inductive method - which 
are themselves required in order to enable us to justify universal 
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lave on the basis of empirical or observational evidence - are 
themselves of the character of euch lave (einte, like laws, they 
enable us to reason from available observational evidence to 
conclusions which go beyond that evidence). But in that case one 
can only justify, on the basis of observational evidence, the 
effectiveness of the rules of inductive reasoning if one can 
already appeal to some rules of inductive reasoning. If this 
latter set of rules is identical with the former not, then one's 
attempted Justification will be viciously circular; while if it 
is not identical with the former not, then one's attempt at 
justification will simply lead to-a regress (since one will now 
need to justify the effectiveness of this latter net of rules on 
the basis of observational evidence). Alternatively, one might 
try to justify the effectiveness of the rules of inductive 
reasoning in a completely different manner, independently of all 
observational evidence. But this entails a form of a priorism, 
in which it is held that knowledge of the world, and in particular 
of its laws, can be obtained without any appeal to observational 
evidence. But if this is the aase then why bother with the rules 
of inductive reasoning at all? And, moreover, how are we now to 
establish the effectiveness of euch a priorietic methods of inquiry? 
The traditional problem of induction in, then, a variant of 
that difficulty for the normative approach articulated above - for 
this latter difficulty in, in effect, the problem of justifying 
the (non-vaouone) effeotiveneee of any method, whereas the 
traditional problem of induction in the problem of justifying the 
(non-vacuous) effectiveness of inductive methods. In other words, 
the traditional problem of induction is that variant in which M 
is identified with the rules of inductive reasoning from evidence 
to laws; K is identified with empirically justified, true lalle (or, 
more weakly, empirically justified, probably true laws); and where 
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the apparent impoebibility of establishing (*) - i. e., the claimed 
effectiveness of M with respect to the attainment of K- becomes 
the apparent impossibility of establishing that the rules of 
inductive reasoning will enable us to attain empirically justified 
true laws (or, more weakly, empirically justified, probably true 
laxe). But this means that the traditional problem of induction 
is not merely a variant of the problem of providing a (non-vacuous) 
justification for the effectiveness of a method, but also that this 
latter problem in in fact an enormous generalisation of the 
traditional problem of induction, in that it applies to any M 
and any independently specified K. Thus, in particular, this 
generalised problem will apply not only to inductive theories of 
method (which are the objects of the traditional problem) but also 
to non-inductive theories of method - such an Popper's. In fact, 
one of the most 0 ommon oritioieme of Popper's theory of method in 
preoieely that he is unable to establish that version of (*) 
whieh in relevant to his own methodological theory; and this 
criticism in sometimes put, slightly misleadingly, by saying that 
Popper has failed to solve the problem of induction (that is, the 
traditional problem). In the next section we will inveetigag+e this 
line of argument. 
2.2: The Generalised Problem of Induction and Popper's Theory of 
Method. 
We begin, then by briefly describing Popper's theory of method. 
According to Popper the beet, most effective, methoce of empirical 
scientific inquiry are the non-inductive methods of bold conjecture 
and severe refutation. These methods are non-inductive since they 
nowhere aim to establish, or justify, the truth (or even the high 
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probability of truth ) of any scientific hypothesis, including 
hypothesised lave of nature, on the basis of empirical evidence. 
Rather, for Popper, the role of euch evidence in purely negative, 
enabling ne by purely deductive modes of reasoning to knock out, 
or falsity, scientific hypotheses (thus Popper might truly be 
called a'logical negativist'). Now in order for empirical evidence 
to be used in this negative, or critioal, manner two requirements 
tunet be met: firstly, the scientific hypotheses which we allow 
ourselves to entertain must be restricted to those which, if the 
evidence turned out that way, could clash with such evidence (this 
is Popper's famous demarcation criterion). Secondly, we must 
consciously (and conscientiously) suppress our native desires to 
find evidence which will 'support' our hypotheses, and to restrict 
instead our efforts to the conscientious attempt to find evidence 
which would clash with our hypotheses - for according to Popper's 
theory of corroboration it is only the failure of such attempts 
which can be said to lend any empirioal 'support' to our scientifio 
-hypotheses. That this eeoond requirement, of searching for 
empirical falsifications, is an crucial to empirical science as is 
the first requirement, that of only entertaining empirically 
faleifiable hypotheses, can beet be seen via an example. Thee, 
take the hypothesis h that all fish living in the sea are more 
than 6 inches in height (where the height of a fish is to be 
measured by lying it on its side). Now although this is an 
empirioa11y faleifiable hypothesis, imagine that we propose to 
gather relevant evidence by trawling the sea with note whose 
mesh is 12 inches square. Then clearly, given a few trivial 
additional aeen®ptione, we can expect that euch a procedure will 
produce large amounts of 'positive support' for h- that in, we 
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will gather lote of 'positive instances' of h. But so what? 
This evidence is of about as much interest to us as would be a 
school of red herrings, since the method by which the evidence 
was gathered was designed in advance to produce such 'positive 
instances'. Thus genuine empirical 'support' for an hypothesis can 
only be provided by evidence which results from genuine attempts to 
t` that hypothesis; that is, from genuine attempts to find 
negative counter-evidence to it. 
For our purposes here the above brief sketoh of Popper's theory 
of method will suffice: the beet, most effective, methods of 
empirical scientific inquiry are those of bold, faleifiable, 
conjecture and severe, sincere attempts at empirical falsifications 
of them. Now Popper also holde that the goal of scientific 
inquiry in to attain the Truth; or, more weakly, to progressively 
get closer to it (increasing Verisimilitude). 
3 But, it has been 
argued (see, for example, Nicholas Maihell (1972), Imre Lakatos 
(19714) 
" and W. Newton-Smith 
(1981)), unless Popper can establish 
that the pursuit of science in eccordanco with his methodology 
offers ne an effective means for attaining the truth - o; at least, 
for progressively getting closer to it - then there is no reason 
whatsoever to adopt Popper's methodological reconmendatim e. And, 
it is claimed, Popper cannot establish euch a connection unless 
he incorporates into his theory something like the following 
synthetic metaphysical principle (P): that the results of severe 
testing, and hence Popperian degrees of corroboration, are fallible 
indicators of, or guides to, the Truth, or at least to degrees of 
Verisimilitude) Now such a principle is exactly on a par with 
any principle of induction (or rule of inductive inference) - 
for example, with the admittedly rather vague principle that past 
experience in a good guide to the future. Such a principle cannot 
be established on the basis of past experience unless, that is, 
it is first presupposed. So too the results of severe testing 
cannot establish the truth of (P) - or even that it has some 
degree of approximation to the truth - unless (P) is first 
presupposed. The critics then conclude that since Popper refuses 
to admit principles of induction (or rules of inductive reasoning) 
into his theory of scientific method, so too must he refuse to 
admit (P). But this means that Popper can provide no rationale 
or justification for adopting his own methodological rules. As 
Newton-Smith puts it: 
Popper can have no reasons for thinking that the method 
of conjecture and refutation will tend to produce 
theories having greater verisimilitude. This means that 
on his own terms Popper has to regard science as an 
irrational activity. (Newton-Smith (1981), P. 45). 
An a oritioiem of Popper all of this is, I submit, totally 
misplaced - and this for at least two reasons. Firstly, given the 
generalised problem of induction any attempt to establish a connection 
between one's theory of rational inquiry, on the one hand, and an 
independently specified goal of euch inquiry (or an independently 
specified notion of 'scientific knowledge') on the other hand, is 
bound to lead either to circularity or to a regress. Time, it 
cannot be a fault of Popper's theory that he does not provide any 
rational justification for adopting his methodological proposals 
by establishing their effectiveneee for attaining either Truth or 
increasing Verisimilitude. For if our previous argument is correct 
then euch effectiveness cannot be established for e methodology, 
no matter how we specify the goal of scientific inquiry - so long, 
that is,, ae we specify it independently of method. In other werde, 
it cannot be a fault of Popper's theory that it does not deliver 
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what can't be delivered. To argue otherwise is to think that 
one can turn what is a general impossibility for everyone into a 
epecifia argument against Popper. 
Secondly, and more importantly, is the question of whether 
this general impossibility shown, as Newton-Smith puts it, 'that on 
his own terms Popper has to regard science as an irrational 
activity'. Newton-Smith. is totally wrong here, but since the 
issue is rather complex we had better take things slowly. Let us 
begin by making an aeavMtion which is almost second-nature in 
the philosophical tradition - that ie, the assumption (R) that it 
in only rational to adopt a position if one is able to establish 
that position by rational means, by giving arguments, reasons, 
grounds, or justification for it. As applied to the special 
aase of a theory of rational method, (R) beooinee (R') that it is 
only rational to adopt a methodology if one is able to establish 
it by rational means, by giving arguments, reasons, groumde, or 
justification for it. In the context we are considering, eetab- 
liehing a methodology (or giving arguments, reasons, eto. for 
it) is equivalent to establishing (*) that the application of that 
methodology's rules of procedure is effective for the attainment 
of an independently specified goal of scientific inquiry. Given 
this, (R') then becomes (R") that it in only rational to adopt 
a methodology if one is able to establish (*) by giving arguments, 
reasons, etc., for (*). Now if (R") is simply taken as given then 
Popper's failure to establish the relevant (*) for his own 
methodology entails that it cannot be rational to adopt Popper's 
methodology - so that, seemingly, if science in fact adopts that 
methodology then 'Popper has to regard science as an irrational 
activity'. However, all of this only goes through if (R") - and 
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ultimately (R) itself - in taken as given. But eine Popper 
totally rejects the theory of rationality articulated in (R), 
and thus also rejects the meter-theory of rationality articulated 
in (R"), it simply is not the ease that on his own t_ Popper's 
failure to establish the relevant (*) entails that he comet regard 
eoienoe an 'an irrational activity'. 
Now why does Popper reject (R), and what does he propose in 
its stead? The answer to the first question is simplicity itself: 
if we ineieiet on 131 then it can never be rational to adopt auch 
position. Thus the theory of rationality articulated in (R) 
entails the non-existence of rationality, since the attempt to 
establish any position by rational means must always produce (as 
we have in effect already seen) either an infinite regress or a 
circularity. That this is so was already known in antiquity 
(by the sceptics): for every attempt to establish a position, by 
giving arguments, etc. for it, will itself always start from 
assumptions which are themselves positions and which, therefore, by (R) 
cannot be rationally adopted until they themselves have been 
established (or arguments, etc. have been given for them). But in 
that oaee the attempt to rationally establish, or give arguments for, 
any position inevitably leads to a regress, in that no premieeee 
for euch arguments are ever rationally available until they have, 
in effect, been turned into conclusions. Since the process of 
turning each preiiieede into rationally adoptable conclusions 
itself requires further premieeee, no position can ever be established 
using only rationally adoptable prenisses. Thus no position can ever 
be rationally established. Such a regress can only be halted either 
in a rationally unsatisfactory circularity (in which we simply 
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assume, an premieees, what we wish to establish as conolusion) or 
in a form of dogmatism or Fedeiem (in which we claim that some 
peaitione can be rationally adopted, as preiieees, without first 
being established, or in the absence of arguments, etc. ). If we 
opt for the former alternatives (those of regress or circularity) 
then (R) entails the impossibility of rationally adopting and 
position; while if we opt for a dogaatiem or fedeiem then we have 
opted out of (R) altogether. Thus (R) rules out these latter 
options, and so entails the impossibility of rationally adopting 
any position. Moreover, given the generality of the argument, 
precisely the same argument meet go through with respect to (R"). 
Time, if we hope to be able to rationally adopt any methodology 
we had better not require that it meet up to the demand of (R"). 
In place of the traditional theory of rationality articulated 
in (R), according to which rationality consists in giving arguments 
in support of a position, Popper proposes a wholly negativist 
theory of rationality (PR). According to (PR) one does not, to be 
rational, require any argnmente for adopting a position. Rather, 
one can rationally adopt a position so long as it is not irratiorl 
to adopt that position, so long as there are no arguments against 
adopting it. To be eure euch a view of rationality is also 
affected by a kind of regress - since every argument against a 
position itself starts from assumptions which are themselves 
positions. But according to (PR) so long as there are no arguments 
against adopting them, we can rationally adopt them, and so 
rationally reject the initial position. Moreover, while (R) is 
itself internally incoherent, (PR) in not. To see this one needs 
first realise that (R) is, after all, a position (a position with 
regard to rationality), and time by its own lights can only be 
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rationally adopted if it itself can be established by rational 
meeae, if arguments, reasons, etc. can be given for it. But by our 
previous argt ent, (R) entails that this is impossible, since it 
entails the impossibility of rationally establishing any position. 
Thus (R) entails the impossibility of rationally adopting (R). If 
we now add the further traditional aemmption that one meet, to be 
rational, reject any position which cannot be rationally adopted, 
then it follows that the rational man must himself reject (R). But 
this means that (R) requires or necessitates its own rejection. 
This, however, is not the case for (PR) - for according to 
(PR), 
(PR) can itself be rationally adopted so long as there are no 
arguments against adopting it. So am long as no euch arguments 
are available, (PR) can be rationally adopted by its own lights. 
In other words, (R) in necessarily self-defeating while (PR) is 
not. 
5 
Now let ne shift our attention away from (R) to (R"); that ie, 
to the claim that one can only rationally adopt a methodology, or 
a not of rules of rational inquiry, if one is able to establish by 
argument that the application of that set of rules is effective for 
the attainment of scientific knowledge (as independently specified). 
As we have already argued (R") suffers a similar fate to (R), in 
that if it were accepted we would be unable to rationally adopt 
any sethodology. Given this it is then unsurprising that those who 
adopt (R") are in a position to argue that we are unable to 
rationally adopt Popper's methodology. But this is a totally 
Pyrrhic victory since, to repeat, the adoption of (R") knocke out 
the possibility of rationally adopting any methodology. So if we 
hope to have a meta-theory of how it can be rational to adopt a set 
of rules of rational inquiry then that meta-theory must not require 
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that we be able to rationally establish, or justify, the claim that 
the application of euch rules is effective for the attainment of the 
goal of each inquiry (as independently specified). Now euch an 
alternative meta-theory in, in fact, readily available. For just 
as (R") is a special case of (R) - that special case in which the 
position in question is a theory of rational inquiry with an 
independently specified goal of inquiry - so too can we generate 
a parallel special case of (PR). Since according to (PR) we can 
rationally adopt a position so long as there are no arguments 
against adopting it, the parallel special case (PR") asserts that 
we can rationally adopt a proposed set of rules of rational inquiry 
so long an no arguments are available to show that the application 
of those rules fruetratee one's search for scientific knowledge (as 
independently specified). In other words, so long as no argmente 
are available to show that the application of one's proposed 
rules of inquiry are inconsistent with the successful purenIt of 
the independently specified goal of inquiry one can quite rationally 
adopt the proposed set of rules. Such a meta-theory is, quite 
amply, Popper's non-jnetificationiet theory of rationality (PR) 
applied at the level of the theory of rational inquiry itself. 
2.3: Three Apparent Objections to (PR") 
Three 1n ediate inter-related objections will, I suspect, be 
urged against our proposal of (PR"). The first is that this 
proposal is ludicrously weak, in that if all we require in order to 
be able to rationally adopt a methodology is that it not provably 
frustrate our search for scientific knowledge (as independently 
specified), then we will be unable to say that the methodology 
we rationally adopt it; effective for achieving the goal of inquiry 
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(let alone that it is maximally effective). This, however, is a 
mistake - for in the absence of negative arguments there 
is nothing 
rationally to pre= ne fror saying that our rationally adopted 
e 
methodology is effective for achieving the goals of inquiry, and 
usti so rationally we can indeed say eo. What we can't do is 
our maying no; but to insist that we cannot rationally say any- 
thing until we can justify our saying it is simply to surrepti- 
tiouely re-introduce (R) - since it in (R) which requires that we 
rationally justify (or establish) what we say before We are 
rationally entitled to say it. But, to repeat, if we obstinately 
insist on (R) then we can never be rationally entitled to say 
ararthing - since before we can be rationally entitled to say 
something we must, according to (R), say something else, and 
before we can be rationally entitled to say that we laust say 
something else again, and so on. Thee if we want to be rationally 
entitled to say anything we had better relinquish (R); but once 
we relinquish (R) there is then nothing preventing us from 
rationally asserting, in the absence of negative arguments, that 
a proposed set of rules of inquiry in effective for achieving the 
goal of inquiry. 
The eeoond likely objection is closely related to the first. 
According to it our proposal of (PR") is once again ludicrously 
weak, only this time in a slightly different sense. That in, it 
might be argued that (PR") is totally vacuous, in that any proposed 
methodology will be able to meet its requirements, so that given 
(PR") every methodological theory becomes rationally adoptable 
(whereas given (R") none are). If this were indeed the case then 
not only would it not be at all clear that one should prefer 
(PR") to (R"), but moreover the adoption of (PR") would in effect 
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constitute a retreat back to the 'transcendental' strategy (or to 
something akin to the 'analytic justification of a method') 
wherein, an we saw, any theory of method can be 'rationally 
adopted'. Luckily, however, this in not the came with respect to 
(PR"), as is shown by the traditional problem of induction. 
To see this, let us begin with the classical empiricist view 
that all knowledge of the world derives from experience, so that 
empirical knowledge consists of whatever we obtain directly from 
experience plus whatever we can rationally build on its basis. Now 
the empiricist tradition does not, in the main, see scientific 
knowledge as merely a collection of 'direct' empirical facto; 
rather it sees empirical science as aiming to provide us with a 
'deep' knowledge of the world -a knowledge of the causes of 
phenomena, or of the underlying hidden mechanisms which are rem- 
ponsible for the 'directly observable faxte', or a knowledge of the 
laws of nature. Since, for the empiricist, all knowledge of the 
world derives from experience, so too must science's knowledge of 
these laws, causes, etc. derive from experience. But in order to 
discover these laws, causes, etc., or to justify our hypotheses 
about them, on the basis of experience we have to be able to make 
inferences from experience to that which is outwith experience 
(this is particularly clear with regard to trying to discover 
underlying hidden mechanisms on the basis of experience), and the 
rules of inductive method were supposed to provide ne with rules 
for Haling euch inferences. All this seems well and good, until we 
realise (with Hume) that the rules of inductive inference must 
themselves refer to that which in outwith experience, for if they 
didn't they wouldn't enable us to reason from what is within 
experience to that which is outwith it. But this entails, for the 
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elRpirioiet, that we can have no knowledge of such rules at all. 
For according to his to obtain a knowledge of them we must derive 
them from experience; but since they themselves refer to that which 
in outwith experience we can only obtain a knowledge of them if we 
already have 
, 
a, knowledge of them. Thus we cannot obtain a knowledge 
of the rules of inductive inference. But in order to obtain a 
knowledge of that which is outwith experience (which is the goal of 
empirical science), we need to have a knowledge of the rules of 
inductive inference. Thus the goal of empirical science is 
unattainable. Conclusion: (PR") is not at all vacuous, since the 
theory of inductive method is provably inconsistent with the 
empiricist's goal for scientific inquiry. Thus (PR") does indeed 
rule out some theories of method as not being rationally adoptable. 
The third likely objection, like the first two, also sees our 
propoes]. of (PR") as ludicrously weak - only this time in a third 
Bense. That is, it might be argued that if we are rationally 
entitled to adopt a proposed set of rules of rational inquiry so 
long as there are no arguments against the claim that the application 
of euch rules is effective for achieving an independently specified 
goal of inquiry, then we may very well find that many different, 
inoompatible, sets of rules are all equally rationally adoptable. 
Tue (PR") is, although not quite vacuous, then at least rather 
weak, in that adapting it may not enable us to single out a 
unique theory of rational inquiry for any given, independently 
specified goal of inquiry. But this entails that different 
inquirers may, quite rationally, adopt very different, incompatible, 
rules of inquiry; and this, the argument concludes, is a highly 
unsatisfactory situation - for how can it be equally rational to 
adopt different, incompatible, rules of rational inquiry; different, 
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inoospatible, theories of rational method? 
It should be noted to begin with that the worry being expressed 
here in not the worry that different rules of inquiry may quite 
rationally be adopted given different independently specified goals 
of inquiry. That one ®et of rules of inquiry may be well suited 
to the pursuit of one goal of inquiry and another, incompatible, 
set to the pursuit of a different goal of inquiry would not, I 
suspect, raise many eyebrows (although there may be a lingering hope, 
which to some extent I share, that some goals of inquiry really 
are preferable to others). Rather the worry is that given (PR") 
different, incompatible rules of rational inquiry may, with equal 
rationality, be adopted even although we aim to pursue the same 
goal of inquiry. 
To be honest I do not really see anything to worry about here, 
and this for at least three reasons. Firstly, I do not think that 
an embarrae de richeese is anything to be embarrassed about. On 
the contrary, in my view we should count oure'lveA lucky if we can 
find a single set of rules of inquiry meeting the Betsande of (PB"); 
and thus doubly lucky if we can find more than one. Secondly, if 
we are lucky enough to find more than one euch ®et then we have in 
fact a golden opportunity - for one thing we can then do is to enrich! 
or strengthen, our proposed goal of inquiry so as to hopef-:.. i be 
able to discriminate between the different, incompatible, sets of 
rules of inquiry. We may then find that the application of one 
each ®et in provably inconsistent with the attainment of this 
richer goal of inquiry, while the other is not. In that case (PR") 
will indeed enable us to rule out the former set of rules - relative, 
that is, to our strengthened goal of inquiry. If one now wonders 
how, given (PR"), we can rationally prefer a set of rules of inquiry 
the application of which is not provably inconsistent with the 
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purenit of a richer goal of inquiry to one which is, then the 
simple answer iss why shouldn't we prefer the former set to the 
latter? Is there a serious argument against this preference? 
If not, then we can rationally make the preference. Since, in the 
situation we are imagining, the application of one set of rules 
of inquiry is not provably inconsistent with the pnrenit of a 
richer goal of inquiry, while the application of another set is, 
there will clearly be no argument against our preferring the 
former set on the grounds that in doing so we are sacrificing 
anything which we might want. On the contrary, in preferring the 
latter set we would be sacrificing something which we might 
want (i. e., the enriched goal). Of course, this is not to say 
that anyone who is uninterested in this richer goal of inquiry is 
forced to prefer the former set of rules to the latter - for him 
the two note remain rationally on a par (unless, that is, he 
enriches the goal in some other manner). But, and this is the 
crucial point, he will have no argument against our preference, 
and three our preference will, given (PR"), be a perfectly rational 
one. 
Now the above procedure involves, in effect, the attempt to 
make progressively finer discriminations between competing theories 
of rational method each of which meets the initial 'teat' of 
(PR"). But it does so by strengthening (and thus changing) the 
initially proposed, independently specified, goal of inquiry. Since 
the worry expressed in the third objection was precisely that gieren 
(PR") different, incompatible, rules of rational inquiry may, with 
equal rationality, be adopted even although we aim to pursue the 
game goal of inquiry, it might be argued that this worry car-not be 
allayed by showing how finer discriminations can be made relative 
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to a changed goal of inquiry. So the question is: can we develop 
a prooedure which enables ne to make progressively finer 
discriminations between competing theories of rational method, but 
where this procedure leaves the initially specified, independent 
goal of inquiry unchanged? The answer is that we can. 
Let ne ass e, once again, that we have been lucky enough to 
find more than a single set of rules of rational inquiry which meets 
the demands of (PR"). Then rather than, as in our previous procedure, 
strengthening or enriching our proposed goal of inquiry in order to 
enable a rational preference (in accordance with (PR")) between 
the alternative sets of rules, `chat we can do instead is to 
strengthen or enrich our demands on a theory of rational inquiry 
beyond those specified in (PR"). For example, imagine that our goal 
of inquiry in simply to attain the Truth (i. e., the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth) ; and imagine further that we are in the 
lucky position of having two different sets of rules of inquiry 
the application of neither, so far as is known, is inconsistent with 
the attainment of this goal. Then rather than enriching our goal 
of inquiry (tq say, attaining not just the Truth but also truthful 
explanations) we may instead enrich our demands on a theory of 
rational inquiry beyond those specified in (PR"). For example, we 
may wish to include the requirement that not only must the 
application of our rules not be provably inconsistent with the 
attairnnent of our goal, but also that the application of these rules 
operates in euch a manner that at any later time we are in as good 
a position to pursue the goal of inquiry as we were previously. In 
other horde, we might demand that the application of a set of rules 
of inquiry not make inquiry progressively more difficult to pursue 
(let us call this demand the requirement that our rules of inquiry 
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be 'temporally invariant'). Then, if the application of one of 
our initial note of rules is provably inconsistent with this demand, 
while the other in not, then (PR) will enable us to rationally rule 
out the former set of rules in favour of the latter set - relative, 
that is, to our new additional demand. If one now wonders how, 
given (PR), one can rationally prefer a set of rules of inquiry the 
application of which is not provably inconsistent with the require- 
went of temporal invariance to one which is, then the answer once 
again is simplicity itself: wby shouldn't we prefer the former set 
to the latter? Is there any serious argument mat this 
preference? If not, then we can rationally make the preference. 
Since, in the situation we are imagining, the application of one 
set of rules of inquiry is not provably inconsistent with the demand 
of temporal invariance, while the application of another set is, 
there vrill olearly be no argument against our preferring the former 
set on the grounds that in doing so we are sacrificing something 
which we might want to demand. On the contrary, in preferring the 
latter set of rules of inquiry we wou14 be sacrificing something which 
we might want to demand (i. e., we would be getting lees then we 
could get). Of course, this in not to Ray that anyone who is 
uninterested in this additional demand is forced tc prefer the former 
net of rules to the latter net - for him the two sets main 
rationally on a par (unless, that is, he makes some other additional 
demand). But, and once again this is the crucial point, he will 
have no argument against-our preference, and thus our preference 
will, given (PR), be a perfectly rational one. 
The possibility of employing the above procedure is, I suggest, 
extremely important: for what it shows is that w° can. when 
confronted with competing theories of ration], inquiry all of which 
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are initially on a par (from the standpoint of (PR")) nevertheless 
come to be able to sake rational preferenese among them - and yet 
where each preferences themselves always remain 'negativists 
ones (and thus in accord with (PR)). In other words, by incor- 
porating increasingly stringent demands on a theory of rational 
inquiry - beyond those specified in (PR") - we can progressively 
weed out some of the initially live competitors by showing that 
although consistent with the initial demand incorporated in (PR") 
they are inconsistent with plausible additional demands (which 
thus provide argmmentB against them). But this means that the 
initial worry expressed in the third objection - namely, that (PR") 
in too weak, eine it will not enable us to single out a unique 
theory of inquiry for any given, independently specified, goal of 
inquiry - iss really no worry at all. For what I have in effect done 
in to give a method which is completely consistent with (PR") and 
yet which enables us to progressively discriminate among the range 
of initially live competitors, since it enables us to progressively 
eliminate some of them against the 'test' of increasingly more 
stringent demands. Of course this is not to say that anyone who 
does not wish to employ these more stringent 'tests' is forced to 
do so - but his uhvillingneee to do so cannot possibly undermine the 
(PR)- based rationality of our preference, for his refusal to 
employ a potentially critical 'test' cannot possibly count as a 
criticism of our preference. 
2.4: 'Transcendentalism' and Naturalism Re-visited 
At this point we make a alight detour in order to offer some 
further remarks both an to (PR") and as to the above method for 
progressively discriminating between competing theories of rational 
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inquiry -a method which might be dubbed 'the method of 
strengthening demands' (or MSD). More particularly, we propose 
to show bow (PR") - and thus MSD, which incorporates (PR") as its 
first demand - avoids the 'transcendental' strategy while staying 
totally within the normative approach. In other words, we hope to 
show how (PR") and MSD give us a start in providing what was 
asked for at the end of the last chapter. 
To begin with, however, a few further remarks as to (PR") and 
MSD. Firstly, it is important to realise that (PR") has the 
property that while some theories of rational scientific inquiry 
can meet its requirement (of consistency between the application of 
a method and the achievement of an independently specified goal of 
inquiry), others cannot (recall the traditional problem of induction). 
It thus follows that (PR") enables us to avoid the serious 
oonundrum whioh results it we adopt (R"). For given (R") we are 
required, before we can rationally adopt a theory of rational 
scientific inquiry, to establish the effectiveness of the application 
of that theory for the pursuit of scientific knowledge. But if we 
then specify our notion of 'eoientific knr'viedge' in terms of the 
results of applying a method of inquiry, then we can establish the 
'effectiveness' of any method of inquiry, and so by (R") can 
'rationally adopt' any such method; while if we specify our notion 
of 'scientific knowledge' independently of applying a method, then 
the generalised problem of induction shows that - on pain of 
infinite regress or circularity - we are unable to establish the 
effectiveness of any method of inquiry, and so by (R") can rationally 
adopt no euch method. Thee the requirement incorporated in (R") 
is either vacuous - and thus too weak - or it destroys rationality 
altogether - and in than too strong. 
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Now it might be argued here that although I have indeed shown 
that (PR") - and thus MSD - is indeed non-vacuous, in that it is 
strong enough not to be satisfiable by every theory of method, I 
have not shown it to be satisfiable by some theories of method. In 
other words, I have not shown that (PR") is not too strong or, 
equivalently, that it is weak enough. But given (PR) I do not need 
to show this, for so long as no one can produce an argument to 
show that (PR") isn't weak enough we can continue to rationally 
accept the conjecture that it is weak enough. To insist that we 
are unable to rationally accept this conjecture unless we can first 
establish it, is simply to re-introduce the refuted theory of 
rationality incorporated in (R) (and (R")). Moreover, since all of 
the obvious objections to (PR") try to make out that it is too 
weak, it is unlikely that any argument will be forthcoming to show 
that it isn't weak enough. This suggestion is reinforced if we 
think of what would be required in order to produce euch an 
argument - for any argument to show that 
(PR") isn't weak enough 
will have to have, as its conclusion, the assertion that the applic- 
ation of no theory of rational scientific method can ever be 
consistent with the attainment of an independently specified goal 
of scientific inquiry. In other words, an argument against (PR") 
will have to show that the application of every possible theory of 
rational scientific method must be inconsistent with the attainment 
of scientific knowledge (however this is independently specified). 
But this in, quite clearly, an enormously strong assertion, and it 
is difficult to see how anyone could ever produce an argument to 
show it. Moreover, the very fact that it takes euch an enormously 
strong assertion to rule out (PR") is itself evidence of (PR")'e 
weakness. No wonder then that all of the apparent objections to 
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(PR") try to argue that its requirement is too weak. But as we 
have seen, these objections fail. 
Secondly, it is crucial to realise that (PR") - and thus MSD - 
succeeds in avoiding the pit-falls of the 'transcendental' 
strategy (or of the 'analytic justification of a method'). For 
since (PR") - and thus MSD - always works with an independently 
specified notion of 'scientific knowledge', or with a goal of 
scientific inquiry which has been specified independently of the 
applioation of a method, we are never in the position of 
identifying what we hope to achieve in methodology (i. e., an effective 
theory of rational inquiry) with our present theories of method 
for the claim that one of our present theories is effective always 
remains a 'synthetic' one. Moreover, it also always remains a 
criticisable claim - for if anyone can show that the application of 
one of our present theories is, in fact, incompatible with the 
achievement of scientific knowledge (as independently specified), 
then he would have eliminated the claim that that theory is 
effective (since he would have shown that it can't be effective). 
Since the central objectionable feature of the 'transcendental' 
strategy was precisely that it turned all theories of rational 
scientific method into uncritioisable 'self-fulfilling' ones, it 
follows that (PR") - and MSD, which incorporates (PR") - avoids 
the pit-falls of the 'transcendental' strategy. 
Thirdly, it is equally important to realise that (PR") - 
and MSD - not only avoid the 'transcendental' strategy but are able 
to do so without any retreat into a methodological naturalism. 
They thus remain firmly within the normative approach to method- 
ology. For the claim that a set of methodological rules is 
effective for achieving an independently specified goal of inquiry 
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is not a claim which can be criticised by appeal to the actual 
Practices of scientists, or by appeal to the naturalistic 
methodologist's test of congruence. In other words, the simple 
fact that a set of methodological rules is not employed in actual 
practice does nothing towards showing that the application of that 
set is not effective for the achievement of an independently 
specified goal of inquiry. To think otherwise is equivalent to 
thinking that one can criticise the claimed effectiveness of, say, 
a newly proposed opening strategy in chess on the grounds that no 
one has as yet tried it out in an actual game of chess. The 
naturalistic methodologist's critical test of congruence is thus 
irrelevant as a critical test of effectiveness. 
However, it might be argued that although the failure of a 
methodology to pass the methodological naturaliet'e test of 
congruence in no way rules out the claimed effectiveness of that 
methodology, the success of a methodology in passing the test of 
congruence can indeed rule in its effectiveness. This, however, is 
not the case either, for at least two reasons. Firstly, the simple 
fact that a set of methodological rules is actually applied in 
scientific practice does nothing towards showing that the application 
of that set is in fact effective for achieving the independently 
specified goal of inquiry. At the very least we should also have 
to assume that actual science has in fact achieved this goal, or 
made progress towards achieving it, before the fact that a set of 
methods is actually applied can be taken to show that they are 
effective. But secondly, even this will not be enough - for actual 
®oience may have been successful in achieving the independently 
specified goal of inquiry not because it has in fact adopted a 
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certain set of methods but in spite of this fat. In other words, 
even if we assume that science has been successful, the fact that 
science adopts in actual practice a certain set of rules of inquiry 
will not show the effectiveness of those rules - for this success 
might have been achieved despite all the obstacles which the adoption 
of those rules presents. 
The above approach - which attempts to argue from the asstumption 
of actual scientific success in achieving an independently specified 
goal of inquiry, together with the fact that in actual practice 
science has adopted methodology M, to the effectiveness of M for 
achieving that goal - might be dubbed 'normative naturalism'. For 
euch an approach does not simply hold that we ought to adopt a 
methodology N because science in fact adopts --t; but rather molds 
that we ought to adopt M because science adopts it and science has 
been successful. Thus, if we want success in achieving ecience'e 
goal of inquiry, or in achieving scientific knowledge, then we 
ought to adopt M. This 'normative naturalist-Lao viewpoint iia,,, in 
fact, attracted a number of philosophers of soiernce who are ý. _'ý r 
worried by the generalised problem of induction (vaguely' because 
they do not quite see the problem) - timt _s, the problem of 
establishing the effectiveness of a me'chod. Thus Newton-Smith, who 
we previously saw as attempting to criticise Poppers theory of 
method on the grounds that Popper does not zýs atuish the effect- 
iveness of his methods, holds that the proper method for doing so 
is precisely the 'normative naturalistict one. That is, he holds 
that in order to establish (or 'vindicate') a metac: dology 
We need first to establish that there nas been progress 
in science without the use of methodological principles. 
Having done that, we then carefully examine the history of 
science to see what principles have actually been operative 
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in bringing about that progress. That is how one 
vindicates a methodology; that is, by showing that 
it encapsulates the principles that have in fact been 
followed in bringing about progress. (Newton-Smith, 
(1981), P. 97) 
Such a programme cannot, however, succeed, and this again for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, a 'careful examinations of the history 
of science might indeed reveal that certain methodological principles 
have in fact been operative in the history of actual science, but 
this will in no way show that those principles have actually been 
operative in bringing about scientific progress (and this even if 
we asm e that the history of actual science has in fact displayed 
euch progress). To show that they havewe should have to show the 
effectiveness of euch principles for bringing about progress. In 
other words, the fact that science employs methodology M, coupled 
with the (asevmed) fact that science has made progress P. in no 
Way shows that it is M which is responsible for P. In order to show 
that it is M which is responsible for P we should have to show the 
effectiveness of M for bringing about P. But this entails that the 
normative naturalistic programme for establishing the effectiveness 
of a methodology cannot succeed. 
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Secondly, how on earth are we supposed 'to establish that there 
has been progress in science without the use of methodological 
principles"? In the absence of such principles we can, of course, 
assume that there has been progress (towards an independently 
specified goal); but how are we supposed to establish this in the 
absence of euch principles? For the generalised problem of induction 
shows that we cannot establish this even in the presence of such 
principles - for to establish that there has been progress, given 
euch principles, we must first establish the effectiveness of such 
principles for bringing about progress; and this the generalised 
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problem of induction shows we cannot do. How, then, we are 
supposed to establish the existence of progress in the absence of 
all methodological assumptions remains, for me, an utter mystery 
(one which Newton-Smith nowhere clears up, despite his persistent 
a=waving). To put this point another way: how are we to establish 
that there has been progress; what method are we to employ? If 
one's answer is no method at all, then this is tantamount to saying 
that one will simply assume that science has made progress (end 
so will not establish that it has). On the other hand, if one's 
answer is - by method M (whatever this be) then one's attempt to 
establish that there has been progress has not been achieved without 
the use of methodological assumptions. Thus the A+ýrwrrpt to 
'establish that there has been progress in science without the 
use of methodological principles' simply cannot succeed. Of course 
this is not to say that in the absence of such principles we cannot 
make the assumption that science has made progress; but to make such 
an assumption is a far-cry from being able to establish it. 
The above difficulty for the normative naturalistic approach 
can also be seen from a slightly different angle - for assume that 
we had actually succeeded in establishing that there has been progress 
in science without the use of any methodological principles. In 
this case two possibilities emerge: either we have succeeded in 
establishing that there has been progress in physics, chemistry, 
biology, etc. (and in consequence established that there has been 
progress in science), or we have somehow established that there has 
been progress in science (in general) without at the same time 
establishing that there has been progress in any particular branch 
or area of science. If this latter were the case, then our 'proof' 
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that science has made progress would fail to inform us that, for example, 
Einsteinian physics was progress over Newtonian physics. But in 
that event we should require, presumably, some methodological principles 
in order to decide that Einsteinian physics is progress over Newtonian 
physics. Now call these methodological principles M. Since our 
'proof' that science has made progress does not entail that 
Einsteinian physics is progress over Newtonian physics, it cannot be 
employed to establish that M is an effective method for either 
achieving or recognising progress. On the other hand, in the first 
case we assume that we have succeeded in establishing, independently 
of any methodological principles, not merely that science (in general) 
has made progress but more particularly that (e. g. ) physics has made 
progress, and therefore that Einsteinian physics is progress over 
Newtonian physics. But in this case our 'proof' that science has 
made progress is simultaneously a 'proof' of the irrelevance of 
M for recognising euch progress - for our 'proof' itself, which has 
proceeded in the absence of any methodological principles, and 
therefore in the absence of M, has enabled us to recognise that 
Einsteinian physics is progress over Newtonian physics. Thus we 
have no need of M in order to recognise such progress. Thus, either 
our 'proof' that science has made progress fails to establish the 
effectiveness of M or else it succeeds in establishing the irrel- 
evanoe of M. But plausibly we will only need to establish the 
effectiveness of M if we need M itself. Conclusion: the normative 
naturalist can only establish the effectiveness of a methodology 
if he has no need of a methodology for recognising progress, and 
thus no need to establish the effectiveness of any methodology. 
Thus the normative naturalist can only establish the effectiveness 
of a methodology if he has no need to . So if he needs to, he cant. 
We thne reach the following results: firstly, the failure of 
a set of methodological rules to pass the naturalistic methodo- 
1egieft test of congruence in no way shows the ineffectiveness of 
euch rules for achieving either scientific success :r scientif: ýc 
progress (as independently specified). Secondly, the success: 
a set of methodological rules in passing the naturalistic meth--do- 
logist's test of congruence in no way shows the 
effectiveness of those rules for achieving either success or progress 
(and this even if, with the normative naturalist, we assme that 
actual science has in fact been successful, or has in fact made 
progress). Thirdly, we have shown that the normative naturalistic 
hope, as articulated by Newton-Smith, of being able to 'establish 
that there has been progress in science without the use of methodo- 
logical principles' - in order to then be able to employ the naturalistic 
test of congruence as proof of the effectiveness of whatever methodo- 
logy passes this test - cannot succeed either. Thus the naturalistic 
methodologist's test of congruence can neither ru'e in nor rule out 
the effeotiveness of a proposed thec i7 of inquiry. But this entails 
that naturalistic methodology is logically irrelevant to the issue 
of the effectiveness, or otherwise, o" proposed theories of method. 
Since, from the point of view of (PR") and . TID,, a primary concern 
of our methodological inquiries is precisely that of the effect- 
ivenees, or otherwise, of proposed theories of method, and since 
naturalistic methodology is logically irrelevant to this concern, 
it follows that (PR") and MSD not only avoid the 'transcendental' 
strategy but do so in such a way as to remain totally independent 
of methodological naturalism.. In other words, (PR") and MSD give 
us a start in providing what was asked for at the end of the last 
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ohapter - namely, a way of eeouring the avoidance of the 
'transcendental' strategy while remaining firmly within the 
noffiat ive approach. 
Despite all this it might be thought that there nevertheless 
remajn8 two potential ways in which the naturalistic approach 
could remain useful. Firstly, it might be argued that although 
failing the test of congruence does not entail ineffectiveness, 
and passing this test does not entail effectiveness, we might wish 
to use the test of congruence as follows: assume that a theory of 
method aeees the test of congruence, and assume further that actual 
science has not achieved either success or progress (as independently 
specified), then we might think of this as entailing that the 
methods in question are ineffective for achieving success or progress. 
Even this, however, will not work - since science's failure to 
achieve success may have been the result of non-methodological 
factors (e. g., political factors) interfering with the successful 
application of what are, in fact, effective methods of inquiry. 
More importantly for our purposes, however, this uoe of the 
methodological naturalist's test of congruence depends upon our 
assuming that actual science has not been successful in achieving 
either scientific success or scientific progress (as independently 
specified); but if we assume this then what we will obviously want 
to do is to investigate the questions of rational methodology 
independently of actual science, so as to hopefully improve on 
eoience°e past 'track-record'. But in that case we move directly 
back to the normative approach. 
Secondly, it might be argued that the naturalistic approach 
reýmaine crucial given the inability of (PR") to single out a unique 
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theory of inquiry (this, it will be recalled, was the third 
objection to (PR")). In other words, since (PR") permits us to 
rationally adopt any theory of inquiry so long as the application 
of that theory has not been shown to frustrate the achievement of 
scientific knowledge (as independently specified), and since at any 
point in time many theories of inquiry may as a result be rationally 
adoptable, the naturalistic methodologist's test of congruence may 
then function as a useful tool for discriminating among these 
initially live options. That is, ae$ me M1 and M2- are (at time t 
both rationally adoptable from the viewpoint of (PR"); and assume 
12 further that M but not M can pass the test of congruence; then it 
might be argued that this gives us a reason for preferring Ml to M2. 
Thus, the argument concludes, the test of congruence must, given 
(PR"), retain an important role within the normative approach. 
Three responses are in order here. Firstly, it is important 
to recall that the test of congruence will be useless as a 
discriminatory tool unless we can assume that actual scientific 
practice is relatively monolithic and coherent. But this assumption 
is unlikely to be correct if competing theories of inquiry are all 
equally live options. Thus the naturalistic methodologist's test 
of congruence is unlikely to be a powerful tool of discrimination in 
the situation we are imagining. Secondly, this position as to the 
usefulness of the test of congruence does not constitute in any 
manner whatsoever a challenge to the normative approach, since it 
sees its usefulness as arising within that approach. In other words, 
we are not here being offered a retreat back to a methodological 
naturalism. Thirdly, the suggestion being put forward here is, in 
fact, a variant of what I have previously called the method of 
strengthening demands (or MSD) - for what is being proposed is that 
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we demand of a rationally adoptable theory of rational inquiry 
not only that it pass the 'test' incorporated in (PR"), but also 
that it pass the 'test' of congruence. Thus, the suggestion 
being put forward here is not only no challenge to the normative 
approach (as realised in (PR")) but moreover it is in fact a 
potential example of the method of strengthening demands. 
However, the important questions which then arise are two-fold: 
firstly, is the additional demand of 'congruence' a plausible one?; 
secondly, are we in any manner forced to adopt it? The second 
question is straight-forwardly answered in the negative, since we 
have already seen that other additional demands on a theory of 
rational inquiry (like that of temporal invariance) are readily 
available. Thus nothing foroes us, given our desire to progressively 
discriminate between competing theories of rational inquiry, to 
adopt 'congruence' as an additional demand. However, this is not 
to say that we cannot adopt 'congruence' as an additional demand; and 
so the question becomes: should we so adopt it? It is here that the 
first question of the plausibility, or otherwise, of adopting this 
additional demand comes to the fore. Now as far as I can see, if 
we are firmly within the normative approach (as we are given the 
suggestion that 'congruence' be made an additional demand), then 
this demand must in fact be a demand of last resort, and so not an 
additional demand of particular power. In other words, given that 
we are pursuing the normative approach the additional demand of 
'congruence' will only start to bite if we have already run out of 
plausible additional normative demands on a theory of rational 
inquiry. For example, take the normative demand that our theory of 
rational inquiry be such that no area of our present knowledge of 
the world be beyond the scope of inquiry. This demand is, in effect, 
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the demand that our theory of inquiry be such that inquiry is 
potentially unlimited; that we are not, given it, restricted 
as to what we can inquiry into. Now this demand looks, on the 
surface, to be an entirely plausible one - in that if we want a 
theory of rational inquiry at all then we will presumably prefer 
one (if we can get it) which enables us to rationally inquire into 
erbt part of knowledge which we so choose. But this means that if we 
were able to find a theory of rational inquiry which met the 'test' 
of (PR") and which also met the 'teat' of 'unlimitedneas' then we 
would, as normativists, quite clearly prefer it to some alternative 
theory which failed this latter 'test' - and this even if the former 
theory failed the test of congruence while the latter theory passed 
this test. In other words, as normativists we would then argue that 
a reform of scientific practice was desirable, in order to make this 
practice meet the demand of unlimitedness . Thus within the normative 
approach the test of congruence will always remain the weakest test 
of all, in that we shall only employ it if our problem is the 
unlikely one of having to discriminate between competing theories 
of rational inquiry each of which can meet all the plausible normative 
demands which we are able to devise. Moreover, given the arguments 
of section 1.4, we already know that the test of congruence will be 
a useless one if actual scientific practice fails to be relatively 
monolithic and coherent. Thus even as a 'test of last resort' 
the test of congruence is likely tc) be of relatively little use. 
To conclude this section: we have seen that from the stand- 
point of (PR") some theories of rational scientific inquiry, but not 
others, are rationally adoptable. As a result (PR") avoids the 
serious dilemma necessarily imposed upon as if we accept 
(R") -- 
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namely, that either any theory of rational scientific inquiry is 
'rationally adaptable' or none is. Moreover, since MSD incorporates 
as its first 'test' on the acceptability of any theory of method 
that it meet the requirement laid down in (PR") (rather than that 
laid down in (R")) it follows that MSD also has the potential for 
avoiding this dilarrana (although whether this potential be actualised 
will obviously depend on exactly how we strengthen our demands - for 
eile, if we strengthen our demands in such a Tray that the 
additional demands are themselves inconsistent with (FR"), then 
such an application of MSD will result in no consistent theory of 
method being rationally acceptable). In addition, we have seen 
that not only does (PR") - and MSD - avoid the 'transcendental' 
strategy (since theories of rational scientific inquiry are indeed 
criticisable, and rationally eliminable, given them), but also that 
they are able to do so without any retreat into a methodological 
naturalism. Thus, on the face of it, (PR") - and MSD - offer us a 
means for staying firmly within the normative approach while 
avoiding the disaster of a dogmatic 'transcendentalism'. 
2.5= The Relation of Rationality to Choice. 
Let us return now to the third of the three apparent objections 
to (PR") discussed in section 2.3 - namely, the objection that 
(PR") is too weak in the sense that given it, different, incompatible, 
theories of rational scientific inquiry may at any given time be 
rationally adoptable by inquirers who share a common, independently 
specified, goal of inquiry. Recall that in reply to this objection 
I suggested that we adopt the method of strengthening demands, a 
method which enables us to progressively weed out theories of 
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rational inquiry against the 'teat' of increasingly stringent 
requirements on them. Yet despite this proposal I suspect that those 
who are seriously disturbed by the third objection still will not be 
satisfied. For, I conjecture, they will argue as follows: yes, we 
agree with you that the non-justificationist requirement laid down 
in (PR") is non-vacuous, in that not every theory of rational 
scientific inquiry will satisfy it (viz. the traditional problem of 
induction). Moreover, we also agree with you that by your proposed 
method of strengthening the demands on a theory of rational 
scientific inquiry beyond those incorporated in (PR"), we can indeed 
progressively narrow the range of alternative theories which remain 
rationally adoptable (relative, that is, to our strengthened 
demands). But, it will be observed, however far we go in this 
process one thing we will never be able to do, and that is to force 
anyone who desires to be rational to choose a single, unique set 
of rules of rational inquiry, or single, unique, theory of 
scientific method (and this even given that they agree with us as 
to the goal of scientific inquiry). But this, the argument 
concludes, is a singularly undesirable state of affairs. 
Now it must be admitted immediately that the above observation 
is indeed correct, and this for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
even if at some point in time only a single theory of scientific 
method M is available which is not known to fail any of the 'tests' of 
our strengthened demands, this does not prA^lude the possibility 
that some new theory of scientific method might not equally pass 
all of these 'tests'. Thus even those who accept the desirability 
of these demands are not rationally forced to accept M- for they 
are rationally free to search for a different theory of scientific 
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method. Secondly, no one can be rationally forced to accept the 
desirability of the strengthened demands themselves. Frain the 
viewpoint of (PR), however, neither of these points matter. The 
first point, that of the ever open possibility of a new theory of 
scientific method satisfying all of our demands, is certainly no 
basis for a criticism of M- for how does this possibility show that 
there is anything amiss with M? The second point, that of our 
inability to rationally force others to accept our strengthened 
demands, is again no basis for a criticism of M- for how can a 
refusal to employ a critical 'test' on possible theories of method 
itself be a criticism of a theory of method? Thus given the 
theory of rationality incorporated in (PR), our inability to force 
others to accept 'our' theory of rational scientific inquiry is 
really no worry at all - for given 
(PR) we need only be concerned 
for our rationality in choosing M if others can offer criticisms of 
M. 
At this point it is important to unearth a hidden aerumption 
which lies behind the renewed third objection to (PR") - for the 
observation that (PR"), even when supplemented with the method of 
strengthening demands, cannot force anyone who desires to be 
rational to choose a single, unique, theory of rational scientific 
inquiry only constitutes a criticism of (PR") if it is presupposed 
that the aim of rationality is to determine choice. Now this is, 
as far as I can see, precisely the traditional view - for unless 
rationality fully determines our choices, our choices must remain 
(or so it would appear) irrational. In other words, the tradition 
has it that the aim of rationality is to make our choices for us, 
rather than to help us make our choices. But this is, I submit, 
a drastic mistake - if for no other reason than that before 
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rationality can conceivably determine our choices we first have to 
choose to be rational (see Popper (1945) , chapter 2Q. crow this 
latter choice cannot possibly be rationally determined, r:.: _nce none 
of our choices can be rationally determined unless we first chooee 
to be rational. So if we n^w insist that unless rationality 
fully determines our choices, our choices remain irrational, then 
we shall have to conclude that in choosing to be rational we are 
making an irrational choice (this, in fact, is how Popper saw the 
situation in chapter 24 of his (1945)). But in that case rationality 
evaporates - for rationality would entail irrationality. Since 
irrationality also entails irrationality, it would they: follow that 
we only have a single choice - namely, to be irrational.. 
If, then, we hope to avoid this further conundrum, and lefoid 
once again the possibility of rational ty, then we must r P- th u sii 
the idea that the aim of rational methods is to determine choice. 
On the other hand, we certainly want our rational methods j^ bear 
some relation to choice - for otherwise rationality would 'e useless 
from a practical point of view. These requirements (or desiderata) 
are easily satisfiable if we see rationality as aiming to &aide us 
in our choices, without fully determining them. ? ow the therry of 
rationality articulated in (PR) - and thus in its special cs. ses 
(PR") and MSD - is precisely a theory of rationality according to 
Which rationality guides choice without determining it. For 
according to (PR) one can rationally adopt (or choose) any position 
so long as it is not irrational to adort that position, so long as 
there are no serious rational arg unentr ist adopting it. But 
this means that (PR) sees the fimotirn of rationality an one of 
limit. choice, rather than of deterrniniz it - fý, -- any of the 
Positions which are left open by rational argument are, according to 
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(PR), capable of being rationally chosen. 
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We thus reach the following result: if we insist, with those 
who are seriously disturbed by the third objection to (PR"), that 
rational methods have the property of determining choice, then we 
shall always remain disappointed - for rational methods alone can 
never determine choice, if for no other reason than that before they 
can possibly do so we must first choose to allow them to do no. 
But this means that if we see the aim of rationality as that of 
determining choice then we shall have to conclude that rationality 
is dependent on irrationality (since our choice to allow rational 
methods to determine our choice cannot itself be determined by 
rational methods). And this, in effect, means that rationality 
once again becomes impossible. So if we war* rationality to be 
possible, we cannot identify the aim of rationality with that of 
determining choice (here, incidentally, is a perfect example of how 
rational argument can limit choice! ). On the other hand, if 
rationality has nothing to do with choice then rationality becomes 
useless from a practical point of view. So if we want rational 
methods to be both possible and useful, then we had better view them 
as aiming to guide choice rather than to determine it. But as 
we have seen (PR) - and thus its special cases 
(PR") and MSD - 
satisfies precisely this requirement, since it enables rational 
methods to limit choice without determining it. Thus those who 
are seriously disturbed by the third objection to (PR") have got it 
all wrong - for they are presupposing an impossible view of 
rationality and insisting that we reject both a possible and a 
useful view of rationality on the basis of an impossibility. 
One final comment before bringing this section to a close: 
[Do 
in the context of much of the contemporary discussion in the 
philosophy of science the above remarks as to the relation of 
rationality to choice seem to me to be highly pertinent. For 
there is an almost universal consensus which identifies the problem 
of scientific rationality with the issue of rational choice. That 
is, almost everyone holds that the problem of the rationality of 
science is the problem of making sense of how, in science, rational 
choices between competing theories can be made. Thus we get both 
Kuhn and Feyerabend arguing, in effect, that since no rational 
considerations can ever determine a scientist'-s choice - either of 
theory, paradigm, or research project - science itself is irrational, 
in that what determines such choices is either s-cio-psychological 
factors (Kuhn) or opportunistic propaganda (Feyerabend). Moreover, 
those who take seriously the Duhem-Quine argument as a difficulty 
for the rationality of science also trade upon the assumption that 
empirical science can only be rational if the results of experi- 
mental teste are capable of compelling theoretical choice - for the 
Duhem-Quine argument is usually taken as showing that the results 
of euch tests do not determine the scope of theoretical choice, in 
that no experimental refutation ever informs us as to which of a 
number of logically independent theoretical assumptions must be 
rejected. What, however, is never argued, as far as I can see, is 
that the results of experimental testing do not limit theoretical 
choice; or that non-social, non-propagandistic rational arguments do 
not equally limit euch choice. In other worda, the very fact that, 
for eile, the results of experimental testing cannot determine 
the theoretical choices of scientists, is often taken as proof that 
empirical science is irrational. But once we realise that rational 
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methods can never determine choice then all of these arguments 
become neutralised - for they all rest upon the assumption that 
any choice which is not rationally deterflained is ipso facto an 
irrational choice. So once we relinquish the mistaken idea that 
rational methods can determine choice, and replace it instead A th 
the idea that they aim to guide choice (by limiting it), then we 
are in a position to see that the fact that a choice is not 
rationally determined does not entail that it must be an irrational 
choice. In other words, it then becomes possible to uphold the 
claim that although none of our choices are rationally determined, 
some of them are nevertheless rational (while others are not). But 
as soon as it becomes possible to uphold this claim then many of the 
arguments which have been proposed to show that science is irrational 
become totally ineffective. 
2.6: A Slmmiary of the Argument So-far 
At this point let me try to summarise the basic strands of 
the argument so far put forward in this chapter. We began by 
recalling that one of the traditional hopes of the normative 
approach to methodology is that it will enable us to explain the 
apparent success of science in achieving knowledge of the world on 
the basis of the distinctive effectiveness of scientific methods. 
We then saw that this hope faces a severe difficulty in the 
generalised problem of induction - since either the knowledge we 
hope to achieve in science is defined as being the outcome of the 
application of scientific methods or it is specified independently 
of euch methods. In the former case, any methods of scientific 
inquiry will be 'distinctively effective' ones, since every such 
method will be guaranteed to achieve 'scientific knowledge'; while 
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in the latter case, we will only be able to explain the apparent 
success of science in achieving knowledge if we are able to 
establish a connection between the application of a method and the 
achievement of euch knowledge (as independently specified). But 
since the attempt to do this inevitably leads either to circulatory 
or to a regress, it follows that ve are unable -to establish such a 
connection. If we then insist (in accordance with (R")) that we are 
only rationally entitled to adopt a methodology if we can 
establish such a connection, then we reach the conclusion that no 
methodology can be rationally adopted. 
We then noted that the generalised problem of induct-on has 
often been used as an argument against Popper's non-inductive theory 
of method, but that in that context it is totally ineffective F Lnce, 
for Popper, the possibility of rationally adopting any position 
does not depend, as it does in (R) and (R"), upon having an 
argument, or a justification, for that position. Rather, from 
Popper's non-juatificationiat viewpoitlt (incorporated in (PR) and 
(PR")) we are rationally entitled to adopt a position so long as 
there are no arguments against adopting I L, . From this point of 
view the fact that one is unable to establish a connection between 
the application of a method M and the achievement of scientific 
knowledge K (as independently species ied) canr%ot be taken as an 
argtmment to show that we are not rationally entätied to claim that 
M is effective for attaining K. Rather, such an argument must show 
that the application of M is inconsistent with, or frustrates, the 
achievement of K. But given this view (i. e., (PR")), we are then 
able to understand how we can be rationally entitled to adopt a 
methodology despite our inability to establish a. connecti'%r. :, etweer, 
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the application of that methodology and the attainment of scientific 
knowledge (as independently specified). 
We then noted that three possible objections might be raised 
against the proposal incorporated in (PR"). The first objection 
suggested that if we adopt (PR") then we will be unable to say 
that the methodology we rationally adopt is well-suited, or 
effective, for the achievement of scientific knowledge. This 
objection, as we say, surreptitiously re-introduces (R) (or (R")), 
since it presupposes that before we are rationally entitled to 
say anything we must first be able to justify our saying it (a 
position which, as we saw, entails that we are never rationally 
entitled to say anything). But since, according to (PR) (and (PR")), 
we are rationally entitled to say whatever we like so long as there 
are no serious arguments against our saying it, the fact timt there 
are no such arguments to show that the application of a method is 
inconsistent with, or frustrates, the achievement of scientific 
knowledge, entails that we are rationally entitled to say that the 
application of that method is indeed well-suited, or effective, 
for the achievement of scientific knowledge. 
Secondly, we saw that one might be tempted to object to the 
proposal incorporated in (PR") on the grounds that any method- 
ology will meet the requirements of (PR"), so that (PR") is in 
fact a form of 'transcendentalism', or of the 'analytic justification 
of a method'. This, however, turned out to be false - since the 
traditional problem of induction shows that some theories of method 
cannot meet the requirements of 
(PR"), in that we cannot attain 
scientific knowledge (as understood by the classical empiricist) 
by the supposed methods of inductive inference. But this means that 
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(PR") enables us to steer a miArlle course between the undesirable 
alternatives which are forced upon us by (R"). That is, (RI")' 
entails either that we are rationally entitled to adopt any method 
('analytic justification of a method') or rationally entitled to 
adopt no method (impossibility of a 'synthetic justification of a 
method'). But since some theories of method cannot meet the 
requiraments of (PR"), (PR") does not entail that we are rationally 
entitled to adopt any method; while since some theories of method 
can, so far as we know, meet the requirements of (PR"), (PR") does 
not entail that we are rationally entitled to adopt no method. Thus 
according to (PR") some methods, but not others, are rationally 
adoptable. 
Thirdly, we raised the objection that (PR") does not enable us 
to single out a uni ue theory of rational method as being the only 
methodology rationally adoptable by those who pursue an agreed,, 
independently specified, goal of scientific inquiry (if the goal is 
not independently specified then we will indeed be able to pick out 
a unique theory of method, but unfortunately we will then be able to 
'uniquely' pick out any theory of method). In response to this 
objection we pointed out that an embarras de richesse is nothing to 
be embarrassed about, and that if we desire to make rational 
discriminations between competing theories of method then we can 
indeed do so in a manner completely consistent with (PR"). For all 
we need do is to make our requirements on an adoptable theory of 
method stronger than those incorporated in (PR"), and then see which 
of the initially live theories can be rationally eliminated relative 
to our stronger requirements. Now this procedure, as we admitted, 
can never of itself single out a unique theory of method - since even 
if, by its help, we are able to eliminate all but one of the known 
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theories of method, it will still always be possible that some new, 
anrrently unarticulated, theory will satisfy our strengthened 
requirments. But, as we argued, to find such a possibility 
worrying is equivalent to insisting that rational procedures 
determine our choices, rather than limit them. Since this insis- 
tence leads, as we have seen, to the conclusion that rational 
procedures depend upon irrational ones, such an insistence leads to 
the self-destruction of rationality (since, if rationality entails 
irrationality then, since irrationality entails irrationality, 
there is no alternative but irrationality). 'thus, if we wish to 
have a non-self-destructive theory of rationality then we must 
relinquish the idea that rational procedures can determine our 
choices. But as soon as we relinquish this idea then we see that 
there is nothing at all worrying in the fact that the procedure 
which we have proposed is unable to single out a unique theory of 
rational method - for if it could do so, then it would make our 
choices for us, rather than help us make our choices. In other 
words, our proposed procedure (i. e., the method of strengthening 
demands starting from (PR")) gives us everything which we can 
rationally expect from a procedure for choosing between alternative 
theories of method, in that it shows how we can limit our choices 
without determining them. But since (PR") - and MSD - give us a 
way of limiting our choices (by excluding some theories of method), 
they avoid 'transcendentalism'; while since they are capable of 
doing so without any appeal to the test of congruence, they avoid 
methodological naturalism as well. 
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2.7: Explaining The Success of Science 
Let us return now to a discussion of the third traditional aim 
of the normative approach to methodology - that of explaining the 
supposed success of science in achieving knowledge of the world on 
the basis of its having adopted a distinctive set of methods of 
inquiry (what is usually known as 'the scientific method'). In this 
context, the upshot of our previous argument is straight-forward: this 
traditional aim (or hope) must be abandoned, and replaced by a 
weaker aim (or hope) - that of explaining not the supposed success 
of science but rather the possibility of such success. 
In order to see this, let us begin by considering what would 
have to be the case for this traditional aim to be achievable. 
Since we aim to enlain the supposed success of science on the 
basis of its methods of inquiry, we will have to offer an explanation, 
or an explanatory argument. Now any euch explanation will have to 
have, as its premise, a description of science's supposed methods; 
and as its conclusion, a statement to the effect that science has 
been successful in achieving knowledge (as independently specified). 
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But such an explanatory argument can never be valid unless we are 
able to incorporate an additional premise asserting some link 
between the methods described and the success supposedly achieved; 
and any euch additional premise could itself never be deduced from 
our theory of method alone - not, that is, if the success supposedly 
achieved is specified independently of our theory of method. Since 
we are unable to deduce this link from our theory of method alone, 
and since in order to explain the success supposedly achieved we 
must assume euch a link, it follows that we can never deduce the 
success supposedly achieved from our theory of method alone. But 
this entails that we cannot explain this supposed success simply on 
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the basis of science's having adopted some particular set of rules 
of rational inquiry, or some particular methodology. 
Now we are of course, given (PR"), rationally entitled to 
conjecture a link between a described set of methods and the success 
which we have supposedly achieved., eo long as there are no arguments 
to show that the methods described cannot produce the success 
supposedly achieved (although we must be rather careful here as to 
what success we suppose science has achieved, since some of the 
types of success which it has been supposed science has achieved 
are demonstrably unachievable - for example, it has often been 
supposed that science has achieved inductively justified theoretical 
knowledge). But, and this is the central point here, the most that 
any euch conjectural link will enable us to explain is how science 
might be successful, not why it must be successful. 
To see this, begin by realising that if we could establish, 
starting from a description of a method, some link between the 
method so described and the success supposedly achieved, then we 
would be in a position to see the past success of science as 
inevitable and its future success as assured (assuming, of course, 
that science in fact has adopted, and will continue to adopt, the 
methods described). In other words, if from the description of a 
method we could deduce the link then, since from the method plus 
the link we can indeed deduce the success supposedly achieved, it 
would follow that from a mere description of the method we could 
deduce success. But in that case the success becomes a necessary 
or inevitable consequence of the application of the method - and so science. 
long as it continues to employ this method, is guaranteed to 
achieve success (as independently specified). Since we are unable 
to deduce such a link from the more description of a method (viz., 
i0i 
the generalised problem of induction) it follows that such a 
description can never provide a guarantee for whatever success we 
suppose science to have achieved. 
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Given this, it follows that if we require/ a rationally acceptable 
theory of rational scientific method that it provide either a 
sufficient explanation for, or a guarantee of, the supposed success 
of science (as independently specified) then we shall have to conclude 
(once again! ) that no such theory can ever be rationally accepted. 
So if we hope to be able to rationally accept some such theory then 
we mist relinquish this traditional requirement (i. e., this traditional 
hope of the normative approach). But is there, perhaps, a weaker 
requirement which we can put in its stead - one which will be weak 
enough to be satisfiable by some theories of method, and yet strong 
enough not to be satisfiable by every theory of method? The answer 
to this question is yes: what we can require of a theory of scientific 
method is that it enable us to understand how the supposed success of 
science is possible, without making it neceeeasy (or guaranteeing it, 
of offering a sufficient explanation of it). Such a requirement is, 
in fact, part and parcel of the requirement incorporated in (PR") - 
for (PR") demands that a rationally adoptable theory of rational 
scientific method be such that the application of that method not be 
provably inconsistent with the achievement of scientific knowledge (as 
independently specified). But this means that (PR") requires that our 
theories of scientific method be consistent with the assumption that we 
have, in science, achieved some success in attaining scientific know- 
ledge (as independently specified). But if our theories of method are 
consistent with this assumption then they do not rule it out, so 
that it then becomes possible that science has achieved the success 
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which we euppose it has achieved. Since ( PR" ) is, we have argued, 
weak enough to be potentially satisfiable by some theories of method 
and yet strong enough not to be satisfiable by every theory of 
method, and since our new (weaker) requirement of 'possibility 
rather than neces ity# is itself part and parcel of (PR"), it 
follows that this new (weaker) requirement equally shares this same 
property (of being weak enough, etc. ). 
We have, then, reached the following remelt: if we demand 
(or hope) that our theory of rational scientific inquiry have the 
property of guaranteeing, or offering a sufficient explanation of, 
science's supposed success (as independently specified) then we 
shall be forever disappointed. So the best that we can hope for 
(or demand) is that our theory of rational method be (a) consistent 
with the assumption that we have, in science, achieved some success 
in attaining knowledge (as independently specified), and (b) 
consistent with any stronger requirements which we are able to impose 
upon an acceptable theory of method. To demand (a) is, in effect, 
to require that any acceptable theory of method be capable of 
explaining the possibility of scientific success (or progress), 
without being able to necessitate it. Thus the demand incorporated 
in (a) is weaker than the demand that our theory of rational scientific 
inquiry be capable of explaining science's supposed success - for 
to demand the latter is equivalent to demanding that we be able to 
deduce the success of science from our theory of method. Now if we 
can deduce A from B, then A must be consistent with B (assuming 
B to be consistent); but A can be consistent with B without it being 
possible to deduce it from B. Thus the requirement of consistency 
(as in (a)) is weaker than the traditional requirement of explanation; 
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but it enables a widely recognized type of explanation nevertheless. 
For the consistency of our theory of method with the assumption 
that science has achieved success enables us to explain how that 
success is possible. Such a theory will thus provide an answer 
(although, of course, not necessarily a unique answer) to the 
question: how is the success of science possible? 
2.8: The Method of Strengthening Demands - Further Remarks 
I want, finally, to spell out an important consequence of the 
previous sectionts results for the method of strengthening demands 
(MSD) - for one of the obvious difficulties . th regard to MSD is 
the question of Whether or not our selection of additional demands 
can be anything other than arbitrary. That it can be other than 
arbitrary has, I suggest, already been argued (in Section 2.4) in 
relation to the issue of whether or not the naturalistic 
methodologist 'e test of congruence should be incorporated as an 
additional. demand. But since that argument depended, in part, upon 
the assumption that we are trying to remain firmly within the 
normative approach, it will not do much to allay the worries of those 
who wonder whether our selection of additional normative demands 
can be Urthing other than arbitrary. The results of the last 
section, however, show that their worries are baseless. 
To see this, let us return virtually to the beginning of this 
chapter and recall that if we insist (in accordance with (R")) 
that we cannot rationally adopt a methodology unless we are able 
to establish the claim that the application of that methodology's 
rules of procedure is effective for the attainment of scientific 
knowledge, then we confront a serious dilemma - in that either every 
method of inquiry will be rationally adoptable 
('analytic justification 
of a method') or none will be (impossibility of a 'synthetic 
justification of a method'). Since we have vowed to avoid the 
'traneoendental' strategy (if we can), and since the approach of 
an 'analytic justification' is equivalent to adopting euch a 
strategy, we must reject this 'analytic' approach. But this then 
leaves us with the 'synthetic' approach, and given (R") this 
approach entails the impossibility of rationally adopting any 
theory of method. So if we want to both avoid the 'analytic' approach 
and yet make it possible for ourselves to rationally adopt some 
theory of method then we must relinquish (R"). In this context the 
argument for replacing (R") with (PR") is particularly strong - 
since, as we have seen, (PR") both avoids the 'analytic' approach 
and makes it possible (so far as we know) to rationally adopt some 
theories of method. 
Now if we want to continue to reap the benefits of replacing 
(R") with (PR"), then there are two things which we cannot do. 
Firstly, we cannot retreat from an independent specification of our 
notion of 'scientific knowledge' (or of the goal of scientific 
inquiry) - for to do this would be to return to the 'analytic' 
approach. Secondly, we cannot strengthen our demands on an 
acceptable theory of method beyond that incorporated in (PR") in 
such a wahr that no theory of method becomes rationally adoptable - 
for to do this would be to relinquish the other chief advantage 
of our replacing (R") with (PR"). But this immediately entails 
two strict limits on how we can go about strengthening our demands. 
Firstly, we cannot strengthen our demands beyond (PR") in euch a way 
that our strengthened set of demands becomes internally inconsistent, 
for in that case no consistent theory of method will be able to 
satisfy all of our demands, and so we will once again wind up with 
being unable to rationally adopt any theory of method. In other 
words, any additional demand which we propose to employ in eunplementation 
jl-I... 
of (PR") must itself be consistent with the demand incorporated 
in (PR"), for if it isn't then we have simrply re-impaled ourselves 
on one of the home of the initial dilemma which (PR") helps us to 
avoid. Thus any additional demand which we propose to make on an 
acceptable theory of method must itself be consistent with the demand 
incorporated in (PR"). 
Secondly, imagine that we propose to demand of an acceptable 
theory of method that it satisfy some requirement 0; and imagine 
further that we can show that no theory of method can satisfy 0; 
then to adopt $ as an additional demand would be once again 
equivalent to a retreat onto one of the horns of our initial 
dilemma - in that even if 0 and (PR") were consistent, the impoe- 
eibility of satisfying 0 would entail the impossibility of jointly 
satisfying 0 and (PR"). Thus any unsatisfiable demand on a theory 
of rational method must be rejected if we hope to continue to reap 
the benefits of rejecting (R") in favour of (PR"). 
Now the results of the previous section are of relevance in 
precisely this context. For what they show is that one of the 
traditional demands of the normative approach on an acceptable 
theory of method - namely, that the application of its rules of 
procedure provide a sufficient explanation of , or a guarantee for, 
scientific success (as independently specified) - cannot itself be 
satisfied. But this means that we cannot supplement the demand of 
(PR") with this additional (traditional) demand and yet retain the 
benefits of (PR"). Thus, if we adopt (PR") in order to free 
ourselves from the initial dilemma, then we cannot accept this 
traditional demand of the normative approach, and must instead 
replace it with a demand which is both satisfiable and consistent 
with (PR"). But as we saw the demand that our theories of method 
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explain the possibility of scientific success (or progress), without 
being able to necessitate it)is precisely such a demand. 
We thus reach the following result: our desire to avoid the 
'transoendental' strategy wherein every theory of method becomes 
'rationally acceptable' (so that the notion of a rational methodology 
becomes empty), coupled with our desire to be able to rationally 
accept some theory of method (so that a rational methodology is 
possible) entails that we must reject (R"). Since (PR") enables 
us, so far as we know, to achieve both of these objectives, no 
argument can at present be raised against our accepting (PR") on 
the grounds of either of these objectives. Thus we axe rationally 
able to accept (PR"). But having thus adopted (PR") the last thing 
we will want to do is to then proceed to put these objectives at 
risk (since if we were willing to put them at risk we wouldn't 
have rejected (R") in favour of (PR")). But this then entails, first 
of all, that we cannot retreat from an independent specification of 
our notion of 'scientific knowledge' (or of the goal of scientific 
inquiry); and it also entails the existence of limits on any accept- 
able further demand on a theory of rational inquiry beyond that 
specified in (PR"). But this means, recalling the discussion of 
Section 2.5, that our choice of additional demands need not be 
arbitrary - at least not in that sense of 'arbitrary' in which an 
arbitrary choice is an irrational choice. In other words, since 
given our objectives we are able to adopt (PR") (but not (R")), and 
since given our objectives plus (PR") there are definite limits on 
the additional normative demands which we are able to impose on a 
theory of rational inquiry, it follows that our initial objectives 
plus (PR") serve to guide, but not fully determine, our choice of 
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of additional demands. But since this is all that we can rationally 
expect from any rational methods for choice, it follows that our 
initial objectives plus (PR") enable us to make rational - and thus 
in one important sense of 'non-arbitrary', non-arbitrary - choices 
of additional normative demands. 
Two further points need, however, to be made here. Firstly, 
many may wonder how it can be possible that our desire to avoid 
'transcendentalism', coupled with our desire to be able to rationally 
accept some theory of method, can themselves provide the basis, 
or at least part of the basis, for a rational method for choosing 
additional normative demands on an acceptable theory of method. 
Behind this wonderment lies, I suspect, the idea that our desires 
and our rationality inhabit 'different worlds', so that where desire 
reigns there rationality is nowhere to be seen. This however is 
another drastic mistake (a mistake made, understandably enough, by 
the romantics - who saw rationality as the enemy of desire; but in 
this they were encouraged by the traditional rationalists - who saw 
one of the aims of rationality as that of conquering irrational desire) 
- for so long as our desires are not irrational they are, given 
(PR), 
rational desires. Thus so long as no serious arguments are available 
to show that our two desires are unachievable, or that the cost of 
achieving them is too great, our desire to achieve them is certainly 
not irrational. Now the only serious argument known to me which 
seems to show that our two desires are unachievable is precisely 
the 
initial argument from (R") , an argument which seems 
to show that 
either we must adopt the 'transcendentalism' of 
the 'analytic' 
approach or we must relinquish the possibility of rationally 
adopting any theory of method. But nothing rationally 
forces us to 
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accept (R"), and in fact the cost of accepting it is itself 
exceptionally large (since if we do accept it then rationality 
becomes either vacuous or impossible); while if we replace (R") with 
(PR") then our two desires become simultaneously achievable. It 
thus follows that our two desires are indeed simultaneously 
achievable, and at no great cost, and no our desire to achieve 
them is certainly not irrational. Thus, given (PR), our desire to 
achieve them is a rational desire. But moreover not only are these 
desires themselves rational desires they are, in fact, equivalent to 
the desire to be rational! For our first desire is to avoid 
'transcendentalism', and this means desiring that our notion of 
rationality (or of rational method) not be empty; while our 
second desire is to be able to rationally adopt some theory of 
method, and this means desiring that rationality (or rational 
methodology) be possible. But to desire both of these is precisely 
to desire that we be capable of non-vacuous rationality (or of 
implementing non-vacuous rational methods). Thus not only are our 
two desires rational ones, but they constitute moreover the 
rational desire to be rational. 
Now this result is an important one, for it indicates yet 
another advantage of abandoning the traditional juatificationist 
view of rationality incorporated in (R) and (R") in favour of their 
non-justificationist rivals incorporated in (PR) and (PR"). It thus 
indicates a further cost which we must bear if we refuse to give 
up the justificationist view of rationality - for according to this 
view until our desires are deteanire d by reasons they always remain 
irrational desires (and thus something to be avoided by the rational 
man). But before our desires can possibly be determined by reasons 
we must first desire to be rational. But this latter desire cannot 
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be determined by reasons, since no desire can be determined by 
reasons unless we desire to be rational. Thus the desire to be 
rational must itself be an irrational desire. Yet it is hard to 
imagine a more rational desire than the desire to be rational. Thus 
if even this desire is irrational, then all desires must be irrational 
- and so rationality and desire become irreconcilable enemies. So 
if we hope to make sense of the possibility of rational desire then 
we mast relinquish the justifioationist view of rationality 
incorporated in (R). But if we do so, and replace it with (PR), then 
the apparent 'Marsare' between reason and desire simply vanishes, 
since according to (PR) some desires but not others can be rational 
desires (the rational desires being those which aren't irrational - 
that i®, those against which no serious arguments are available to 
show either that they are unachievable, or that the cost of achieving 
them is too great). 
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More particularly, given (PR) (and thus 
(PR")) the eminently rational desire to be rational can itself now 
be seen as a rational desire. 
Secondly, with respect to the limits which our initial 
objectives plus (PR") place upon acceptable additional normative 
demands on an adoptable theory of method, a certain severe difficulty 
might be thought to arise. To see this, let us imagine that we 
propose to demand of an acceptable theory of rational inquiry that 
it satisfy not only (PR") but also the two additional demands 0 
and $. Imagine further that no argument is available to show that 
either demand is inconsistent with (PR") - thus each demand meets 
the first 'test' for an acceptable additional demand. Imagine 
further that no argument is available to show that either 0 or $ 
are in themselves unsatisfiable - thus each demand meets the second 
'test# for an acceptable additional demand. Nevertheless, it remains 
III 
possible that although 0 and 0 are each satisfiable, and indeed 
each jointly satisfiable with (PR"), the conjunction of all three 
demands can be shown to be inconsistent (and thus unsatisfiable). 
Thee, if we were to demand of an acceptable theory of rational 
inquiry that it meet all three of these demands then we would re- 
impale ourselves on one of the horns of the initial dilemma which 
(PR") helps us to avoid - namely, that horn in which no theory of 
method is rationally adoptable. On the other hand, our motivation 
for strengthening our demands at all is so as to rationally 
discriminate between competing theories of scientific inquiry each 
of which, so far as is known, satisfies the requirement of (PR") 
for some given, independently specified, goal of such inquiry. But, 
and here is the problem, how are we to deoide whether to strengthen 
(PR") with 0 or whether to strengthen it with $ Given our desire 
to make it possible for ourselves to rationally adopt some theory of 
method, we cannot strengthen (PR") with both; while given our desire 
to be able to rationally discriminate between competing theories of 
inquiry each of which satisfies (PR") we will, presumably, hope to 
strengthen it with at least one. So the question is: what procedure 
shall we adopt in order to help ourselves to decide between 0 and 0. 
Now the answer I want to suggest to this question is perhaps 
surprising - for the aim of the above argument is to show a severe 
limitation to my proposed method of strengthening demands (MZD). That 
is, the argument aims to show that the employment of MSD to help 
us discriminate between competing theories of inquiry will get 
nowhere, since in its employment we are likely to have to confront 
what are, in effect, competing additional demands (like $ and $) and 
MSD itself, or so it would appear, is going to be unable to help us 
in such a situation. But my answer to the question - what procedure 
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shall we adopt in order to help ourselves decide whether to opt for 
0 or `whether to opt for $- is itself: the procedure outlined in 
the method of strengthening demands! That is, having discovered 
that the conjunction of the three demands 0, $ and (PR") is 
uneatiefiable we shall, given our Objectives, quite rationally 
refuse to supplement the demand incorporated in (PR") with both $ 
and $. On the other hand, since both 0 and $ separately meet the 
first two 'tests' for acceptable additional demands, we have as 
yet no means for rationally prefering the addition of one of them 
rather than the other (and so rationally can add either). So if we 
hope to make it possible for ourselves to make a rational preference 
between 0 and $ then we have to give ourselves the means to do so - 
that is, we have to develop some further ttest' on acceptable 
additional demands in the hope that one or the otter of 0 and $ will 
fail this new 'teat' so that, given (PR), we will then be able to 
rationally prefer the demand which passes this 'test' to the one 
Which doesn't. 
Now assume that we can generate some further additional demand 
on an acceptable theory of method (call this further demand F); and 
assume further that F itself can meet each of the first two 'tests' 
on acceptable additional demands - that is, F is both consistent 
with (PR") and satisfiable in itself. Then the following situation 
may very well arise - whereas the conjunction of F, 
0 and (PR") 
cannot be shown to be inconsistent, the conjunction of F, $ and 
(PR") can be shown to be inconsistent. In this case, if we raise 
consistency with F into a further 'test' on an acceptable additional 
demand then we are enabled to rationally discriminate between 0 and 
$- for whereas 0 passes this 'test', $ fails it. Thus given all 
this we can quite rationally prefer 0 to $" 
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Another, perhaps better, way of looking at the situation 
described above is this: since we have an argument to show that the 
conjunction of O, 0 and (PR") is inconsistent we will, given our 
objectives, quite rationally refuse to supplement (PR") with both 
0 and X. However, if we have an argument to show that the conjunction 
of 0, $ and (PR") is inconsistent, then we equally have an argument 
to show that the conjunction of (PR") and F is inconsistent. 
Thus we shall, given our objectives, quite rationally refuse to 
supplement (PR") with the multiple additional demand consisting of the 
conjunction of 0, $ and F. On the other hand, it is perfectly 
possible that the multiple additional demand consisting of the 
conjunction of 0 and F can pass the first two 'tests' on an 
acceptable additional demand (that is, no argument is available to 
show either that this multiple demand is inconsistent with (PR") or 
to show that it is unsatisfiable in itself, whereas an argument is 
available to show that the multiple additional demand consisting 
of the conjunction of $ and F fails at least one of these 'tests'. 
Then from the viewpoint of these 'tests' we will, quite rationally, 
prefer the multiple demand (0 and F) to the multiple demand ($ and 
F), and so these 'testet will enable us to rationally discriminate 
between 0 and $ (in the presence of F). 
To am up: in the situation we have imagined 0 and $ each 
severally meet the first two 'tests' on acceptable additional 
demands, ahereae the multiple demand (0 and $) fails at least one 
of these 'testet. In this situation we may quite reasonably 
describe 0 and $ as competing additional demands on an acceptable 
theory of inquiry - in that any euch theory can attempt to satisfy 
one or the other but not both. Our problem was then to find a 
method whereby we could make some progress in helping us to rationally 
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decide between these competing additional demands, and the method 
so-found was precisely this - employ the method of etremgthenixig 
d_, for by employing this method we are able to make available 
to ourselves progressively more stringent 'teste' on our initially 
competing demands. Or, to this point another way, we are able to 
make available to ourselves a means by Which our two initial 
'tests' can themselves be employed to enable us to discriminate, in 
the presence of a further strengthening of our demands, between our 
initially oompeting demands. 
Now those who still hanker after the possibility that rational 
methods will be powerful enough to actually determine choice will, 
I am eure, be unhappy with the above suggestion - for nothing I have 
said shows in any way that we are rationally forced to accept F 
( the further additional demand), and thus nothing I have said 
shows in any way that we are rationally forced to prefer 0 to $. 
True enough, but at least the following is clear: anyone who wants 
our theories of rational inquiry to satisfy the demand F will, by the 
above method, be able to make a straight-forwardly rational pref- 
erenoe of 0 over #- since (0 and F) but not ($ and F) can meet the 
requirements of our two initial 'teats'; while for anyone who is 
unconcerned about F these two demands are rationally on a par (since 
both 0 and $ severally pass the two initial 'tests' on an acceptable 
additional demand). But this means that those who are unconcerned 
about F can have no argument against our preference (unless, that is, 
they raise some further additional demand); in particular, they 
cannot show that our preference of 0 fails to be a rational one. 
But then, given (PR), our preference of 0 is a perfectly rational 
preference. In other words, once again, it is crucial to realise 
that the refusal to employ a potentially critical 'test' cannot 
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possibly count as a criticism of any preference. Thus such a refusal 
cannot, given (PR), show that the preference made in the light of 
the 'test' fails to be a rational preference. 
Considerable disquiet may, however, still remain - for imagine 
the following situation. Let us imagine, as before, that 0 and $ 
each severally pass the two initial 'teste' on an acceptable 
additional demand, Whereas the multiple demand (0 and $) does not. 
Assume further that $ is thought of as a particularly valuable or 
important demand which an acceptable theory of rational inquiry 
should meet, Whereas 0 is thought of as relatively unimportant. 
In this case one might be tempted to think that the employment of MSD 
will either be unnecessary or futile - for we will prefer J to 0 as 
an additional demand simply because we think that meeting this demand 
is so much more important than meeting the demand incorporated in 0. 
Thus we will have no need to employ MSD in order to help us make 
our choice. This, however, is a mistake, and for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, imagine again, as before, that the multiple 
demand (0 and F) can meet the requirement of our two initial 'tests' 
whereas the multiple demand ($ and F) cannot. Then even although 
we initially value the demand $ much more highly than we value 0, 
nevertheless the employment of MD has here enabled us to learn 
something - namely, it has enabled us to learn that sacrificing F 
is one of the costs which we shall have to bear in demanding $. Thus 
the employment of MSD can, in principle, lead us to modify our 
initial conjecture as to the enormous value of meeting the demand 
incorporated in $= for by the employment of MSD we may be able to 
ring our initial valuing of $ with so many die-utilities(or costs) 
that we come to realize that the values we are forced to sacrifice by 
valuing $ actually outweigh the value of 0. Secondly, and this point 
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is closely related to the first, we may not be, in the absence of 
inquiry, in a very good position to be able to know exactly what it 
is which we really do desire, or want, or value. Thu% we may 
initially think that we value I very highly; but now imagine that 
through the employment of MSD we not only come to rationally 
appreciate that our valuing of $ is becoming progressively more costly, 
but moreover someone is able to fomulate an ever so slight weakening 
of $ which is such that, although $ itself forces us to abandon many 
of our other demands, this ever so slight weakening of X does not. 
In such a situation we may very well come to the conclusion that we 
never 'really' valued $ at all; that what we 'really' valued all 
along was its ever so slight weakening, a weakening which gives us 
all that we ever really wanted from $ but without its costs. But to 
formulate such a weakening of $ is precisely to employ MSD - for it 
is to formulate some further additional demand F which is euch that 
the multiple demand consisting of F and all the costa of $ itself 
meets the two initial 'tests' on an acceptable additional demand on 
a theory of rational inquiry. In other words, by employing lSD we 
can not only come to learn about the costs of what we value, we may 
even come to learn about what exactly it is which we do value. Thus 
despite our initial differential valuing of 0 and $ there is still a 
crucially important role for the employment of MSD. 
2.9: Conolusion 
In this chapter I have tried to ahw that by linking the issues 
of the theory of rational scientific method or inquiry to the question 
of scientific success or progress (as independently epecifi. ed) we can 
generate the beginnings of a method for securing the avoidance of the 
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'tranecendentelt strategy while simultaneously remaining wholly 
within the normative approach to methodology. Such a victory for 
the normative approach can, however, only be won if we are willing 
to abandon the traditional juetificationist view of rationality 
incorporated in (R) and (R") - for unless we do so, the generalised 
problem of induction will entail our inability to rationally adopt any 
normative theory of rational scientific inquiry, and so entail the 
rational impossibility of a non-'transcendental' nonnative theory of 
method. So if we are to have any rational hope for euch a theory 
then we must relinquish the justificationist view of rationality, 
and to replace it instead with Popper's non-justificationist (or 
oritioalist) view of rationality as incorporated in (PR) and (PR"). 
Having done this - and the costs of not doing so are, as we have seen, 
enormous - we were then in a position to develop a method, the method 
of strengthening demands (MSD), which can enable us to progressively 
discriminate between competing theories of rational scientific 
inquiry each of Which is able to pass the initial 'testt of (FR"); 
that is, the 'test' of not provably frustrating our quest for 
scientific knowledge (as independently specified). Moro-over, we 
saw that the non-'transcendental' (or 'synthetic') approach to 
methodology incoporated in (PR") - and thus in MSD, which takes (PR") 
as its first demand on an acceptable theory of inquiry - itself 
remains finely within the normative approach: for the naturalistic 
methodologist Is test of congruence is always irrelevant to the 
question of the effectiveness, or otherwise, of a methodology, and 
thus irrelevant to the question of whether or not a proposed theory 
of rational scientific inquiry is able to pass the initial 'test' 
of (PR"). And in addition we were able to show that this 
approach to methodology is not 'no=nativ' naturalistic' either 
- for the conjunction of the naturalistic methodoiogist's test of 
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oongraence with the nozmative assumption that actual science has 
progressed can neither establish nor refute the claimed effectiveness 
of a proposed theory of inquiry. 
Furthermore, we have investigated a number of possible objec- 
tione to the normative approach to methodology incorporated in (PR") 
and MSD, and have shorn that many of these objections crucially 
depend upon the by now rejected juetificationiet view of rationality. 
In particular, we have seen how the objection that MSD cannot 
uniquely determine our choice of a theory of rational scientific 
inquiry crucially depends upon the justifioationiet view that the aim 
of rational procedures is to determine choice, a view which would 
turn all of our choices into irrational ones - since rational choice 
Would then only be possible if we had firnt irrationally chosen to 
be rational. Moreover, we have shown how, within MSD, the decision 
as to Which additional normative demands are to be made on an acceptable 
theory of rational inquiry is itseli a decision which is guided, or 
constrained, or limited - and thus a decision which can be rational 
and non-arbitrary. And we have even shown how MSD can itself be 
fruitfully employed when the issue in question is not the 'first-order' 
one of discriminating between competing theories of rational 
inquiry but rather the 'second-order' one of discriminating between 
competing additional demands on competing theories of rational inquiry. 
Finally, we have argued that the third traditional hope of the 
normative approach to methodology - the hope of providing a sufficient 
methodological explanation for the success of science (as indepen- 
dently specified), or a methodological guarantee for such success - 
cannot itself be realised. Thus this traditional äesidera. tum on an 
acceptable normative theory of scientific method must rationally be 
relinquished and replaced instead with the more modest desideratum 
(2S 
that an acceptable theory of scientific method be such that it 
enable us to explain, or understand, only the possibility that 
science has been successful (in either achieving, or making progress 
towards, an independently specified goal of scientific inquiry). 
But this result should not be taken to challenge, or call into 
question, the other two traditional hopes of the normative approach 
to methodology - that is, the hope of providing a theory of rational 
inquiry which could, in principle, have been of use in the 
establishment of science, in getting it off the ground; and the 
hope of contributing, via the independent discussion of normative 
methodological issues, to the progressive reform of science's 
actual methodological practices. For as far as I can see these two 
traditional hopes remain completely intact. 
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1. The idea that in specifying a notion of 'scientific knowledge' 
we are simultaneously specifying a goal of scientific inquiry is 
due to Nicholas Maxwell. See his 'The Rationality of Scientific 
Discovery, Part I' , P'hiloso lp 11 of Science, 41 
(1974)9 PP " 123-53 " 
2. A similar 'defence' of inductive methods is provided by AJ Ayer 
in his The Problem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1956), p. 75 where he writes that scientific method (i. e., the 
methods of inductive inference) 'could be irrational only if there 
were a standard of rationality thtch it failed to meet; whereas 
in fact it goes to set the standard: arguments are judged to be 
rational or irrational by reference to it'. But not only does this 
simply declare the methods of inductive inference 'rational' by 
a kind of terminological fiat , but moreover the very same procedure 
can be employed to 'justify' the acceptance of any rational 
standard (or the acceptability of any theory of method). For 
other expositions of the 'analytic justification of induction' 
see PF Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen, 
1952), chapter 9, section II; and Paul Edwards, 'Russell's Doubts 
About Induction', in R Swinburne (ed. ), The Justification of 
Induction (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 26-47. 
3. It should, in this context, be noted that there is in fact a 
persistent ambiguity in Popper's later philosophy - in that it is 
unclear as to whether he wants to say that getting closer to the 
truth (or increasing Verisimilitude) is the goal of scientific 
inquiry, or whether he wants to hold that the goal of such inquiry 
is simply to discover the truth (i. e., the whole Truth) but where 
the progress of such inquiry towards this goal is to be 'measured' 
by increasing Verisimilitude. For my part, I prefer to see the goal 
of scientific inquiry as simply that of attaining the Truth, and to 
consider Poppers theory of Verisimilitude as an attempt (albeit an 
unsuccessful attempt) to make sense of the idea that we can make 
progress towards this goal through a sequence of false theories. 
This distinction - between increasing Verisimilitude as the goal 
of scientific inquiry, on the one side, and as a 'measure' of 
II 
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progress towards a different goal, on the other side - seems to me 
to be of crucial significance: for while Popper's falsificationist 
methodology is, I submit, admirably suited to pursuing the goal of 
attaining the Truth, it is not at all clear that it is well-suited 
to the goal of increasing Verisimilitude. In fact, given the 
extreme difficulties involved in even articulating a defensible 
notion of Verisimilitude it must remain an open question as to what 
the goal of science is if its goal is to increase Verisimilitude. 
But if it is not at all clear what this goal consists in, then it 
mast be doubly unclear as to whether any particular theory of 
method is, or is not, suited to pursuing this goal. For a severe 
refutation of Popper's theory of Verisimilitude, see David Miller, 
'Popper's Qualitative Theory of Verisimilitude', British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, 25 (1974) , pp. 178-88. 
! ý. The suggestion that some such principle needs to be incorporated 
into Popper's methodology has been explicitly made by Imre Lakatos. 
He writes: 'Tarski's rehabilitation of the correspondence theory of 
truth ... stimulated Popper to complement his logic of discovery 
/. e., his methodological recommendations? with his own theory of 
verisimilitude ... It 
Ehen7 became possible, for the first time, 
to define progress even for a sequence of false theories ... But 
this is not enough: we have to recognise progress. This can be done 
easily by an inductive principle which connects realist metaphysics 
with methodological appraisals, verisimilitude with corroboration % 
As we shall see this suggestion of Lakatos' is completely beside the 
point - since from, a Popperian viewpoint there is simply no need 
Whatsoever to supplement one's theory of method with such an 
'inductive principle'. The above quotation from Lakatos in from 
p. 254 of his 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction' in PAS hilpp (ed. ), 
The Philosophy of Karl Popper, (La Salle, 3L1.: Open Court, 19Th), 
pp. 2L. 1-73. 
This fact, that (PR) can be rationally adopted by its own lights, 
means that (PR) is a version of what WW Bartley has called 
'comprehensively critical rationalismt - see his The Retreat to 
Commitment (1962), op. cit.. It should be noted here that (R) can 
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be fommulated in such a manner that the additional assumption 
required in the text can be dispensed with. Thus, let (R) simply 
be the view that the rationalist can, and should, hold all of his 
positions rationally - that is, on the basis of arguments. Then, 
since the attempt to base every position on arguments leads to a 
regress, it mast be the case that either the rationalist cannot 
hold all of his positions rationally or else that, since he can't, 
he shouldn't. In either case (R) is false; and this has been 
shown on the basis of argument. But this means that anyone who 
wants, in accordance with (R), to hold all of his positions on 
the basis of argumente, must hold not-(R). Thus (R) leads to its 
own rejection. 
6. I might just mention here that in some of his published writings 
Kula seems also to adopt a 'hormative naturalistic' viewpoint 
rather than a merely naturalistic one. Thus when confronted, or 
example by Feyerabend, with the question of whether his theory of 
scientific research (and in particular his theory of normal 3oiencej 
is to be taken as merely descriptive of current scientif-c practice 
or as prescriptive for that practice, Kuhn has argued that it 
'should be read in both ways at once'. In other words, his theory 
is supposed to be simultaneously normative and naturalistic. Now 
clearly any argument from the naturalistic premise (a) that this is 
how science methodologically proceeds, to the normative conclasion 
(b) that this is how science ought to methodologically proceed, must 
itself have a normative premise, and such a premise would be supplied 
by the assumption (c) that how science currently methodologically 
proceeds facilitates, or brings about, the progress of scientific 
knowledge, so that (d) if our concern is with the progress of such 
knowledge then we ought to continue with our current methodological 
practices. The crucial problem here, however, arises with regard 
to (o) - since, as we have seen, no amount of purely naturalistic 
investigation will ever be able to show that it is how science 
currently methodologica? . '. y proceeds which is 
itself responsible for 
scientific progress. But, on the other hand, the generalised problem 
of induction shows that no amount of normative i^. vestigation will 
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ever show this either. Thus, the attempt to establish (c) simply 
cannot succeed - whether no3matively or naturalistically - and so 
the attempt to justify the current methodological practices of 
science cannot succeed either. For Feyerabend'e criticism of Kuhn's 
theory as being 'ambiguous' between description and prescription, see 
his 'Consolations for the Specialist', in I Lakatos and A Musgrave 
(eds. ), (1970), pp. 197-230; for Kuhn's reply see his 'Reflections 
on ley Critics' in the same volume, pp. 231-278 (the quotation above 
is from p. 237). See also in this connection the Postscript to the 
2nd edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970) where Kuhn makes clear that it is 
precisely because he thinks that science has progressed that he 
thinks that it ought to continue to employ whatever methodology it 
employs at present (and thus whatever methodology it can be 
naturalistically shown to employ). 
7. It is, I think, worth noting here that even Newton-Smith himself 
ultimately admits (tacitly) that his hope of establishing that 
science has made progress., without the use of any methodological 
principles1does not succeed - for we read in the concluding chapter 
(p. 268) of his The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and 
Began Paul, 1981) that 'we should, in fact, adopt the hypothesis 
that there has been progress towards greater verisimilitude in 
science because that hypothesis provides the best explanation of 
the increase in predictive and manipulative powers provided by 
s61encel. Three points should be made in response to this: firstly, 
to provide an argument for adopting the hypothesis that science has 
made progress is hardly to have established that science has made 
progress. But secondly, and more importantly, even the argument 
Newton-Smith is proposing here for merely adopting this hypothesis 
is not itself free of the use of methodological principles - for the 
argument is that we should adopt the hypothesis of progress (towards 
greater verisimilitude in science) because it provides the best 
explanation of certain assumed 'facts' (namely, 'the increase of 
predictive and manipulative powers provide: ' by science*). But that 
we should adapt an hypothesis because it provides the best explanation 
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of certain assumed facts is itself, clearly, a methodological 
principle; as indeed will be all of those principles by which we 
hope to recognise which hypotheses actually do provide the best 
explanations for assumed facts. Finally, if we actually hope to 
establish the hypothesis of progress by the above means then we 
should have to establish, at the very least, that (a) the assumed 
fact is an actual fact, (b) the hypothesis of progress provides the 
best explanation of that fact (and not just the best available 
explanation), (c) that the methodologica" rules by which we recog- 
nise which hypothesis actually provides the best explanation of any 
fact are themselves rules which lead to the adoption of the best 
explanation, and (d) that the methodological rule enjoining us to 
adopt that hypothesis which provides the best explanation of any 
fact is itself a rule which leads to the adoption of true 
hypotheses (or, at least, to the adoption of hypotheses having 
greater verisimilitude than any rival or alternative hypothesis). 
In other words, it is clear as a bell that Newton-Smith has failed 
even to establish that there has been progress In science: : Let alone 
to establish this without the use of any methodological pA n-: ii . 
8. For an excellent discussion of this ,. ssue of the rela-ion of 
rationality to choice - and for the suggestion that rationality should 
be seen as guiding, but not fully determining, choice -- see ',, ilhiem 
Berkson' e 'Skeptical Rationalism' , Inquiry, 22 
('. 979)v PP. J. 8I ~320. 
I owe the distinction between rationality as making our choicef2 for 
us, and as helping us makeour chow, t Nick Maxwel:. - . gee, ¢'-)r 
s=ample, his 'Science, Reason, Knowledgr_, and Wisdom: A Crit.: que of 
Specialism', Inquiry, 23 (1980), pp. 15-81, esp. P. 57. `a well dubs 
as t0raculart conceptions of reason those concepL. wons ace rding to 
Which retianality 'is something which reaches decisions for us, 
rather than being something which heTpe us to decade' (p. 57). 
9. Jere m Shea nur has pointed out to me that one consequence of the 
traditional view that the aim of rationality is tý deýermi. ý. e 
choice has been a perceived conflict betwee,. rat nai . in 
the one 
hand, and individuality, on the other. emus the rant ant ice, who 
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stressed the value of individuality, tended to reject the value of 
rationality; while traditional rationalists like Bacon, who stressed 
the value of rationality, tended to reject the value of individu- 
ality (since, if knowledge is obtainable by a publically available 
methodology, no individual distinction befalls those who obtain 
knowledge). That there is any conflict here at all depends 
crucially upon the assumption that the aim of rationality, or of 
rational methodology, is to determine choice - for in that case a 
rational choice is no longer our choice. But once we see the aim 
of rationality, or of rational methodology, as that of gaiding 
choice (by limiting it) without determining it, then we see that 
there is no conflict whatsoever between rationality and individuality 
- for our choices always remain our choices, only some such choices 
are rational ones while others are not. For some interesting 
discussion relevant to this issue, see Joseph Agassi, 'Genius in 
Science', Philosophyhy of the Social Sciences, (1975) . Pp- 145-61* 
10. We ignore here the possibility of specifying one's notion of 
'scientific knowledge' in terms of the results of applying a set 
of methods. The reason for doing so is simple: if we define 
'scientific knowledge' as 'that which results from the application 
of method M' then of course we will be able to 'explain' the 
success of science in achieving knowledge on the basis of its having 
adopted M. But in that case the success achieved will be quite 
worthless Isuccesst (or, to put it another way, it will be of no 
particular epistemological value or interest). Since what we are 
discussing is a traditional aim of the normative approach to 
methodology, it can be of no interest to us to 'explain' the 'success' 
of science in achieving epistemologically valueless 'knowledge' - 
since this will in no way inform us that we ought to adopt whatever 
methods enable us to achieve such 'knowledge'. Among other things, 
this is one of the reasons why the 'analytic justification of in- 
ductiont is futile, for how can the fact that inductive methods 
yield conclusions which are themselves reached by inductive methods 
indicate in any way that we ought to adopt such methods, or that 
they yield valuable knowledge? For a similar viewpoint, though one 
which remains to my mind slightly justificationist, see Nicholas 
Maxwell, 'A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method', 
j32- 
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Philosophy of Science, 2 (1972), PP. 131-52, as well as his 'The 
Rationality of Scientific Discovery, Part It (1974), off. it.. 
I might just mention here that the second method for arguing that 
a desire is irrational - namely, that its cost is too high - is in 
fact simply a special case of arguing that certain desires are 
irrational because unachievable. Thus imagine an argument to the 
effect that desire D has cost C. Such an argument will only be 
effective, as enn argument against D, with regard to those who do not 
desire to bear this cost. But even those who have no desire to avoid 
C will happily admit - if nothing wrong can be found with the 
argument - that the argument shows that the multiple desire (D 
plus not--C) is unachievable. Thus such an argument entails the 
irrationality of the multiple desire (D plus not-C); but it does 
not force anyone who desires to be rational to cease to desire D 
itself. What it does do is force those who desire to be rational 
to cease to desire (D plus not-C). Thus the role of raVLcnal 
argument, or of rationality, with respect to desire is to guide 
our desires by limiting them, just as the role of rationality with 
respect to choice is to guide our choices by limiting them. 
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Chapter :N i'rliOrDOLOGY AID THE COT OF INQUIKY 
The first two chapters have, in a sense, been concerned with 
ieeues which might loosely be called metamethodological. - that is, 
issues which may be broadly conceptualised as being themselves about 
our theories of method. Thus, for example, we have been concerned to 
discuss a number of general meta-theoretical approaches to the theory 
of rational method - such as transcendentalism, normativism, naturalism, 
and normative naturalism - and to attempt to defend the possibility 
of a normative approach to methodology which nevertheless avoids the 
pit-falls of transcendentalism. Moreover, we have tried to develop a 
method, the method of strengthening demands, by which it becomes 
possible to rationally inquire into theory of rational method. Thus 
the method of strengthening demands can itself be thought of as a 
meta-method, as a method for inquiring into methodology itself. Now 
although, as we shall see, the questions of methodology cannot be 
kept sharply separated from those of meta, --methodology, the time has 
come, perhaps, to move down from this apparently meta-methodological 
level to confront some issues of methodology itself. 
In this chapter, then, ,I shall begin the discussion of some of 
these issues. More particularly, I shall consider the question of 
whether methodology can provide guidance, or rules, within what has 
come to be called the context of discovery; or whether it must be 
restricted, as many have claimed, to providing rxidance, or rules, 
within what has come to be called the conte-t -)f justification. The 
upshot of these condiderations will, to anti. ciDate, be four-fold: 
firstly, that the traditional hope of solving the 'problem of justi- 
Bring our scientific theories or hypotheses via a logic of discovery 
carmot succeed; secondly, that in any case the idea of 
,3 
a content of justification ought to be replaced by the idea of a non- 
juatificationist context of appraisal, and that equally the idea 
of a context of discovery ought to be replaced by the idea of a 
context of production; thirdly, that it is possible to specify, in a 
quite general manner, those aspects of the context of production 
which can be held to be of general methodological significance, 
and which are thus not merely of interest to empirical psychology; 
and finally, that once we have seen these possibilities then we 
ought to eliminate altogether the idea of methodology as concerned 
with two distinct 'contexts', and should instead view it as concerned 
with a single 'context' - the context of inquiry. 
3.1 : The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification 
Mary philosophers of science are prone to make a eha: a , tiard. 
and fast, distinction between what has come to be called the context 
of discovery, on the one hand, and the context of Justification on 
the other. The chief questions arising within the former context 
are normally thought of as questions of origins, or genetic questions; 
while the chief questions arising within the latter context are 
normally thought of as questions of appraisal, or logical and evaluate 
questions. Thus, with respect, say, to a scientific theory, the 
questions arising within the context of Discovery are the genetic 
ones of how did the inventor, or discoverer, o tI-is theory come to 
invent it or discover it'?; what led him to put it forward? ý How did 
he manage to reach it?; what methods dii he employ in reaching it?; 
and so on. On the other hand, the questions which arise within the 
context of justification are apparently quite disc ct from these - 
for example, however the inventor or discoverer of a theory may have 
come to invent it or discover it, is the theory any good? In 
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particular, is it true, and do we have good reasons for accepting 
it as true? Or, more weakly, is it closer to the truth than some 
rival or alternative theory, and do we have good reasons for accepting 
it as such? Or, perhaps, does it constitute scientific progress when 
compared to its rivals, and do we have good reasons for holding that 
it does? And so on. 
Now when one is considering methodology or the theory of rational 
method, one might very well be thinking in terms either of the context 
of discovery or of the context of justification. That is, method- 
ology might be conceived of either as providing rules, or guides, within 
the context of discovery - and thus'methods for reaching new theories 
- or it may be conceived as providing rules, or guides, within the 
context of justification - and thus methods for evaluating, and 
rationally accepting, theories independently of how they have been 
reached. Let us call, as is quite usual, methodology as aiming to 
provide rules for discovery, methodology as 'logic of discovery'; 
while let us call, as is also quite usual, methodology as aiming to 
provide rules for rationally accepting theories, methodology as 
'logic of justification'. The question then is: is methodology logic 
of discovery, or logic of justification? Or is it, perhaps, both? 
Or even, perhaps, neither? 
With regard to this issue the overwhelming (though by no means 
unanimous) judgment of modern philosophers of science seems to be 
that there is no euch thing as a rational 'logic of discovery', and 
that therefore the aim of methodology can at best be to provide a 
'logic of justification'. Thus, for example, Popper writes that 
the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me 
neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible 
of it. The question how it happens that a new idna occurs 
to a man ... may be great interest to empirical psychology; 
but it is irrelevant to the logical anal-, -s-is of scientific 
1ý 
knowledge ... Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply 
between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the 
methods and results of examining it logically. As to the 
task of the logic of knowledge - in contradistinction to the 
psychology of knowledge -I shall proceed on the asownpti. on 
that it consists solely in investigating the methods 
employed in those systematic tests to which every new 
idea must be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained. 
(Popper (1959), P" 31) 
And Popper goes on to say that in his view 'there is no such thing 
as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction 
of this process' so that 'every discovery contains "an irrational 
element", or "a creative intuition", in Bergson's senset (Popper 
(1959), p. 32). 
Similar pronouncements can be'found in many other modern philosophers 
of science. Thus Reichenbach writes that 'epistemology is only 
occupied in constructing the context of justification' and that, 
given the distinction between the context of discovery and that of 
justification, 'epistemology cannot be concerned with the first but 
only with the latter' (Reichenbach (1938), p. 7 and p. 382). 
Similarly Feigl writes that 
It is one thing to retrace the historical origins, the 
psychological genesis and development, the social-political- 
economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of 
scientific theories; and it is quite another thing to 
provide a logical reconstruction of the conceptual- 
structures and of the testing of scientific theories. 
(Feigl (1970), P. 4) 
Let us begin our discussion of these issues by noting that the 
tradition in methodology inaugurated in the 17th century by Bacon 
and Descartes would not in the least have accepted the above described 
viewpoint - for according to these thinkers, rather than, there being 
a complete divorce between questions of discovery and questions of' 
justification (where the former are thought of as empirical o 
pegchological; while the latter are thought of as -logical or 
philosophical), questions of justification were to be answered via a 
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logic of discovery. That is, for both Bacon and Descartes the 
evaluative questions of appraisal and acceptance which arise within 
the context of justification - for example, is a certain theory any 
good?; and, in particular, do we have good reasons for accepting it 
as trite? - were to be answered by first answering the question: how 
was this theory arrived at or reached? What method was employed in 
its discovery? For both Bacon and Descartes dreamt of the possibility 
of a method of discovery which was such that anyone correctly employing 
it was bound to reach, or arrive at, true theories. In this setting 
the genetic questions of the context of discovery are not at all 
irrelevant to, or divorced from, the evaluative questions of appraisal 
and acceptance arising within the context of justification - for these 
latter questions are to be answered by reference to one's answers 
to the former questions. As Larry Laudan puts it, 'as conceived 
by most 17th and 18th century authors, a logic of discovery would 
function epistemolo cally as a logic of justification' (Laudan 
(1980), p. 176). Moreover, if such a logic could be found then not 
only would it solve the problem of justification, it would also 
provide a practical instrument for accelerating the pace of scientific 
advance. 
Clearly the 17th century idea of a logic, or methodoloE7, of 
discovery which would simultaneously function as the logic, or 
methodology, of justification has fallen upon hard times - hence the 
insistence of Popper, Reichenbach, etc., that not only can a logic 
of discovery not replace a logic of justification but, moreover, that 
the context of discovery has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
context of justification. How can we explain this shift? One 
answer, I suggest, can be found in the general isec' problem of 
induction - for if we hope to have good reasons ýýr accepting the 
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claim that a certain theory is true (or, more weakly, that it is closer 
to the truth than some rival theory) on the grounds that it was 
reached or arrived at by a certain method M. then we shall have to 
have good reasons for accepting the claim that M is a logic of 
discovery (in the sense that the application of M invariably leads to 
true theories or, more weakly, to theories which are closer to the 
truth than those arrived at by some rival method M*). But the 
generalised problem of induction shows that, on pain of either 
infinite regress or circularity, this cannot be done. Thus the 
claim that M is a logic of discovery is itself a claim which we 
cannot have good reasons for accepting by reference to a logic of 
discovery (on pain either of infinite regress or of circularity). 
It immediately follows that one cannot hope successfully to replace 
the context of justification tth a logic of discovery - for the very 
evaluative questions of rational acceptance which arise within the 
context of justification, and which one hopes to answer by reference 
to a logic of discovery, are themselves bound to arise with respect 
to any proposed logic of discovery. Thus one cannot eliminate the 
context of justification solely in favour of a logic of discovery. 
It might be argued here, however, that although the generalised 
problem of induction indeed shows our inability to have Rood reasons 
for accepting the claim that a certain method M is a logic of dis- 
covert', this inability in no way shows that M is not a logic of 
discovery. Thus despite our inability to establish that M is a logic 
of discovery, we may very well - in the absence of negative arguments 
- rationally accept the claim that M is a logic of discovery, and then 
employ M as such. That is, we will decide whether or not to accept 
a theory T, or will decide how to evaluate T, depending upon whether 
or not T has been arrived at, or generated, in accordance with M. 
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But if we are willing to adopt a methodology M as a logic of 
discovery so long as no negative arguments are available to show that 
M is not such a logic, then we must make it possible for ourselves 
to produce such negative arguments - for if we don't, then au 
methodology M will be rationally acceptable as a 'logic of discovery'. 
So what would count as a negative argument against the claim that M 
is a logic of discovery (for, say, truth )? Clearly, such an 
argument will have to take the following form -T has been 
generated in accordance with M; but T is false; therefore, 11 is no 
logic of discovery (for truth). But this entails that in order to 
secure the possibility of negative arguments against the claim that 
M is a logic of discovery, we shall have to have available to us some 
means for investigating the truth-value of theories independently 
of M. In other words, even if we relinquish the (justificationist) 
requirement that in order to claim that M is a logic of discovery 
we need to have good reasons for thinking that it is, and instead 
replace this requirement with tie non-juetificationist one that we 
can uphold this claim so long as no negative arguments are 
available against it, we should still not be able to eliminate the 
need for an independent context of 'justification' (or, rather, 
appraisal) in favour of a logic of discovery - for negative arguments 
will only be available against such a claim if there is an 
independent method for appraising theories. Thus, even in the non- 
justificationist, or criticalist, setting of (PR) we will be unable 
to eliminate the need for a method of appraising theories which is 
independent of any conjectured logic of discovery. 
3.2: Three Crucial Distinctions 
At this point it will, I suggest, be useful to introduce three 
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distinctions which bear directly upon the whole gamut of issues 
involved in the question of whether methodology is to be thought 
of as providing a 'logic of discovery', or whether it is to be thought 
of only as providing a 'logic of justification'. The first die- 
tinction, already hinted at above, is that between the context of 
appraisal, on tie one hand, and the context of justification on the 
other. This distinction is, in air view, crucial - since justific- 
ationiem is beet seen as one particular theory or approach to the 
problems of appraisal (an approach which, as one might guess, I 
reject). That is, according to justificationism theories are to be 
appraised by seeing whether or not good reasons can be found for 
accepting them - those for which such reasons can be found being 
positively appraised, and hence accepted; while those for which they 
cannot be found are negatively appraised, and hence rejected. The 
trouble with this view is that the search for good reasons must 
inevitably lead to a regress - for to call a set of reasons good 
reasons is clearly to positively appraise them; but according to 
the justificationist theory of appraisal nothing can be positively 
appraised, and hence accepted, in the absence of goa9 reasons. Thus 
before one can positively appraise, and hence accept, ones reasons 
for a theory as good reasons, one must have good reasons for accepting 
them; but before one can positively appraise, and hence accept, one's 
reasons for one's reasons as good reasons, one mist have good 
reasons for accepting them; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the 
justificationist theory of appraisal entails the impossibility of 
positively appraising, and hence accepting, any theory; and there- 
fore the necessity of negatively appraising, and so rejecting, every 
theory. So if we hope to be able to positively appraise and. /or. 
accept some theories, while negatively appraising 1v'Ior rejectingothere, 
f 
then we had better relinquish the idea that theories are tc ., ý 
appraised in terms of justification. But in that case ,: ý== 
crucial to distinguish the context of appraisal from the coriex:. 
of justification. 
Seoondly, it is equally important to distinguish tint t -'IIIk. x-:: of 
discovery from what might be called the context of invent . or. 
(or, 
better, production) - for 'discovery, is erg eTister,. o' ogic.,.. y -goaded 
success term, while 'productiont is nog T''h e, .: 
'or extpie, we would 
attribute to Priestley the discovery of o. , but we would not 
attribute to him the discovery of air' - -3nd this 
despite the fact that as far as Priestley wa concerned. the gac he 
discovered was de phlogisticated air. Similar"' y. re would not 
attribute to Cavendish the discovery ýf pELo stor., gut rather of 
hydrogen, and this despite the fact that as iar ae Cavendi i .c 
concerned he had discovered phlogiston. Equa . y, n.: % one wci` 
attribute to PtolemY the discovery that the planetary sc^` . ,s 
geo-centric (although one might very well attriiriit r -to ham: the 
discovery of the first mathematically : -voph-49t-,. ca F-1'. c--centric 
astronomical theory). In other words, to äesc: ̀ i'x ri t has 
produced as a 'discovery' is to positively a,? jpr-. lse the-! -r pr_eluction 
from an epistemological point of view. No wonder, then, t:. ýt the 
'context of discovery' cannot be made to repiacý-t- t::.. 3 'tonte, of 
appraisal' - for given that 'discovery' is itsel. ::. a stemc"-- 
ogically-loaded success terra, the former context must deperc, .;.! art, 
upon the latter context. But in the case of 'pra. Iuc - cn'*,, . 1. c 
epistemological suoce .: i(Y 
1ii : '"'o \e -' " 
T: nx_ ?t 
undoubtedly produced a theory of geo-cent-ic astro7. ö ty, : rho-, P 
Priestley undoubtedly produce the `hý- 
discovered was de-phlogisticated u: _r - -r_' 'L.;, er - ý. 
t' r` 
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achievements are in no way threatened by the fact that we would now 
appraise these productions negatively (from an epistemological point 
of view). Thus the context of production may very well remain 
independent of the context of appraisal, while the context of dis- 
covery does not. However, as I shall suggest later, the fact that the 
context of production may remain independent of the context of 
appraisal does not entail that the former context must be totally 
irrelevant to the latter context. 
Thirdly, it is equally important to distinguish between a 
logic of discovery (or production, or invention), on the one hand, 
and the weaker idea of a methodology of discovery (or production, or 
invention) on the other. A 'logic' of either discovery or production 
is to be thought of as a set of rules R which are such that, given 
some pre-existing situation S (which may be conceived of as the 
'input' to the 'logic'), some outcome 0 is singled out uniquely by 
the application of R in S. In other words, in S, R logically 
necessitates 0. On the other hand, a methodology of either discovery 
or production is to be thought of as a set of rules which, in S, 
merely constrain the search for an 'outcome' 0, but without logically 
necessitating that 'outcome'. Thus it is perfectly possible to deny 
the existence of both a logic of discovery and a logic of production 
and yet assert the existence of either a methodology of discovery 
or a methodology of production. 
3.3: Towards a Non-Psychologiatic Context of Production (I) 
limed with these distinctions, we now return to the main theme. 
I have argued (in Section 3.1) that the Baconian and Cartesian hope 
of replacing an independent context of justification with a logic of 
discovery cannot succeed, and that we equally cannot hope to eliminate 
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a non-justificationist context of appraisal in favour of such a 
'logics. Moreover, we have seen that to dub some production (such as 
a scientific theory or hypothesis) a 'discovery' is already to 
positively appraise it from an epistemological point of view, so that 
we cannot eliminate a non-justificationist context of appra'. sal in 
favour of a metb doloy (as opposed to a logic) of discovery either. 
But does it follow from these results that Popper and 'eigl are 
right to hold, as they seem to do, that the context of production 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the context of appraisal? Or that 
the former context is totally divorced from the latter context? 
As far as I can see, the answer to this question is in the negative - 
for the above results, while indeed showing the ineliminability of 
an independent non-juetificationist context of appraisal in favour 
of either a logic or methodology of discovery, in no way show that 
questions arising within the context of production are totally 
irrelevant to questions of non-justificationist appraisal. That the 
former questions are indeed so irrelevant is not, then, a product of 
the above results at all; but rather, I suggest, a product of the 
conviction - which Popper and Feigi seem to share - that questions of 
production, or of how a theory was reached or arrived at, are 
purely matters fore irical pcycholq ical (and, perhaps, empirical 
history), and thus of no relevance whatsoever to the logical and 
evaluative questions which arise in the context of appraisal. In 
other words, I want to suggest that the thesis which both Popper and 
Feigl seem to uphold - the thesis of the total divor. e between 
production and appraisal - is itself th result rief of the above 
arguments, but rather of their conviction that questions of nro3uýti, ýý 
are purely empirical ones. For if this conviction is co =A--t eher 
indeed the context of production will be to'ý. al- -; 7 
I "iii 
irrelevant to, the logical and evaluative context of appraisal - 
fo if it weren't then the naturalistic fallacy would be no Fallacy 
at all. 
But is it the case that issues connected with the question of 
production are always totally irrelevant to the logical and 
evaluative questions which arise within the non-justificationist 
context of appraisal? In my view, the answer to this ques trL is in 
the negative. To see this, take a simplified, schematic, e:, - 1 e. 
Assume that we have some theory T on the basis of which we can make 
a number of new, bold, predictions - that is, predictions 
given the state of our knowledge prior to the Introduction of T, ire 
would expect to go decisively against T. Assume further that we nave 
actually performed some relevant experiments to test these predict thins , 
and that T passes these tests with flying cclcurs Bruch tc our 
surprise). Now aseývme that someone comes ' 1ong, ý. ý °ýota cýýr ,ýr ce 
of the results of these experiments, and proposes an a? _ 
terr. < '. ýý 
theory to T by modifying our knowledge prior to '. in such a. 
it' is now consistent with the previously surprising results of tries 
experiments. In other words, assume that he 'cool-, ' our pre v io-, i 
knowledge so that it is no longer refuted by these re ui ts. ixe-:. t. -, r:: 
is the issue which arises in the context of production - na. ne j ýc ,ý 
was this theory arrived at? - totally irrelevant to the logiý. al and 
evaluative questions which arise in the non-justificationist context 
of appraisal? In my view, not all - for the very fact that the 
alternative to T was 'cooked up' so as to handle the sl risL. g 
results itself shows that these results provide no genuine en-r, 
'support' for this alternative. In other words, our non-jus,, ificationist 
evaluative appraisals are not totally divorced from al issues which 
arise within the context of production 
1 
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Now the above suggestion might be thought to be highly 
objectionable - for surely, it will be retorted, whether or not a 
piece of experimental evidence'eupports' or 'confirms' a sc-entific 
theory is purely a matter of logic, having nothing whatsoever to do 
either with history or psychology. That is, whether or not some 
empirical evidence e 'supports' or 'confirms' a scientific hypothesis 
h is simply a matter of the logical relations holding between h and 
e, and this has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not h was 
available prior toe (so that e was a novel prediction of h) or e 
was available prior to h (so that the inventor of h could have 
employed e in the reasoning which led him to h). Such a view, which 
may be called the purely logical approach to confirmation (see 
Musgrave (1974)), is widely held - thus Keynes, for example, insists 
that the 'peculiar value of prediction ... is altogether imaginary 
000 The question as to whether a particular hypothesis happens 
to be propounded before or after examination L/of its instanceu is 
quite irrelevant' (Keynes (1921), p. 305). Bh'l- this view, however 
plausible it may seem, runs into an enormous difficulty in Hempel's 
paradox of confirmation - for this paradox cannot be solved within 
the purely logical approach to confirmation. 
To see this, recall how Hempel"s paradox arises. We begin 
with the assumption that any positive instance e of a hypothesis h 
ete 
confirms h, where( being a 'positive instance' is thought of 
as a purely logical relation between h and e (in Her-, "I Is theory, e 
logically entails the 'development' of h for the indllviduaT. e riontiono(I 
in e- see Hempel (1965), Chapter 1). Assume, mere ýý i ýLýp <1q, ii_valennce 
condition that if e confirms h1 and h1 is ogically equiva-Arzt ý^ ý, ý, 
then e also confirms h2 (a condition which "-.. rPiy r :)t be obwo . in 
any purely logical approach to confirmation). B' now T. ý {F t^c' 
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hypothesis h1 that 'all ravens are black'; this is logically 
equivalent to h2 that 'all non-black things are non-ravens' and this, 
by the principle that positive instances confirm, is confirmed by the 
evidence that I am presently wearing brown shoes. Thus, by the 
equivalence condition, 'all ravens are black' is equally confirmed by 
this evidence - evidence which, intuitively speaking, seems completely 
irrelevant to 'all ravens are black'. To generalise this result, in 
the purely logical approach to confirmation any evidence which does 
not logically refute a hypothesis h must be taken to confirm h. since 
it will be a positive instance of some hypothesis which is logically 
equivalent to h. 
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Now this result is devastating - for it shows how trivial 
confirmation is, how easy it is to obtain, if we identify it as in 
the purely logical appraoch to confirmation. In other words, eve 
scientific hypothesis - including the contrary hypotheses that tall 
ravens are black' and 'all ravens are white' -" will have millions upon 
millions of confirming instances. But in that case confirmation 
ceases to be of any value in the context of appraisal - since all 
unrefuted scientific hypotheses will have as much confirmation as we 
care to please. Thus the only relevant evidence in the context of 
appraisal becomes refuting evidence. But, and here we return to our 
initial problem, it may always be possible to 'cook' our hypotheses 
in such a way that, although continuously refuted, they can be 
inmunised from such refutations by a stream of ad hoc modifications. 
So unless we are willing to take into account the method, or manner, 
by which euch hypotheses were generated we shall, would appear, 
have no means by which to prefer a non-ad hoc hypothesis which 
successfully passes severe tests to ad hoc hyrotheses which have not 
passed any such tests, but which have been ex post facto 'rigged-up 
ýýý 
130 as not to be refuted. So the boot is on the other foot - rather 
than our suggestion that non-justificationist evaluative appraiaals 
are not totally independent of all issues arising within the context 
of production being objectionable because ir. conflict with the purely 
logical approach to confirmation, this latter approach thins out to 
be objectionable precisely because it rules o. t thi su d'e tion. ' 
Nevertheless, despite this argument therc is ýi '. a 
apparent obstacle to overcome - for if 2o per ar: c 
that questions of production are mere-Ly empiric ;. p. 7yc D1ogical 
questions, while questions of appraisal are ! cg; car. and evt ý, ý tive 
ones, then it indeed becomes difficult to e how the former could 
possibly be relevant to the latter. In ether words, Popper and reigi 
seem to be setting up a categorical d stinrtyon between production 
and appraisal, and given this distinction any n. 1 +: ̀ to 'mix' t1- rn 
would have to be seen as a kind of 'categ y mlstake'. ` Sc IrA 
order to make good the above argument we s al"I. need to show that 
questions of production are not merely questions o: rr Irical 
psychology but have, rather, a non-psychoIov-. L., _. ý i. spect tc them. 
Is, then, the context of product. ior - Are yü for 
psychology? Now it must be admitted at tý_-ýF , outc et tha°; -e cont . ý--. 
of production certainly includes element w} is; h arg 
for empirical psychology, and which t is have no obvious beari r. ° on t . h- 
context of appraisal. Thus, for emnple , take -ý. ne 
famous :ý: L the 
chemist Kekule who, having dozed off in front of af Ire S 
one of the leaping flames as a snake, Va ich then ýý ccF <<-,, 
its own tail in its mouth. Kekule, who had. been 
problem of the chemical structure of b-ný: ane, suddenly aoýsý - th the 
idea that benzene (like the malre it 1. ?ý ýý, `" ýý -ios : 
structure - an idea which he ti-en rroc ee, lr 
ýýý 
It is, I think, pretty clear that although Kekule'e drer, layed a 
role (psychologically) in the context of production of his idea, this 
fact is indeed purely of interest to empirical psychology, and thus of 
no relevance to the context of appraisal. To put this point another 
way, no one would, I take it, recommend as a general methodological rule 
to scientists searching for new ideas that they would be well advised 
to doze off in front of fires! Thus the fact that the context of 
Kekule's production included such a dozing off is of particular (or 
psychological) interest only, but is of no general (-or methodological) 
significance. 
Now to admit that certain elements in the context of production 
are merely of interest to empirical psychology is in no way to admit 
the thesis that there is a total divorce between the context of 
production and the context of appraisal; nor is it to admit the claim 
that the context of production in toto is merely of interest tc. 
empirical psychology. Thus despite the fact that certain e . -m , rats in 
the context of production are indeed of merely psycholcc'Lc Interest, 
it-may nevertheless remain the case that other elements are -, '. 
genuinA methodological significance, and thus potentially of relevance 
in the context of appraisal. But then we face the following question: 
is there, perhaps, some way of generally characterislaa those elements 
in the context of production which are of genuine methodological 
significance, and which are thus potentially relevant to the context 
of appraisal? 
In response to this question I want to suggest that there are 
at least two possible ways of achieving such a general characterisation. 
Firstly, it may be possible for the process of production to itself 
be controlled (plastically) by those very factors which will enable the 
product produced to be positively appraised (or, from the viewpoint of 
ýý 
(PR), to not be negatively appraised). In other :r ids, elements 
of the context of appraisal can themselves play a role l. n the conte, ct 
of production then such elements of the context :. ý producti'n are 
board to be of relevance in Ehe context of ap, -, rai . al. `^o : ýý^e fiOý. "r this 
might work, take, for example, ", he Puppe: _an proposaI teat, in 
science, testable hypotheses are always to ,. , r©c eu to unto ý" °ile 
ones (since it is only with respect tc, -. he omer tnat we :1 the the 
possibility of learning from experience,; and that, in a, =i ition, 
more testable hypotheses are to be preferred, prior to ýýýe _, to 
lese testable ones (since, given that we ini , ia1?, r require te: -.. tbl. e 
hypotheses, more testable ones will give us more of what we initially 
require). Formulated in this manner suci-i proposals arc clearly 
part of an evaluative context of apprG __ uai, ä-lc: e they give us a means 
by which we can make a preference-ordering, prior try ,, esting, a , rg. 
a variety of available rypothese'. 3ut now foxmmL ate such --ý-oy ý: plc 
not as evaluative standnxds of appraisal. )iLt r I,, ýr as the . _nc* 
maxims for action: (' j whenever you ire confronte .y an ý, ýrý trees r 
which fails to be empirically falsifiable, sea: f, ý-h for a way of 
strengthening the hypothesis so as to make ýý, c eher itself empi. 
falsifiable, or else a logically non-reaunclant part of ä}. .rT 
falsifiable theory (where by this is meant a pari c the ý ýe ; 
whose removal reduces the empirical falsifiabili y of th - cieTa. "i 
theory); and (2) whenever you are confronted by an 
falsifiable hypothesis, search for ways of strengthe. --.; nF- it 
make it still more fam. 'ifiable. Formulated in this z : ter try; 
initial proposals in the context of appraisal become 11` t=': -. 
guide, or govern, the search for hypotheses - and thus 2"lä3 A. ithin 
the context of production. But clearly, if we incorro 
^, Pl ,ý . 'Lys? 
j 
into the context of production then we will increase our -krr'es cl 
,1Z 
developing theories which meet, or progressively better meet, ot; r 
standards of appraisal. It follows that such rules can both be 
elements in the context of production and yet of relevance to the 
context of appraisal. 
The basic idea which lies behind the above suggestion is , hilly 
astonishingly simple - so simple, in fact, that it is difficult to see 
how anyone ever could have thought that there must be a total divorce 
between the context of production and the context of appraisal. 
t any For the above suggestion simply capitali. es or the fact ' vIL, 
proposed principle which is to be er_mloyed in the context of apnraisal 
can be formulated not only as an evaluat, -ve standard of apTprai? 
but 
also as a maxim for action - and thus as a methodological ru f- 
playing a role in the context of production. There thus seems to 
be little difficulty in incorporating elements (or rules) into the 
context of production which are not merely of -)ar+icular psychological 
interest, but are also of general methodological significance. More- 
over, since such rules guide, or gov`rn q . '. e process :: " nrý ,ý xc t on 
by reference to desired properties of t , c, ': u# came, or prod;: ýt, of 
this process, it immediately follows that in so far as such products 
are not merely of interest to empirical n rcho]_ogy so too --m-st such 
rules not merely be of euch interest e: +, er. In other words, the 
above suggestion allows us to make ir: it. al senÜe of the pos^ibility 
of a genuinely non-psychological heuristics - sind it enables us 
to see methodology as aiming to provide, not only rules for appraising 
already produced theories, but also general strate=, -c! ru'_ee for 
producing such theories. 
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If, as I have suggested, there is such a 3ýmr". e 'Pr, ýc rdrre for 
introducing elements into the context of not 
merely of interest to empirical psychology, ho! - "' -, it marry 
t, - 
serious philosophers of science have been convinced that gaeÜýýÜ: ýýs 
of production can only be of interest to empirical psychs: o wr. 
An answer, perhaps, lies in the following argument: if there awe 
genuine, non-psychological, rules for producing theories, then such 
rules must provide what might be called 'single-exit solutions' in 
the context of production; for if they do not, then the fact that 
they were applied will not explain wx y the actual theory -produced 
actually wwas produced. In other words, -. t might be argued that no 
non-psychologistic methodological rules deserve to be called rules 
of production unless the application of those ...: Les, in a 'production- 
eituationt S, leads uniquely to the o -%, come produced (so tiü, t, in S, 
the application of the rules fully explains that outcome). For in 
so far as euch rules do not enable aucn an. explanation, it would 
appear to follow that the explanation as to why (or how) the actua_ 
theory produced actually was produced Eu3p. -&. y zeia ma mater or 
empirical psychology. 
Now the above argument rests, in effect, u-")on ILL dersanl ti-ls-- 
any genuine, non-psychologistic, mies of' rast 
a 'logic of production', rather than a 'methoüo_i-ctj cf produc iorir 
for the application of a set of rules of production VLs-L oruy enable 
us to explain why, in situation 5, the product produced 
actually was produced if, in S, the applicatic a of the rules meads 
of logical necessity to the outcome produced. But t1r. is recd., -- a-e--ment 
is simply the analogue, in the context of production, of the demand, 
in the context of appraisal, that rational methods _or ^_. noos: ýý, rr 
hypotheses fully determine our choice - since qj, ß-eä 
is that rational, non-psychologistic, ruieo of production ý... y 
detemßne the product produced; and just as, in uY s to 
possibility of rational choice, we had to relinquish 4 vier, (in the 
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context of appraisal) that rational methods for choice must constitute 
a 'logic of choice', why not equally relinquish the view (in the 
context of production) that rational, non-psychologistic, rules of 
production must constitute a 'logic of production'? 
Now I want, in fact, to argue that if we are to have any 
hope of securing, in an interesting fashion, a rational, non-psychological, 
context of production, then we must relinquish the above requirement 
- for if we require of genuine, non-psychologistic, rules of production 
(RP) that their application, in a 'production situation' S, leads 
uniquely to the product produced (P), then it must be the cane that 
the conjunction of RP with a description of S logically entails a 
description of P. But in that case P can no longer be seen as a 
, 
genuinely novel product, since it is already 'Contained' in the contalt 
of RP (in the presence of a description of S). Thus, if we require 
that the application of a set of rules of production leads uniquely 
to the product produced then no genuinely novel products ever will be 
produced in the rational, non-psychological, Lontext of production; 
and so the production of genuinely novel scientific hypotheses will 
have to be seen as merely a matter of empirical psychological interest. 
In other words, if we insist that a rational, non-psychological, 
context of production for genuinely novel scientific hypotheses can 
only be secured via a 'logic of production', then we will have to 
inonediately conclude to the non-existence of such a context. So if 
we hope to defend the possibility of rational, non-psychological, 
methods for producing genuinely novel scientific hypotheses then we 
must see such methods as aiming to provide us, not with a 'logic of 
production', but rather with a 'methodology of production' - that is, 
with rules which place constraints on the search for such hypotheses 
without determining the outcome of the search, and which thus serve 
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to guide, or limit, the process of searching without fully determining 
it. 
Now it has to be admitted that the application of such rules of 
production will not fully explain why, in a certain situation S. the 
actual hypothesis produced actually was produced - for to constrain 
or limit the search for new hypotheses is not to explain why, within 
those constraints, one hypothesis was produced rather than another. 
But this does not entail that the explanation as to why (or how) the 
actual hypothesis produced actually was produced is"simply a matter 
of empirical psychology; rather, it only means that the rational, or 
non-psychological, elements in the -context of production can never 
fully eliminate all potential non-rational, or psychological, 
elements of that context. But to admit this is to admit no more than 
was previously admitted when discussing the example of Kekule - 
namely, that certain elements in the context of production may indeed 
be of merely particular psychological interest. In other words, to 
admit that the rational, or non-psychologistic, elements in the context 
of production do not exhaust that context is not to admit tla t the 
non-rational, or psychological, elements of that context do exhaust 
it. Moreover, it is crucial to realise that the former admission in 
no way threatens the potential rationality of the process of production 
- for given the non-justificationist theory of rationality articulated in 
the previous chapter, there need be nothing irrational about a process 
of production whose outcome is not fully determined by rational 
methods of production. So long as the hypothesis actually produced 
satisfies the methodological constraints imposed on the process of 
production, whatever hypothesis is so produced will have been rationally 
produced. Thus to admit that rational methods of production do not 
fully determine the pncess of production is neither to admit that this 
IS4 
process is merely of interest to empirical psychology nor is it to 
admit the irrationality of this process. 
At this point, there arises what seems to me to be a matter of 
considerable interest - for the very idea that we be able to fully 
explain (whether rationally, or psychologically, or even by a mixture 
of the two) why an actual hypothesis produced actually was produced, 
seems to be highly problematic, especially if we axe thinking in 
terms of genuinely novel, creative, hWpötheses. Thus, let H be such 
an hypothesis; and assume that we were able to provide a sufficient 
explanation (of whatever kind) as to why (or how), given some conditions 
prevailing prior to the production of H, the producer of H had to 
produce it. Call euch an explanation E. It would immediately follow 
that if E had been available prior to the production of H (and, 
Erima facie, there is no reason why it couldn't be), the producer 
of H would not have needed to genuinely produce H, since he could 
have 'produced' it simply by predicting (given E) his own future 
production of H. In other words, E, by providing an in-principle 
publically available 'logic of production' for H, would rob the 
producer of H of any particular, or individual, claim to having 
himself creatively produced H. Moreover, the possibility of E 
suggests the apparently paradoxical possibility that we can come to 
produce today what shall be novelly produced tomorrow. Thus assume 
that H is Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity (STR) novelly 
produoed in 1905; and assume further that E was available prior to 
1905 (as, in principle, it could be); then, in principle, it becomes 
possible to predict, prior to 1905, that STR will be produced in 1905. 
But to predict prior to 1905, the production of STR in 1905, is 
effectively to produce STR prior to 1905 - so that STR could not 
then be novelly produced in 1905. Thus the possibility of a sufficient 
explanation E for Einstein's novel 1905 production of STR seems to 
be ruled out. In other words, it would appear as if sufficient 
explanations (like E), for genuinely novel, creative products (like 
STR), cannot be produced - and this independently of whether E is 
thought of as explaining the production of STR rationally, or 
psychologically, or by a mixture of the two. 
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The point of the above arguments is this: if, in science, there 
are genuinely creative productions of genuinely novel products (or 
hypotheses), then the context of production cannot consist either of 
a 'logic of production' or of any sufficient explanation of prod- 
uction. So if we take the antecedent of this conditional as given, 
it immediately follows that the fact that the kind of non-psycholo- 
gistic methodological rules of production whose possibility I have 
suggested do not provide us with eitherjis no criticism whatsoever 
of this suggestion. On the contrary, if we want to defend the 
possibility that science involves the creative production of novel 
products (or hypotheses), while simultaneously upholding the 
possibility that the context of production is not merely a matter 
for empirical psychology, then we must, it would appear, accept the 
fact that any non-psychologistic elements in the context of production 
are going to have only the constraining, or guiding, properties 
of a 'methodology of production'. Thus, if we hope to have any non- 
peychologietic rules of creative production in science, then such 
rules can only serve to guide, or govern, the process of production 
without either fully determining it or fully explaining it; and the 
initial suggestion that I have made with regard to such rules - 
namely, that they be seen as guiding the process of production by 
reference to desired properties of the outcome, or product, of this 
prodess - is itself a suggestion which seems to satisfy these 
I56 
requirements, 
3.4: Towards a Non-Psychologietic Context of Production (II) 
I said earlier, in response to the question of whether some 
general characterisation can be found of those elements in the context 
of production which are of genuine methodological significance, 
that I wanted to suggest that there are at least two possible ways 
of achieving such a characterisation. The first, already discussed 
above, is that general evaluative principles in the context of 
appraisal could be formulated as maxims for action - and thus as 
elements of the context of production which are of obvious relevance 
to the non-peychologioal content of appraisal. The second suggestion 
which, although in some ways resembling the first, is subtly 
different to it, will be the subject of this section. After intro- 
duping and explaining this idea, I will then briefly compare the two 
suggestions. 
To understand my second proposal, it will be well to go back to 
the long passage from Popper (1959, P. 31) quoted earlier in this 
chapter. There Popper asserts that he will distinguish sharply 
between the logic of knowledge and its psychology, and that he 
shall proceed on the assumption that the task of the former 
consists solely in investigating the methods employed in 
those systematic tests to which every new idea must 
be subjected if it is to be seriously entertained. 
Now notice that there is a certain peculiarity in Popperts terminology 
here - for presumably, from Popper's viewpoint, the systematic tests 
to which every new idea must be subjected are designed to inform us 
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not whether the new idea can be entertained, but whether or not it 
can be maintained. That is, from Popper's point of view whether or 
not a new hypothesis can be entertained will, presumably, simply be 
a matter of whether or not the hypothesis is tAstable (and so, by his 
demarcation criterion, can enter into science); whereas the role of 
actual systematic testing will be to help us decide whether or not the 
new hypothesis can be maintained in science, having already entered. 
Now as soon as one introduces a distinction between entertaining 
hypotheses and maintaining them, it becomes possible to view the non- 
psychologistic context of production as consisting of considerations 
relevant to the question of entertaining hypotheses, whereas the context 
of appraisal will then consist of considerations relevant to the question 
of whether some hypothesis which has already met the 'considerations of 
entertainment' can be subsequently maintained. Now clearly whatever 
considerations are relevant to the question of entertaining a certain 
hypothesis must themselves be available prior to any subsequent 
testing of that hypothesis, which is designed to see if it can be 
maintained. But this entails that such considerations can also be 
available prior to the production of the hypothesis in the fielt 
place (whereas the subsequent tests of the hypothesis cannot be so 
available - since one cannot attempt to systematically test a 
hypothesis until it has been produced). In other words, whatever 
considerations are relevant to the question of whether or not a certair. 
hypothesis is to be entertained, can themselves be available prior to 
the production of that hypothesis, and so it then becomes possible 
that such considerations can function as non-psychologistic elenents 
in the context of production. 
To see how this might work return, if you will, to the care of 
Kekule: Kekule's dream was, we have admitted, merely of particular 
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psychological interest, and thus of no general methodological 
significance. But what of Kekule's ability to recognise that the 
idea produced partially as a result of his dream - namely, that 
benzene has a closed, ring structure - was itself an idea worthy 
of subsequent testing; that it was worth expending effort putting it 
through the hoops of the context of appraisal? Unless we are willing 
to say that any idea Kekule would have awoken, with he would nave 
subsequently tested, we must be willing to admit that somehow he was 
able to discriminate, prior to subsequent testing, an idea worthy 
of such testing from one which was not. But surely this discriminatory 
ability, however we eventually explain it, is of obvious relevance to 
the subsequent context of appraisal - since whether or not a new 
hypothesis is even put into this context will itself be dependent 
upon this ability. But now imagine that Kekule's discriminatory 
ability could be explained as resulting from articulable requirements 
which any new hypothesis concerning the structure of benzene should 
meet before it is to be considered worthy of subsequent test. Then 
euch articulable requirements can very well be available prior to the 
production of new hypotheses concerning benzene's structure, and so 
it then becomes possible that such requirements can function to guide, 
or govern, the search for such hypotheses. In other words, such 
'considerations of entertainment' could play a role in a non- 
peychologistic methodology of production, since they will guide the 
process of producing new hypotheses by constraining, or limiting, 
this process. 
The basic idea which lies behind this second proposal is once 
again really quite simple - for it simply depends upon recogniS. ini 
the distinction between 'considerations of entertainment, and 
considerations of maintenance', and in seeing that whereas the former 
considerations can be available prior to the production of an 
hypothesis, the latter considerations cannot be so available. But 
this entails that the foaner considerations, unlike the latter, can 
potentially guide, or govern, the process of searching for new 
hypotheses, and thus function as elements of a methodology of 
production. Moroever, such considerations will, as before, guide 
or govern the process of production by reference to desired properties 
of the outcome, or product, of this process - since we will desire 
that any hypothesis produced meet the considerations of entertainment 
governing the process of production itself. In addition, although 
functioning as elements of the context of production, such 
considerations will clearly be of relevance to any subsequent context 
of appraisal - since whether or not an hypothesis produced is put 
into this context will itself be dependent upon whether it meets 
these initial considerations. It thus follows, once again, that 
euch elements of the context of production are not merely of interest 
to empirical psychology - for since the products produced are not 
merely of interest to empirical psychology, the considerations of 
entertainment, considered as elements of the context of production, 
cannot be merely of such interest either. In other words, this second 
suggestion allows us to make further sense of the possibility of a 
genuinely non-psychological heuristics. 
Now it has to be admitted straight-away that whether or not this 
second proposal can ultimately be made to stick crucially hinges upon 
whether or not the 'considerations of entertainment' can themselves 
be exhibited as articulable ones. For remember that not only are 
euch considerations to be envisaged as playing a role in a non- 
psychologistic context of production - by guiding or limiting the 
process of production - but also that they are to function as the basis 
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upon which we hope to explain the discriminatory ability to recognise, 
prior to subsequent testing, which hypotheses produced are themselves 
worthy of such testing. But if such considerations cannot be revealed 
as articulable - for example, if they must remain only part of the 
producer's 'tacit knowledge' (ä la Polany i- see his (1966), Chap. 1) 
- then it becomes difficult to see how they could be made to function 
as part of a non-psychology' stic context of production. Moreover, the 
discriminatory ability which we hope to explain on the basis of such 
considerations will then also have to be thought of as being merely 
a purely psychological ability. It thus becomes crucial to show that 
'considerations of entertainment' can indeed be articulated, so that 
they can function as part of a genuinely non-psychological heuristics. 
How this can be done will, I hope, be satisfactorily explained 
in the next chapters(hence their titles)Yor -, he moment, however, I 
only want to stress that although articulable 'considerations of 
entertainment' can indeed function both as elements in the context of 
production, and as explaining (non-psychologistic-, illy) the arg. lity 
to recognise, prior to subsequent testing, which hypotheses axe worthy 
of such testing, they must not be thought of a.: having any inductive 
implications. In other words, we rnu^t not fall into the trap of 
thinking that euch an ability to recognise which hypothese7 are worthy 
of subsequent testing is, at the same time, an ýtri' 1t to recognise, 
prior to subsequent testing, which hypothesr will actually ýacc 
such tests, or indeed which hypotheses are true ( or even close to the 
truth). For if we do fall into this trag thin we will have succeeded 
in transforming such articulable Icons ider? tions -)f enterta-inment' 
elements 
from being/in a non-peychologistic metho: `.. or of ., rcduction i. -1-to 
being elements in a methodology of discovr, r; r - L-i that they would tr. "n 
provide us with explicit knowledge now tnat the hypotheses which 
oý 
satisfied them would subsequently be positively appraised (and so 
count as discoveries, since, it will be recalled, an hypothesis will 
only be dubbed a 'discovery' if it is positively appraised). But 
this means that euch considerations would then enable us to dispense 
altogether with an indepeii(ient, non-juetificationist, context of 
appraisal - since clearly we would have no need to perform subsequent 
tests If the 'considerations of entertainment' could in om us, prior 
to euch tests, that the hypotheses which met them would pass such 
tests. But as we have seen previously, an independent, non-justific- 
ationist, context of appraisal cannot be dispersed with. Thus, any 
artioulable 'considerations of entertainment' cannot enable .: 
explicit fore-knowledge of 'success' in tht xabsequent context of 
appraisal. 
Finally, I want briefly to compare this second proposal for 
making sense of the possibility of a genuinely non-psychologistic, 
ically 
methodolog /significant, context of production, with our first 
proposal. Like our first proposal. - which proposes to turn general 
evaluative standards of appraisal directly into rules of production 
(by formulating them as maxims for action) - our second proposal 
also suggests the possibility of rules of production which guide, 
or govern, the process of production by reference to debi-red prop-- 
ertiee of the outcome, or product, of this process (it is finis which 
makes both propoealepropoeals of genuinely non-psychologistic rules 
of produotion). But whereas our first proposal does so via rather 
general desired properties of the outcome, or product, of the process 
of production, our second proposal does so via much more specific 
desired properties. That is, our first suggestion gives rise to 
rather vague, general, rules of production such as 'increase 
teetabilityl', whereas our seccn d suggestion gives rise to much more 
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epeoifio rules of production - euch as 'only produce hypotheses 
concerning the structure of benzene which meet "entertainment 
considerations" A, B, C, D, E, and Ft. In other words, our second 
suggestion carries with it the possibility of much more constraining, 
or directive, rules of production; and thus the possibility of a 
much more substantial methodology of production. Moreover, whereas 
the first proposal suggests, in effect, the imposition of rather 
externally derived rules of production (that is, rules mich have 
been imposed on the context of production from the relatively 
independent context of appraisal), the second proposal suggests the 
possibility that quite substantive rules of production may arise 
fairly naturally from specific considerations which have arisen in 
the context of appraising specific prior hypotheses. But in that 
case it then becomes possible to see the very considerations which 
motivate the search for, and production of, specific new hypotheses 
as themselves controlling this search, and thus controlling or 
governing the process of producing such hypotheses. 
To explain: aseme we have available some specific hypothesis h 
which we have rigorously subjected to examination in accordance with 
our methods of appraisal. Assume further that as a result of mich 
examination we have discovered a number of considerations which lead 
to the rejection of this hypothesis (i. e., to the conclusion that it 
cannot be maintained). Then euch 'considerations of naintenancet 
can be thought of as motivating the search for specific new 
hypotheses with which to replace h. On the other : and, euch 
considerations, since they are available prior to our minding any 
euch hypothesis, can themselves be thought of as 'considerations 
of entertainment' on such hypotheses - in that we will require of 
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any euch hypothesis that it meet these considerations before we will 
seriously subject it to further, subsequent, appraisal. But in that 
case euch considerations play a dual role: in the context of 
appraising h, they motivate the search for a replacement to h; 
while in the context of searching for such a replacement they 
function as desiderata on the search, h, and so can function to control, 
or govern, the process of searching. In other words, such consider- 
ations can simultaneously be thought of as both motivating the 
production of specific new hypotheses (by making their production 
necessary) and as guiding, or governing, the proceai of such 
production (by specifying conditions which the hypotheses produced 
should satisfy before we will consider them worthy of subsequent 
appraisal). But in that case, euch considerations, rather than 
being artificially (or externally) imposed on the process of 
production, can be seen as being quite naturally (or internally) 
imposed on this process - since the initiation of the process -self 
can now be seen to depend on the very considerations vthich will 
control, or govern it (and so the process may be called a 'coupled' one). 
To em up: our second proposal shares with our first proposal 
the propeit7 of specifying non-peyc,: iologistic rules of production 
which are of genuine methodological significance. since the rules 
so-specified guide, or govern, the process of product: -ý_, by reference 
to desired properties of the outcome, or product, of this process. 
But our second proposal appears to have three distinct advantages 
over our first proposal. Firstly, unlike our first proposal, it 
enables us to make sense of the possibility of quite powerful con- 
etraints (and, indeed, progressively more powerful constraints) 
on the process of production, and thus of the possibility of a 
quite powerful non-psychological heuristics. Seconäiy, : ,r enables 
t 
us to understand how it could be possible for the scientist to 
discriminate, prior to subsequent appraisal, which specific 
bbpotheeee are wort of such appraisal (without this at all 
threatening the need for such appraisal). And thirdly, it allows 
us to view the constraints on the process of production, which 
guide or govern that process, not as artificially imposed but 
rather as quite naturally imposed - since the very constraints 
which guide or govern the process also play a role-in the 
requiring of that process to begin with. Thus to impose such 
constraints on the process of production is to impose constraints 
which themselves function to motivate the process of production 
itself.? 
3.5: Conclusion - Methodology as the Theory of Rati;? nal Inquiry 
In this chapter I have attempted to argue the following theses: 
(1) that the 17th century hope of developing a logic (or even a 
methodology) of discovery which could simultaneously function as a 
logic of justification cannot succeed, since the need will still 
remain to justify the claim that any such logic (or methodology) is 
indeed a logic (or methodology) of discovery; (2) that even if 
we transpose this hope into the non-justificationist setting of 
(PR)., we will still need an independent, non-justificationist, 
context of appraisal in order to secure the possibility of critical 
arguments against the claim that any proposed logic (or 
methodology) is a logic (or methodology) of discovery; and 'ý) that 
in any case we must relinquish the justificationist theory of 
appraisal if we hope to be able to positively appraise some theories 
while negatively appraising others. It follows from these first 
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three theses that if we scant to be able successfully to discri. m- 
irate between competing, alternative, theories (from the point of 
view of appraising them) then we must adopt a non-justificationist 
approach to the problem of appraisal; and moreover, that euch an 
approach cannot be eliminated in favour of either a logic or a 
methodology of discovery. 
I then argued (4) that it does not follow from this result 
that the genetic questions of production which have traditionally 
been identified as part of the 'context of discovery' are therefore 
totally irrelevant to-the issues which arise in a non-justificationist 
context of appraisal; and that (5) the thesis that these two sets 
of issues are totally divorced results from the conviction that 
genetic questions of production can be nothing other than merely 
questions of empirical psychology, and thus of a different 'logical 
category' to the questions of appraisal. In response to this 
challenge, I argued (6) that although the context of production 
indeed contains elements which are mere1 y of particular, or 
psychological, interest, it can also contain elements which are of 
genuine methodological significance; and I then proceeded to propose 
two possible means for generally characterising such elements. I 
argued, moreover, (7) that although euch non-psychologistic, 
methodologically, significant, elements of the context of production 
can never function as a 'logic of productions, they can function 
as a tmethodology of production'; and (8) that if we hope to combine 
a rational context of production with the possibility that science 
involves the creative production of genuinely novel hypotheses, 
then we must content ourselves with such a 'methodology' (or set of 
constraints on the process of production) as opposed to a 'logic' 
Abt 
(which will determine the outcome of that process). 
Given these results it immediately follows that the theory of 
rational scientific method need not restrict its interest merely 
to the question of supplying rules for appraising already produced 
theories and hypotheses; but that it may also quite legitimately 
(and non-peychologistically) aim to develop rules which may guide, 
or constrain, the search for new theories and bypotheses - and 
thus rules governing the process of producing them. But I want, 
in fact, to make a slightly stronger claim - for it seems to me 
that if we admit that theories of rational scientific method can 
incorporate elements relating both to production and to appraisal, 
then we ought to cease to make any sharp methodological distinction 
between the context of production and the context of appraisal. 
More specifically, we have already seer. how wnat have traditionally 
been conceived as elements of the context of appraisal can be made 
to function as elements in the context of production (i. e., 
methodological standards of appraisal can be formuiatec: as p roductýon- 
relevant maxims for action, wbi. le prior t conbxäera ions of 
maintenance' can be viewed as production-re evan, k, 'considerations of 
entertainments). Moreover, we have also seer: how what has 
traditionally been conceived as an element in the context of 
production may be made to function in the context of appraisal 
(in that questions of how a certain theory was reached, or the manner 
in which it was produced, may be relevant to the issue of 
appraising it). But if standards and/or considerations of appraisal 
can be made production-relevant, while questions of production can 
be made appraisal-relevant, then what any longer is the point of 
making a sharp distinction between a methodologioai context of 
i 
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appraisal and one of production? 
I want to suggest, then, that from a methodological point of 
view we should cease to think in terms of two sharply distinguishable 
contexts altogether. But is there, then; some single 'context' 
which can be thought of as equally incorporating elements relating 
both to production and to appraisal, and which can thus function as 
the single context of our methodological theories? The newer, I 
suggest, is that we should view our theories of rational method as 
relating to what might be called the context of zn ui , and thus 
view our methodological theories as theories of rational inquiry - 
for when we aim to appraise an already produced theory or ny othesis, 
we can be said to be aiming to inquire into the question of its 
truth (or into the question of whether it should be preferred to 
some rival theory or hypothesis from the point of view of truth) ; 
whereas when we aim to produce new theories or hypothesesywe can 
be said to be aiml. ng to inquire into the question of whe#"ne. r- o 
not there is some alternative to current theories and 'Aypoi eses, or 
some modification to them, which can enable us to overcome their 
shortcomings (where such shortcOmings, or their recognition, can 
themselves be thought of as resin sing from previous inquiry into 
those theories and hypotheses). In other words, the notion of 
inquiry indiscriminately contains within itself the dual ideas of 
appraisal and production. Moreover, in focusing our 
methodological attention on the context of inquiry, and thus 
viewing our methodological theories as theories of rational inquiry, 
we are immediately able to see methodology as simultaneously 
practical and forward-looking - since in inquiry we are always 
concerned with questions of searching or seeking, whether we are 
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seeking to appraise or seeking to produce. In other words, by 
seeing methodology as the theory of rational inquiry we are not 
only able to va1te within a single perspective the 'two contexts' 
of appraisal and production, but moreover we may be able to free 
ourselves from the rather Hegelian view (subsequently taken up by 
Lakatos. ) that the 'owl of Minerva flies at dusk', or that 
rationality can only be retrospective , and never prospective or 
forward-looking. 
From the viewpoint developed here, then, the theory of 
scientific method provides neither rules of justification nor 
rules of discovery. But neither is it to be conceived of as 
providing rules of non- justificationist appraisal of current scientific 
hypotheses which are separable from rules which guide, or govern, 
the process of producing new scientific hypotheses. Rather, the 
theory of scientific method is to be thought of as providing rules 
of rational inquiry - rules which regulate the search for scientific 
knowledge by regulating both our inquiries into current scientific 
hypotheses and our inquiring after new scientific hypotheses. In 
other words, I want to suggest that it is the rational search for 
knowledge which is the object of our methodological theories, 
and that science as she is practiced is rational only in so fas 
as she exemplifies our best theories of the rational search for 
knowledge, our best theories of rational inquiry. More importantly, 
I even want to claim that our very ability to rationally appraise 
oompeting, or alternative, scientific theories and hypotheses 
itself depends upon our conniting ourselves to inquiring in 
accordance with our best theories of inquiry - and that such 
inquiry includes, as a central element, the inquiry after new 
scientific theories and hypotheses. Thus, from the viewpoint to 
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be developed later, the problem of appraising competing scientific 
theories and bypotheees can itself only be solved if we are 
willing to engage in continuing rational inquiry. 
But I am, perhaps, getting ahead of myself here - for having 
introduced the idea that methodology is to be conceived of as the 
theory of rational inquiry, or of the rational search for knowledge, 
I mast now turn to the discussion of an old, hoary, philosophical 
problem: the paradox of Plato's Meno. For this paradox seems to 
entail that the rational search for knowledge is impossible, so 
that a theory of rational inquiry cannot be achieved. It is, then, 
to an examination of this paradox, and related issues, which I 
turn in the next chapter. In particular, I shall hope to show 
that despite Popper's explicit restriction of the scope of scientific 
method to the context of appraisal, it is possible to develop a 
'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox, and thus a 'Popperian' 
theory of rational inquiry which extends to the 'context of 
produotion'. 
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CHAPTER 3-. Footnotes 
1. Oddly enough, this conclusion itself follows from Popper's own 
view concerning 'corroboration' - for according to Popper, 
empirical evidence can only genuinely 'support' or 'corroborate' 
a theory if that evidence was itself gathered as a direct 
result of attempting to test the theory (so as to refute it). 
But clearly any evidence which is available prior to the 
production of a theory could not have been gathered as the 
result of attempting to test that theory (since one can cnly 
attempt to test articulated theories, and so theories which 
have already been produced). In other words, Popper's own 
theory of 'corroboration' itself entails that evaluative 
appraisals cannot be completely divorced from the context of 
production, or from the historical situation obtaining priory '. o 
the emergence of a theory. 
2. To see this, consider once again the hypothesis that 'all 
ravens are black'. This hypothesis is logically equivalent 
to the hypothesis that 'everything is either no raven or black'. 
Clearly everything in the universe except non--black ravens will 
either be no raven or black. Thus 'all ravens are black: ' v: al 
be confirmed by any evidence which does not 'Logically refuate it. 
3. It might be thought that the kind of schematic ac ua-tior, 
imagined in the text - that of 'rigging-up' refutes. ctheses 
ad hoc so as to avoid some apparently devastating djffic tLes 
is really too schematic to have much in the way of interesting 
application. This, however, would be a mistake. Thus, take 
the way in which Cartesian physics evolved in the face of the 
ever increasing empirical success of Newtonian physics. This 
latter success precisely consisted in the progressive 
corroboration of more and more of the novel predictions of 
Newtonian theory; while Cartesian physics was unable to stay 
'ahead' of the 'facts' and instead was constantly being 
modified to 'catch up' with them. The result was that 
Cartesian physics came to be a mere simulation, in another 
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'language', of the empirical content of Newtonian physics. 
Thus unless we consider as evaluatively relevant the whole 
historical evolution of Cartesian physics - and in particular 
the manner by which it w as made to 'fit the facts' - we shall 
not be able to appraise the NAwtonian theory more highly than 
the Cartesian one in terms of its relation -co empirical 
evidence. For the story of the evolution of Cartesian 
physics in the face of Newtonian physics, see William Whewell, 
'On the Transformation of Hypotheses in the tistory of Science', 
Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, (18-51/t PP. '39 - 47. 
See also Imre Lakatos (1970) - to which owe tyre reference to 
Whewell. 
4. A similar point has recently been made oy Robert McLaughlin it 
a paper entitled 'Invention and Ind-u. ',, on: Laudan, Simon a: ü 
the Logic of Discovery, Philosop- of iQ (June, 1982), 
pp. 198 - 211. Nkr distinction between appraisal and production 
is rather similar to his distinction between appraisal and 
invention; but McLaughlin he Ada that what ; unites the context of 
appraisal with his context of invention is induction - i= 
that induction can play a role in both contexts - whereas my 
views are, I hope, total -1Y free of any idea of 'induction', To 
expand: McLaughlin holes that central to his context of both 
invention and appraisal are what he calls 'plausibility 
arguments', arguments which - in the context of invention - 
play a role in leading scientists to invent the hypotheses 
they actually do invent; but which equally play a role in an 
inductive context of appraisal - since they rase the prior, 
or initial, probability of the hypothesis so i.; vented and 
thus, given Bayes' theorem, contribute to its a, posteriori 
probability (or degree of empirical confirmE. n) . I, on the 
other hand, reject the idea that Bayes' theorem has anything 
to do with an inductive logic of confirmation; and, as I shall 
suggest later, hold that the context of invention (or 
production) consists in the main of what I shall call 
('t2. 
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'considerations of entertainment' (rather than 'plausibility 
arguments'). But meeting such considerations of entertainment 
only serves to make an hypothesis worthy of subsequent, or 
further, critical appraisal - and so does not in the least 
raise its initial probability (since if it did, this would 
raise the initial probability of all of its consequences, 
and so would lessen, rather than heighten, the need for 
further critical appraisal of the hypothesis). For a 
devastating refutation of the claim that Bayes' theorem 
provides the basis of an inductive logic of confirmation, see 
Karl Popper and David Miller, 'A Proof of the Impossibility of 
Inductive Probability', Nature, vol. 302, no. 5910 
(21 April, 1983), pp. 687 - 8. 
5. I should, perhaps, explain here why I say, in the context of 
the suggestion put forward in the text, that methodology is 
to be seen as providing general strategic rules guiding the 
process of production - for I do not wish to deny that on a 
tactical level it may be possible to either break or ignore 
these rules and yet produce products which are subsecgaently 
positively appraised. Rather I wish to assert that on a 
strategic level we maximize our chances of developing theories 
which will better meet our standa-3s of appraisal if we. allow 
our long-tern scientific activity to be guided by the relevant 
general rules. As far as I can see, almost all of, e. g., 
Feyerabend's historical arguments against the possibility of 
methodology (and thus in favour of his anarchistic "anything 
goes' philosophy) rest upon the failure to realise -` rLat general 
methodological rules are, in the main, strategic rules and not 
tactical ones. Thus tht fact -that, say, Galileo may have 
broken certain general rules tactically and yet produced 
theories which were subsequently positively appraised, in no 
way shows that breaking such rules would be a good strategy. 
In other words, Feyerabends historical arguments against 
method are, I suggest, irrelevant as criticisms of the value of 
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euch rules as strategic guides in the context of production. 
For Feyerabend's use of Galileo, see his inst Method 
(London: New Left Books, 1975); for the use of the strategy/ 
tactics distinction to defuse certain criticisms of Popper 
raised by Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos, see N. Maxwell 
'A Critique of Popperle views on Scientific Method', Philosophy 
of Science, 39 (1972), pp. 131 - 52. 
6. The argument in the text is clearly rather similar to a well- 
known argument of Popper's that, for Logical reasons, no 
scientific predictor can predict its own future predictions. 
Thus we cannot predict scientifically the future course of 
scientific knowledge - for if we could, then we could now 
scientifically predict science's own future predictions. But 
this would entail that these predictions could scientifically 
be made now, and so would no longer be science's future pred- 
iotions. Thus, if there is genuine growth, or developmen-c, in 
scientific knowledge then this growth cannot be scientifically 
predicted. Similarly, if there is, in science. genuine 
creative productions of novel scientific 'potheses, then these 
productions cannot be scientifically predicted either, and so 
cannot be fully explained. For Popper's oarguner. -re concerning 
these questions, see his 'Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and 
in Classical Physics', British Journal for the Philosophy of 
sc=, 1 (1950), pp. 117 - 33 and 173 - 95. 
7. I should point out here that, on reflection, the differences 
between my two proposals might be thought to vanish. Thus, 
for example, the failure of available hypotheses to meet, say, 
the general requirement of testability can also be thought of 
as both motivating the search for new hypotheses and as con- 
trolling that search. True enough, but this would still not 
eliminate the other main difference between my two proposals 
- namely, the difference in potential heuristic power between 
the first type of constraint on production and the second type. 
Moreover, it might be argued that the ability of the second 
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type of constraint to both motivate and guide the process of 
production itself depends crucially upon adopting the aseral, 
methodological rule (of the first type): 'meet "considerations 
of entertainment"! P. Perhaps this is so (although i am not 
so sure); but even if it is so, this argument would not show 
that the 'type-two' constraints on the process of production 
(based upon 'considerations of entertainment') would not play 
a crucial role in supplementing, and indeed strengthening, the 
'type-one' constraints (based merely upon general methodological 
requirements). In addition, it is crucial to realise here that 
if one wants to be able to explain how it is that scientists 
are able to discriminate, prior to subsequent appraisal, 
those hypotheses which are worthy of such appraisal, then 
the 'type-one' constraints w. l_l simply not suffice 
for they are too weak, in the sense of too easilly 
satisfiable. Thus, for example, if the only discriminatory 
constraint available to Kekule had been the 'type-one' constraint 
of testability, then Kekule would have been unable to dis- 
criminate between any two testable hypotheses, since every 
such hypothesis would be deemed worthy of subsequent appraisal. 
But clearly most such hypotheses (like 'all snakes are poisonous') 
would have been rejected by Kekule as : irrelevant, and thus 
the question of their subsequent appraisal would not arise. So 
if we hope to explain, non-psychologically, this ability to 
'perceive relevance' then we must go beyond the kinds of 
general guidance in the context of production provided by 
type-one' constraints. 
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CHAPTER : Articulating Our Ignorance Hopeful Scepticism 
and the Meno Paradox 
Meno: And how will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you 
do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of 
inquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you 
ever know that this is the thing which you did not know? 
(Plato's Meno, 80 d). 
In an essay entitled 'The Legacy of the Meno', Marjorie Grene 
(1966a) tells us (p. 32) that 'Popper has paid no serious heed to 
Meno'e question' - that is, to the paradox of learning, or of the 
search for new knowledge, articulated in Plato's dialogue of the 
same name. In the course of her discussion she not only repudiates, 
as Popper himself has done, 
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Plato's solution to this problem, 
she also takes Popper's own views on scientific method to task, 
asserting that ton either view, Plato's or Popper's, there is 
really no such thing as learning, (p. 31). A student of Popper's 
philosophy might be forgiven for gasping in response to such a 
claim - for if Popper's falsificationist philosophy of science is 
anything it is, surely, a theory of learning from experience, and 
hence a theory of the growth of empirical scientific knowledge. 
How, one might wonder, could anyone hold that Popper's philosophy 
entails the non-existence of such a thing as learning? 
Well, perhaps they could argue as follows: genuine learning 
must always involve discovery, the learning of what was 
previously unknown; but as we saw in the last chapter, Popper 
(1959, p" 32) holds that 'every discovery contains "an irrational 
element", or a "creative intuition", in Bergson's sense'. Thus, 
the critic might be tempted to conclude that, for Popper, learning 
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must be irrational - or, rather, that although there may be a 
peychologq of learning there can be no logic (or methodo-logic 
of learning, no logic (or even methodology) of searching for that 
which is presently unknown. 
Something of this line of reasoning has, I think, rubbed off 
on Grene, for she says of Plato and Popper that 
neither in the one case nor the other is there any 
reasoned account of learning or discovery. There is 
either, for Plato, nothing new, or, for Popper, 
novelties thrown up so far as one knows a; t random. 
(Grene (1966a), p. 31, my emphasis) 
In other words, I want to suggest that Grene is able to see Popper's 
philosophy as entailing the non-existence of rational learning 
because she identifies, not unreasonably, genuine learning with 
the successful search for new knowledge, and cannot see in Popper 
any rational theory of this search. That is, although she freely 
admits that Popper has a rational theory of the elimination of 
candidates for new knowledge (i. e., his falsificationist 
methodology), she rightly denies that he has any rational theory of 
their generation (or of their 'discovery? ); and, as importantly, 
of how they can come to be recognised as candidates for new 
knowledge. In essence, then, she rightly fails to see any Popperian 
solution to the Meno paradox. The time is ripe, I think, to supply 
one. 
4.1 : Some 'Popperian' Preliminaries 
It will be recalled that Popper himself explicitly restricts 
the scope of scientific method to that of the post hoc appraisal 
or evaluation of theories already invented. He thus explicitly 
denies the possibility of a non-psychological methodology of the 
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search for such theories. On the other hand, as we shall see, the 
challenge of the Meno paradox is precisely the challenge of 
explaining how we can rationally search for new knowledge, including 
new theoretical knowledge, while nevertheless needing to search. 
But this, then, immediately creates a difficulty - for on the one 
side, my aim here is to supply a Popperian solution to the Meno 
paradox; while on the other side, Popper himself has, in effect, 
rejected the possibility of such a solution. So what can be meant 
here by a 'Popperian' eol-, ration to the Meno paradox? The answer 
lies in spelling out some salient features of Popper's philosophy, 
and then turning consistency with these features into explicit 
requirements on a solution to the Meno paradox. Any such solution 
will then, not unreasonably, deserve to be called a 'Popperian' 
solution. 
To begin, then, we raise the following question: wherein lies 
the distinctiveness of Popper's approach to science? Now it might 
be thought that what distinguishes Popper's theory of science from 
that of other philosophers is his fallibilism - that is, his denial 
of the possibility of scientific certainty, and his assertion of 
the conjectural nature of every part of scientific knowledge. But 
this would be a mistake, for the overwhelming majority of contemporary 
philosophers of science - including most of the proponents of 
probabilistic inductive logic - are also fallibilists. So wherein 
lies the difference between them sand Popper? The answer becomes 
clear, I suggest, as soon as one realises that there are in fact at 
least two, very different, ways in which one can be a fallibilist. 
First, one can be what might be teased a justificationist fallibilist 
- that is, one can hold that 
(a) science aims to prove or justify its 
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hypotheses; but that (b) such proof or justification can never 
be perfect: so mat (c) certainty in science can never be reached. 
On this view, one does not reject the aim of justifying, or trying 
to make certain, one's scientific theories or hypotheses; one only 
recognises that the pursuit of this aim has limited, or partial, 
scope for success. But Popper's fallibiliem is quite different to 
this - his is a critical, not a justificationist, fallibili rn. 
That is, Popper rejects not only the possibility of attaining 
certainty (as do all fallibilists), but also the quest for it - 
his fallibiliem rests not so much on the impossibility of perfect 
proof as on the constant possibility of detecting our errors, and 
on the conscious adoption of methodologLcal policies designed to 
help us do so. As David Miller ((1980), p. 115) has noted, for 
Popper 'the conjectural character of scientific hypotheses lies not 
so much in the fact that they cannot be shown to be right as in the 
fact that they may be shown to be wrongs. Thus, the distinguishing 
feature of Popper's approach to science lies not in his fallibilist 
or conjecturalist epistemology, but rather in his falsificationist 
(or criticalist), anti-justificational, methodology. 
Now the traditional debate in the theory of knowledge has been 
between those who believe, optimistically, in the possibility of 
attaining knowledge by rational means ('dogmatists'), and those who, 
pessimistically, deny this possibility ('sceptics'). How are we to 
situate Popper's philosophy within this traditional debate? The 
question is a difficult one, for Popper's philosophy in effect 
proposes a shift in the very terns of the debate, in its 
presuppositions. In so far as the traditional optimists hoped to 
distinguish rational knowledge from mere belief on the basis of 
justification, Popper must qualify as a pessimist (or sceptic) - 
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for as already mentioned, he denies not only the possibility of 
successfully justifying our knowledge claims, but also the fruit- 
fulness of the very search for such justification. But in so far 
as the traditional pessimists held that all cognitive claims are, 
rationally, on a par (relativism) or that the rational search for 
knowledge and truth is mere chimera ('methodological nihilism'), 
Popper must qualify as an optimist. In the context of the traditional 
debate Popper's view might best be chaxacterised as a hopeful, or 
Socratic, scepticism - for like Socrates, Popper is optimistic 
about the search for truth, but pessimistic about our attaining it 
(or, at the very least, knowing that we've attained it); 
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and 
for Popper this 'third view' between traditional optimism and trad- 
itional pessimism is to be forged by shifting the main problem of 
the theory of knowledge away from that of the justification of 
belief altogether, and to instead redirect it to that of the 
critical improvement of conjectural theories -a shift which is 
designed precisely to enable us to be sceptical and yet anti- 
relativistic; to be 'pessimistic' and critical as to the truth of 
our present scientific knowledge and yet optimistic as to science's 
search for the truth. 
Now in order to be 'pessimistic' or critical as to the truth 
of our present scientific knowledge one pre-condition is 
paramount - and that is that we do not adopt a notion of truth 
which simply identifies truth with that which is presently known. 
For if truth is so identified then we cannot be 'pessimistic' or 
critical as to the truth of our present scientific knowledge, since, 
by definition, it would have to be true. Thus Popper's sceptical 
pessimism' requires that we operate always with a non-epistemic, or 
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objective, notion of truth, and thus with the idea that truth is 
above human decision. Given this, the common-sense notion of truth 
as 'correspondence to reality' (or to 'the facts') does nicely - 
since on this notion our cuizent scientific knowledge can indeed 
be false; and the truth will indeed be above human decision (in the 
sense that the decision to accept a statement as true will not make 
it true). But this means that Popper's 'sceptical pessimism', in 
requiring the adoption of an objective, or correspondence, theory of 
truth, simultaneously requires the rejection of the idea that truth 
is relative - relative, that is, to some given framework of asm p- 
tions (since this would reintroduce an epietemic, or non-objectivist, 
notion of truth). But this, then, further entails that if Popper's 
Socratic optimism' as to science's search for the truth is to be 
realisable, then it must not be the case that this search itself 
need be relative to a given framework of asswmptions - for if the 
search for truth must be relative to a given framework of assLmmpti, ons 
then we cannot search for non-framewa k relative (or objective) 
truth; unless, that is, this given framework of assumptions was 
itself objectively true. But given Popper's 'sceptical pessimism' 
we should not simply assume, in the absence of critical inquiry, that 
any given framework of assumptions is objectively true; rather, we 
should aim to inquire into whether or not it is objectively true. 
But if the search for truth were relative to this framework, then 
we could not so inquire. Thus we reach the following result: 
Popper's 'sceptical pessimism' demands an objective or correspondence 
theory of truth, and thus a non-relativistic theory of truth; while 
his 'Socratic optimism' as to the search for such truth requires 
that the search itself not be relative to any given framework of 
assumptions. 
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Moreover, it is important to realise that unlike the overwhelming 
majority of contemporary epistemologiats, Popper does not identify 
knowledge in general, and scientific knowledge in particular, with 
'justified, true belief'; and this not only because he rejects 
the quest for justification (but not the quest for truth), but 
also because he does not identify scientific Imowledge with 
subjective (or 'world-2') belief-states (for Popper's 'Three Worlds' 
view, see his (1972)). That is, for Popper, scientific knowledge is 
t be identified with linguistically formulated conjectural theories, 
theories which (a) are unjustified, (b) may be false, and (c) are 
not beliefs. In fact, it is precisely because Popper rejects the 
quest for justification of our scientific theories, and instead 
proposes that we seek to criticise or falsify them (in order to 
try to find out where they are mistaken), that he is opposed to the 
identification of theoretical scientific knowledge with subjective 
belief-states. For if such knowledge were so identified then any 
potential falsifier of them would simply be, subjectively, dis-believed; 
while if such knowledge were identified with justified subjective 
belief-states, then any potential falsifier of them would simply 
be justifiably dis-believed. As David Miller has put it, the 
application of Popper's criticalist or falsificationist methodology 
requires the suspension of belief. Thus Popper's rejection of the 
identification of scientific knowledge with a special type of belief 
(namely, 'justified, true belief') is of a piece with his rejection 
of justificationiat methodology. 
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The aim of the present chapter, it will be recalled, is to meet 
the challenge posed by Marjorie Grene that 'Popper has paid no 
serious heed to Meno's question', and thus to show that it is indeed 
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possible to develop a 'Popperiant solution to. the paradox of 
searching for that which is presently unknown suggested by it. But 
this aim can now be significantly reformulated. For to search for 
a 'Popperian? solution to the Meno paradox is to search for a 
solution which at least meets the following requirements: Firstly, 
it must be 'pessimistic' (or sceptical), in that it not only rejects 
successfully 
the possibility of/justifying our knowledge claims but, more 
importantly, rejects the very quest for such justification. Thus 
a 'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox must not make the 
rational search for new knowledge, or for that which is presently 
unknown, dependent upon any justificationist methods. But secondly, 
it must simultaneously be toptimistic' (or "Socratic'), in that it 
allows for the possibility of rationally searching for objective 
truth. Thus a 'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox must both 
employ an objective (or correspondence) notion of truth and must not 
make the rational search for such truth relative to any given 
framework of assumptions. Thirdly, the knowledge discovered as a 
result of the rational search must not only be unjustified, it also 
must not consist of subjective belief-states, but of linguistically 
formulated theories; and, to generalise this, our theory of the 
rational search should itself only employ assumptions which refer 
to that which can be linguistically articulated. Thus a 'Popperiant 
solution to the Meno paradox should be 'objectivist'. 
Much of the burden of the rest of this chapter will be to show 
exactly why simultaneously satisfying these requirements seems so 
problematic, and then to offer a solution to the Meno paradox which 
can satisfy them (and so which is tPopperian'). I shall proceed 
as follows: first, in section 4.2.1 shall introduce what I take 
to be the fundamental problem of traditional epistemology - the 
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problem of diversity - and briefly describe both the traditional, 
justificationist, solution to it and its shortcomings; then, in 
Section I. 3,1 shall indicate haw a rejection of this solution seems 
at once to throw us into both a scepticism and a relativism; 
thirdly, in Section 4.4,1 will show how the Meno paradox mi&t be 
used to buttress or support the justificationist solution to the 
problem of diversity as against Popper's hopeful, or Socratic, 
scepticism; finally, in Section )4.5,1 shall outline a solution to 
this paradox which is simultaneously non-justificationiet, non- 
relativist, and objectivist - and so which is 'Popperian'. My 
thesis, in a nut-shell, is here three-fold: first, that (pace 
Marjorie Grene) there does exist a tPopperiant, or Socratic sceptical, 
solution to the Meno paradox; secondly, that such a solution is 
preferable to the rival justificationist solutions; and third, that 
such a solution thus provides an independent means for avoiding 
relativism while simultaneously defending scepticism. 
4.2: Jwstificationiam and the Problem of Diversity 
Rationality ... is of supreme importance ..., not only 
in ages in which it easily prevails, but also, and even 
more, in those less fortunate times in which it is despised 
and rejected as the vain dream of men who lack the 
virility to kill where they cannot agree. - Bertrand Russell 
The central problem confronting the traditional theorist of 
knowledge is, I maintain, an eminently practical one. It results 
from the fact that different men, in the same or different cultures, 
and at the same or different times, make diverse (conflicting and 
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competing) claims about the world. The problem which this diversity 
raises is this: how can any of the disputes which may arise in its 
wake be adjudicated (non-violently)? Which, if any, of the diverse 
claims are rationally acceptable? 
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The traditional, justificationist, 
answer to these questions is that any claim may be said to be part 
of our knowledge, and to be rationally acceptable, if and only if 
it is possible to justify it, to prove that it is true, or at least 
highly probable. Otherwise it is but mere doxa, opinion. It may 
even be true opinion, but until it is justified (or proven; or 
probabilified) the rational man should suspend his judgment, and 
keep himself from coming out in favour of any of the parties to the 
dispute. Now already in antiquity sceptics had pointed out that 
the unlimited demand for j 3tification leads to an infinite regress 
- for since all proofs start from assumptions it is impossible to 
prove all assumptions (or even to probabilify all assumptions). 
This simple logical fact forced justificationists into invoking 
'self-evident' or 'self-justifying' foundations for knowledge - 
that is, statements which we could somehow definitively 'see' to 
be true (or at least 'see' to be true with high probability) 
independently of all proof, and which could thus serve as the 
starting-point either for strict justification (proof) or for 
its weaker, probabilistic, variant (and, hence, as the starting- 
point for knowledge). The juetificationiet solution to the 
problem of diversity amounted, then, to the idea that all genuine 
intellectual disputes can be adjudicated with reference to this 
self-evident foundation - if one of the diverse claims can be 
justified on its basis then it, and it alone, is rationally 
acceptable knowledge; if none of them can be so justified then all 
are mere doxa, and the rational man then suspends his judgment. 
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As is well known, two main schools arose to supply the needed 
juetificational foundation: intellectualism (or rationalism) and 
empiricism. Intellectualists sought to ground knowledge in a 
reliable faculty of 'reason', or 'intellectual intuition'; 
empiricists in a reliable faculty of 'sense', or in 'experience'. 
Yet neither programme can, I submit, really succeed - if for no 
other reason than that the sceptic can always demand a justification 
for assuming the reliability (that is, either the known truth or 
the high probability of truth) of any proposed justificatory 
foundation, and hence re-open the infinite regress. More specifically, 
however, modern intellectualism has been in disarray since the 
times of Newton and Kant. On the one hand, the triumph of 
Newtonian over Cartesian physics, coupled with Descartes' claim to 
have based his physics only upon cleax and distinct ideas guaranteed 
true by our God-given intellectual intuition, undercut confidence in 
the Cartesian 'Natural Light of Reason'; on the other hand, the 
Kantian antinomies showed that we could argue with equal intuitive 
cogency for contradictory propositions. The conclusion seemed 
inescapable: 'pure reason' cannot be a reliable guide to the truth. 
Modern empiricism has (historically) fared much better, largely 
as a result of Newton's insistence that his discovery of the laws of 
motion and of gravitation had been based upon experience and 
induction. 
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Yet Hume showed that justificational empiricism is 
actually inconsistent with inductivism - since the latter requires 
the acceptance of a principle whose justification cannot, without 
circularity, rest upon experience. But this means that not only 
is empiricism unable to provide a rational justification for the 
acceptance of causal laws (and so fails to exhibit natural science 
as a rational enterprise from the justificationist's viewpoint); 
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but also that, in so far as induction was taken to be the theory 
of how we learn from experience, empiricism can provide no account 
of how such learning can be rational. For given Hume's result, the 
justificational empiricist is forced to the conclusion that learning 
from experience is only possible on pain of inconsistency (and 
hence on pain of irrationality). Moreover, there is the further 
problem of how we are to linguistically express the contents of 
our sense experience in such a way as to incorporate only this 
experience. A solution to this problem is just as crucial to the 
justificational empiricists enterprise as is a solution to the 
problem of induction - for proofs, and hence justifications, can 
only proceed from linguistically formulated premisses. If, there- 
fore, our most basic empirical propositions already express more 
than the contents of our sense experience then the empiricist 
has failed to provide, by his own criterion, a reliable foundation 
(of either known truth or high probability of truth) from which 
justification might proceed. And, to make matters worse, there is 
here an absolutely devastating trade-off between these two problems 
- in that the closer we come to a solution to this last problem 
the harder it becomes to solve the problem of induction. Intuitively 
speaking, the more reliability the empiricist manages to obtain at 
the level of the linguistically formulated empirical basis, the 
larger is the logical gap between it and what he hopes to justify 
on its basis (e. g., the universal laws of mathematical physics). 
The seeming insolubility of these, and similar, problems have 
combined, I think, to drastically undermine the plausibility of 
traditional justificationism. But it is important to realise why 
this view maintains its philosophical glitter - for in the absence 
of some sort of reliable epistemological authority to which we can 
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appeal, how are we to go about trying to adjudicate rationally and 
non-violently between competing knowledge claims? Yet in response 
to this difficulty justificationism explains too much - for it 
actually makes the empirical fact of diversity itself highly 
problematic. For if there does exist an adequate (i. e., self- 
evident) justificatory foundation with reference to which all 
disputes can be adjudicated how, then, is the continuing 
existence of diversity and disputes to be explained? Traditional 
justificationists were apt to reply with theories of prejudice (or 
error): diversity and disputes continue, they argued, because 
people are irrationally 'blinded' either by their prejudices (]Bacon) 
or by their Willfulness (Descartes) from seeing the self-evident 
(or Manifest) foundation. But these theories, in their turn, simply 
raise the further problem of how we are now to know when we are 
not prejudiced (or Willful) - for unless we can know this, we can 
never know when we are actually in possession of that very 
foundation of 'self-evident' truth (or 'self-evident' high 
probability of truth) with reference to which we were supposed to 
adjudicate between diverse claims. In other words, there here 
emerges a second devastating trade-off for the justificationist: 
without an unproblematically (or 'self-evidently) self-evident 
foundation he cannot solve the problem of diversity; but with such 
a foundation he cannot explain why there should be continuing 
diversity (and hence a continuing problem) in the first place. 
This last point leads to an important consideration - and 
that is that any successful solution to the problem of diversity 
must not be too successful. That is, it must not be so powerful as 
to eliminate the possibility of rational diversity, or of rational 
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disagreement - for if it could do so1then not only would 
it make 
the fact of continuing diversity itself rationally problematic, it 
would also eliminate the possibility that scientific progress can 
be rational (in so far, that is, as such progress requires the 
introduction of new ideas, and hence the possibility of rationally 
disagreeing with 'established' ideas). On the other band, it must 
not be so weak as to be unable even to rationally eliminate diversity 
in a piece-meal fashion - for in that case, it would provide no 
means whatsoever for rationally adjudicating between competing 
claims. Thus any successful solution to the problem of diversity 
will have to provide a means for adjudicating rationally, and non- 
violently, between competing knowledge-claims which both leaves 
open the possibility of rational diversity, or disagreement, and yet 
can rationally close-down, or settle, at least some of this 
diversity, or disagreement. In the light of our discussion in 
Chapter 2,1 want to suggest that this can only be achieved if we 
restrict the aim of rational methods of adjudication to that of 
constraining our choices between competing claims, rather than as 
aiming to determine these choices. For if rational methods of 
adjudication were to determine choice, then the possibility of 
rational disagreement would be eliminated (since, when applied to a 
dispute between, say, A and B, such methods would either determine 
that A is the rational choice; or that B is the rational choice; or 
determine that, rationally, one should suspend one's judgment); 
but if euch methods simply constrain choice then rational 
disagreement remains possible, while, simultaneously, some choices 
may be eliminated as irrational. Thus any successful solution to 
the problem of diversity must, in effect, be weaker than the 
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justificationist solution and yet stronger than an out and out 
relativism. 
Finally, it ought to be obvious that, in a sense, the very 
structure of the justificationist solution to the problem of 
diversity entails that it cannot successfully solve this problem - 
for in response to the diversity of conflicting claims the 
justificationist assumes the existence of a self-evident foundation 
of knowledge to which we can appeal in order to settle disputes. Yet 
justificationists themselves are in dispute as to the nature of 
this foundation. Hence the diversity of conflicting claims is 
simply reintroduced at the level of the very foundation to which we 
are eupposed to appeal in order to rationally adjudicate between 
conflicting claims. But clearly we cannot, without begging the 
question, appeal to any such foundation in order to settle the 
dispute as to which foundation to appeal to in order to settle 
disputesi Thus, if there is to be a general solution to the 
problem of diversity this solution cannot be the justificationist 
one - for it must also provide us with methods for dealing with the 
justificationist's own diversity as to the foundation of knowledge. 
Thus any general solution to the problem of diversity cannot rely 
upon the justificationist's assumed 'foundation of knowledge'. 
4.3 : Justificationism, Scepticism, and Relativism 
A reasonable response to the overwhelming problems confronting 
the various attempts to specify an adequate justificatory foundation 
is, I believe, to reject its existence. Yet in so doing we must 
not only relinquish the justificationistts solution to the problem 
of diversity (and so leave ourselves with this problem unsolved), 
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but moreover we seem immediately to be driven into some version of 
both scepticism and relativism. For if it is maintained that a 
substantive claim deserves the honorific 'knowledge' if, and only 
if, it is possible to justify it; and if, in virtue of the seemingly 
insoluble problems confronting the justificationist, such justification 
is declared to be impossible; then so, too, must knowledge be im- 
possible. Hence we seem driven into some form of scepticism. On 
the other hand, if the assertion that one view deserves to be 
accorded greater rational, or intellectual, status than another - 
or is rationally preferable t, o another - turns upon the fact that 
one can be justified while the other cannot be; and if once again 
justification is declared to be impossible; then so, too, must it 
be impossible to rationally discriminate between diverse claims. 
Hence all such claims must be accorded equal intellectual status - 
must be seen as rationally on a par - and so we seem driven into a 
hopeless relativism ( in which the problem of diversity can only be 
'solved' by some non-rational mechanism, such as force or violence). 
In this way we can, following Popper, see many traditional sceptics 
and relativists (and even some not so traditional ones) as being 
disappointed justificationists - that is to say, as continuing to 
uphold the ideals of justificationism while simultaneously holding 
that justification itself is (alas) impossible. 
Now it has to be admitted that most philosophers find both 
scepticism and relativism to be highly implausible, and perhaps even 
contradictory, positions. Take relativism first: cognitive relativism 
comes in two main variants - cultural and historical. According to 
cultural relativism, the intellectual products of all cultures must, 
faute de mie _, be accorded equal intellectual, or rational, status; 
while according to historical relativism, the intellectual products 
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of all historical 'periods' must likewise be equally 
evaluated. Yet it ought to be obvious that very few 
cultures actually uphold cultural relativism, and that such 
relativism is, by and large, the intellectual product of our 
culture (of our anthropology, sociology, philosophy, etc. ); 
while historical relativism is, by and large, a product of 
specific historical 'periods'. But this means that both the 
cultural and the historical relativist must, if he is to be 
consistent, acknowled. p- that the anti-relativist position is 
the intellectual equal of relativism. In other words, no 
relativist can coherently claim the intellectual superiority 
(or rational preferability) of relativism over anti-relativism 
without implicitly denying the very doctrine which he seeks to 
uphold. It seem to follow that the consistent relativist 
cannot rationally defend his own view as against those of his 
opponents; and most philosophers find highly implausible - as 
well as rationally unacceptable - any thesis which, by its 
own lights, is rationally indefensible.? 
Similar considerations are thought to apply to scepticism. 
Firstly, the sceptic's assertion that knowledge is impossible 
does seem highly implausible since, after all, we do seem to 
know certain things. Moreover, scepticism (like relativism) is 
often thought to be inconsistent - since the sceptic must be 
claiming to know that knowledge is impossible, and if this 
claim is true then scepticism must be false. But this is a 
mistake - the sceptic should not be interpreted as claiming to 
know that knowledge is impossible; rather he simply claims 
that knowledge is impossible, and this claim, if true, simply is 
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true. Thus my own view of this matter, for what it is worth, 
is that scepticism can be perfectly consistent. But I wish to 
go further - for in my view, a consistent scepticism is not 
only possible, it is true. In other words, I accept the sceptical 
argument that the attempt to justify, or establish, or provide 
good reasons for accepting, any substantial knowledge claim must 
inevitably lead to an infinite regress, so that the search for 
such justification must be fruitless. But I do not assume that 
the infinite regree argument justifies this claim; rather it lays 
down a challenge which the justificationist must meet - the 
challenge of specifying an adequate justificatory foundation 
for stopping the regress - and which, as far as I can see, he 
has so far failed to meet. In other words, I accept the 
sceptical position tentatively - as a so-far uncriticised 
conjecture - not as a piece of . -`, ýstified episteme: 
for should 
a justificationist somehow come up with a theory of the 
justificatory foundations of knowledge which, after much 
critical effort, could not be faulted then I. for one, would 
be prepared to abandon my scepticism (and this despite the fact 
that I do not see how the justificationist ever could come up 
with such a theory). But until that happens, scepticism, 
l °13 
which rests upon denying the assumption of any adequate justificatory 
foundation, remains a viable conjecture. 
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In any case, the point I want centrally to make here is not 
that scepticism is true, but rather that justificationists have 
often employed the seeming implausibility of scepticism (and 
relativism) in order to argue, in a 'transcendental' fashion, 
that the problems confronting them simply must be soluble. To see 
this, remember that the arguments which appeared to lead us into 
these implausible positions crucially hinged upon denying the 
possibility of justification. But if this denial leads to such 
wildly implausible conclusions then, by a kind of 'logical principle 
of the re-transmission of implausibility', so too must this denial 
be implausible (and this in spite of the fact that the failure of every 
attempt to overcome the infinite regress argument, by specifying an 
adequate justificatory foundation, seems to make it plausiblel). 
9 In 
other words, since (for example) scepticism does seem a highly 
implausible thesis (to repeat, we do seem to know certain things) its 
rejection, in the presence of the traditionally uncontroversial 
premise that what distinguishes knowledge from merely true opinion is 
justification, immediately yields the conclusion that an adequate 
justificatory foundation simply must exist (since justification must 
be possible). 
Now oddly enough this type of old-fashioned (or Kantian) 
ttransoendentall reasoning even appeals to philosophers as up-to- 
date as D. M. Armstrong. In his book Belief, Truth and Knowledge 
(1973) he writes: 'Thinking about the threatened regress in the 
classical analysis of knowledge seems to lead to the conclusion that 
there must be non-inferential /i, e. 9 founda. tional7 knowledge' 
jýý 
(p. 62, my emphasis). Armstrong hardly pauses to consider the 
possibility that perhaps one should instead reject (as Popper in 
effect suggests) the classical ideal of knowledge as justified true 
belief. Rather, he proposes a form of the causal theory of knowledge 
in which, roughly, a proposition p is identified as non-inferential, 
or foundational, knowledge for X if, and only if, (i) X believes 
that 2; (ii) 'ý' is true; and (iii) the very state of affairs in 
virtue of which Ißt is true causes X to believe that p. The main 
problem with this type of approach - apart from the fact that it 
continues to identify knowledge, and hence scientific knowledge, as 
a special kind of belief; and app, ' from the further fact that even 
if we are given such 'foundational' knowledge we still must solve 
the problem of induction - is simply that the third condition, which 
is after all an empirical hypothesis, cannot itself be known to be 
true in any specific instance. In other words, we cannot know which 
Z's are 'foundational' and which aren't (even X cannot know which 
. ts are 'foundational' for himself ; and so although we might get 
here a foundation of sorts (i. e., a naturalistic one) it can't be 
used just if bationally as a means of solving the problem of diversity 
- for we never know which p's are the ones to which we should appeal 
in order to adjudicate between competing claims. But in that case, 
why bother with such a 'foundation' at all? 
In response to this question it might be argued that such a 
tfoundationaliett theory does enable us to achieve something 
important - and that is to defeat scepticism. For given the three 
conditions which Armstrong imposes on non-inferential or tfoun- 
dationalt knowledge, it may very well be the case that, as a matter 
of f=, some propositions are 'foundational' knowledge for X, so 
tvS 
that (pace the sceptic) 'non-inferential' or 'foundational' 
knowledge is possible; and we can then proceed to justify other 
knowledge-claims (i. e., the 'inferential' ones) on its basis (if, 
that is, we could solve, for example, the problem of induction). 
But to view the situation in this manner would, I think, be a 
mistake - for it would be to interpret the problem of defeating 
scepticism as a naturalistic one, whereas in fact the problem is a 
methodological one. That is, what the justificationist is after, 
and what the sceptic denies he can have, is anadequate justificatory 
foundation - that is, a basis to which appeals can unproblematically 
be made in order to rationally settle disputes, and where, of 
necessity, this basis must itself be beyond rational dispute (for 
if rational disputes could arise with respect to it then we would 
need a #\arther basis for rationally settling these disputes, and so 
on ad infinitum). But the kind of naturalistic 'foundation-in-fact' 
that Azmstrong proposes cannot serve this purpose - since disputes 
are clearly possible as to whether or not some particular proposition 
is to be included in it. Moreover, when one realises the extent 
to which empirical or observational reports are themselves dependent 
upon prior assumptions, the whole idea of causally determined 
'non-inferential' (or ' foundational') knowledge really appears a 
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chimera. 
At this point, however, we may appear to have reached a highly 
unsatisfactory impasse: on the one hand, the sceptic has argued that 
the just ificat ionist cannot provide an adequate justificatory 
foundation, so that justification must be declared to be impossible 
and thus, too, knowledge (in the justificationist's sense) must 
equally be declared to be impossible. On the other hand, the 
justificationist has argued that since scepticism is false (remember, 
iqý, 
we do seem to know certain things) it simply must be the case that 
an adequate justificatory foundation exists. Paraphrasing Wesley 
Salmon's delightful remark that one man's modus ponens is another 
man's modus tollens, it would appear as if the sceptic's modus 
ponens has now become the justificationist's modus tollens. Yet 
surely we have the right to expect more of the justificationist 
than has so far been offered - for whereas the sceptic has a whole 
host of independent arguments against the possibility of 
justification, in that he has independent arguments both against the 
adequacy of every proposed justificatory foundation as well as 
against the assumption that there can be such a foundation, the 
justificationist's 'transcendental' argument that an adequate 
justificatory foundation simply must exist appears to rest solely 
upon his rejection of scepticism. But givers that the present 
question at issue is precisely the acceptability or otherwise o 
scepticism and justificationism, we would appear to have the righ-u 
to demand that the justificationist no-t simply beg the question ir; 
dispute by merely declaring that, since scepticism is false, an 
adequate justificatory foundation exists. In other words, we want 
the justificationist to himself offer an independent argument. 
(independent, that is, of his rejection of scepticiar: ) for the 
existence of such a foundation. My claim, then, is that the Meno 
paradox appears to offer the justificationist ax: opportunity for 
just such an independent argument - at least with respect to one 
version of scepticism (namely, Popper's Socratic, or hopeful, 
scepticism). 
M 
4.4 : Juetificationism, Socratic Scepticism, and the Meno Paradox 
To see this, let us first present the paradox of the Meno. 
Begin with the commonsensical assertion that if we are to search for 
something we must know what we axe looking for, otherwise we shall 
not be able to know if, or when, our search has been successful. 
Thus, in the absence of a knowledge of what we are looking for, our 
search for 'it' can only be a random flailing in the dark, without 
any possibility of recognising that we have found that for which we 
search. But now apply these sturdy bits of commonsense to the 
special case of searching for knowledge, to the special case of 
searching for that which is presently unknown. Then we can only 
search for knowledge if we know what we are looking for; but if 
we know what we are looking for then, it would appear, what we are 
looking for cannot be presently unknown. Thus we can only search 
for knowledge if it isn't presently unknown. But if it isn't 
presently unknown then we have no need to search for it (since we 
already know it); while if it is presently unknown, then we cannot 
search for it (since we do not know what we are looking for). So 
either we can search for knowledge but needn't, or else we need to 
search for knowledge but can't. Plato sums up the argument leading 
to the paradox (or problem) as follows: 
a man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or 
about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has 
no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not 
know the very subject about which he is to inquire. (Meno, 80e) 
So, the argument concludes, we can search for knowledge only if we 
don't need to search. 
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While the problem of diversity is, I have suggested, the 
fundamental problem of the traditional theory of knowledge, the 
paradox of the Meno is, I submit, no mere Sophism, but the 
lt at , 
fundamental problem, not only of traditional methodology, but of 
methodology tout court. The reason for this is as follows: as I 
argued in the previous chapter, methodology is best understood as 
the theory of rational inquiry; and the aim of any methodological 
theory is to provide us with rules, or heuristics, to help us in our 
search for knowledge and/or truth. It follows that every 
methodological theory must, at least implicitly, contain a solution 
to the Meno paradox - for it must explain how it could be possible 
to rationally search for that which we do not know; or -zo 
rationally search for the truth when we are ignorant of it. For 
should it turn out to be impossible to conduct such a search then 
methodology itself becomes impossible. 
Remember that the problem of the Meno basically rests in the 
conclusion that we can search for knowledge only if we don't need 
to search. It immediately follows that we can rationally search 
for knowledge only if we don't need to search - for the set of 
rational search procedures must be a slab-set of the set of al 
search procedures. But if we can rationally search for 
knowledge only if we don't need to search then, given that 
methodology aims to provide the theory of such a search, meth- 
odology can only be possible if it isn't necessary (i. e., if we 
have no need for such a theory). On the other hand, if we do have 
need for such a theory (because we need to search for knowledge), 
then apparently we can't have such a theory (since we can't, then, 
search for that knowledge rationally). So the fundamental problem 
of every methodological theory, every theory of rational inquiry, 
must be to show how we both can rationally search for knowledge and 
need to - so as to show how methodology itself can be 
simultaneously possible and yet necessary (needed, required). 
tcAg 
The dominant methodological tradition basically follows, with 
variations, the theme of Plato's own solution to this problem. 
According to Plato, we both can rationally search for knowledge 
and need to: we can rationally search precisely because we do 
already know it - all of it (innately and unconsciously) - and so 
we know what we are looking for; while we need to rationally 
search precisely because we don't already know it - any of it 
(explicitly and consciously). Hence the rational search for 
knowledge is, for Plato, really the attempt to ? bring out' that which 
is already ? there' (that is, learning = recollection). This is 
Plato's theory of anamri sis, and the method by which such anamnesis 
was to be achieved was the Socratic method of questioning or 
maieutic ('midwifery'). 
Seventeenth century methodologists proposed solutions to the Neno 
paradox along remarkably similar lines: Descartes, for example, held 
in effect that we can rationally search for knowledge because we 
do already have it - some of it (innately, through the clear and 
distinct ideas open to our God-given Reason); and yet that we need 
to search for it - the rest of it (since the Natural Light only 
immediately illuminates a small portion of that which can be known). 
In his theory we search for this knowledge through deduction from 
that which is innately or intuitively known. 
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Empiricists, on the 
other hand, also held that we are able to rationally search for 
knowledge just because we do already have it - some of it (immed- 
iately, through the senses); and yet that we need to search for it - 
the rest of it (since the senses only give us a knowledge of 
observable effects, not of tr'ir underlying causes; a knowledge of 
appearance, not of reality). For them we search for such knowledge 
throw induction from that which is given by the senses. In other 
2.00 
words. the methodological tradition has it that in order to ration- 
ally search for knowledge we must already have some foundation of 
knowledge from which to begin. Then, and only then, will we be 
able to recognise that for which we search - by its recollective, 
deductive, or inductive relation to that very foundation. 
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I want to claim that, given all this, the justificationist is 
in a position to structure the following argument: if it is possible 
to rationally search for knowledge it can only be because, at the 
very least, we are able to recognise that for which we search; 
but as we have just seen, we can only recognise that for which we 
search (i. e., that which is presently unknown) by its relation to a 
fomdation of knowledge; therefore, if it is possible to rationally 
search for knowledge there must be a foundation of knowledge. 
Now many traditional sceptics (for example, the Pyrrhonians) 
actually accepted this argument - that is, they agreed with the 
justificationist that the rational search for knowledge hinges upon 
a foundation of knowledge. But, they argued, the failure of every 
attempt to stem the infinite regress shows that, rationally, there 
is no such foundation. They thus concluded that, rationally, the 
rational search for knowledge is itself impossible. Pyrrhonian 
sceptics thus urged that we should give up the chimerical rational 
search for knowledge altogether, and instead find happiness in 
'quietude' (ataraxia). Thus, the above justificationist argument is 
no argument at all against the Pyrrhonian sceptic. 
But the situation is quite different if we consider the Socratic, 
or hopeful, sceptic like Popper - who wants both to maintain 
('optimistically') that we can rationally search for knowledge 
and yet der ('pessimistically') the existence of any justificatory 
foundation of knowledge. In fact, Popper not only wants to deny the 
z01 
existence of such a foundation - and so deny the possibility of 
successfully justifying our knowledge claims - he also wants to 
reject the fruitfulness of the very search for such justification. 
But if the conclusion of the above justificationist argument is 
correct, it follows that Popper wants the impossible - and so his 
position must be inconsistentl For the above argument concludes 
that the rational search for knowledge is only possible if there is 
a foundation of knowledge (and so a basis from which justification 
can, successfully, proceed); whereas Popper wishes to cling to the 
former while simultaneously rejecting the latter. Notice, moreover, 
that this argument does not simply presuppose the falsity of 
Socratic, or hopeful, scepticism - and so it constitutes an 
independent argument against such a scepticism. To put this point 
another way, since Popper's hopeful scepticism optimistically 
asserts the possibility of the rational search for knowledge and 
truth, it must offer some solution to the paradox of the Menc (for 
otherwise this search would only be possible if we had no need to 
search). But if the traditional, or justificationist, solution 
to the Meno paradox is the only possible one, then Popper is hoist 
with his own petard - for he would be wanting to have his cake and 
eat it too. There arises, then, the foi-Lowing crucial problem for 
Socratic scepticism: can we offer a solution to the Meno paradox 
which is non-justificational? - that is, which does not require that 
in order to rationally search for knowledge there must be some 
foundation of knowledge from which to begin' Since J_ to le i t, in 
agreement with the first premise of the above justii'ý--o': -ý`t 
argument, that we only can rationally searc'-i for 'mow l ecke il , a-, the 
very least, we are able to recognise that for w?: ^n we? search, it 
202 
follows that our problem is -t find a theory which meets the 
following two requirements: first, it in Bocratic (in that we can 
rationally search for knowledge); and second, it is sce tica. 1 
(in 
that we do not require the existence of any founuation of knowledge 
in order to recognise that for which we search). In sum, can we 
solve the Meno paradox along Socratic-sceptical lines? 
The position we have so far reached in this section is that the 
justificationist can offer a solution to the Neno paradox, and that 
if his type of solution is the only possible one then Popper's 
hopeful, or Socratic, scepticism is inconsistent. Hence, it 
behooves the hopeful sceptic to offer a non-justiilcational 
solution to the ! -Zeno paradox. However, this problem, no matter how 
serious it may be, is not half as serious as one with which the 
justificationist can now be confronted - for if we accept the 
justificationist's solution to the Meno paradox and couple it, not 
with his supposedly 'pure and secure' foundation or starting-point, 
but rather with the seemingly more realistic idea that such starting- 
points are simply culturally or historically supplied, then we 
immediately land up in a cultural or historical relativism. To see 
this remember that for the justificationist the justificatory 
foundation of knowledge functions also as the starting-point in the 
rational search for knowledge - in that one can only rationally 
search on its basis since without it one has no ability to recognise 
that for which one searches ( and a rational search clearly pre- 
supposes at least this ability). But this means that one cannot 
possibly relinquish this starting-poin-c in the course of the search, 
for this would be to give up the search altogether. No wonder then 
that traditional justificationists were so concerned with guar- 
anteeing the epistemological 'purity' of our starting point - for if 
zo3 
it were infected with the slightest error this would necessarily 
condemn our search for knowledge and truth to failure. But if we 
couple the above view not with the justificationist's 'epistem- 
ologically privileged', error-free starting-point, but with the 
rather more plausible ass mption that our starting-points are simply 
culturally or historically supplied, then it follows that both 
knowledge and the rational search for it must either be relative to 
a culture (cultural relativism) or else relative to specific 
historical periods (historical relativism). 
It might be thought that this result is not really terribly 
worrying since, after all, the search for knowledge obviously does 
go on (and must go on) within cultures, or within specific historical 
periods. But to think this is, I believe, to miss entirely the 
import of the above result: for the crucial element in the argument 
is just that, given the justificationist's solution to the Meno 
paradox, such culturally or historically supplied starting-points 
cannot rationally be relinquished in the course of the search, for 
this would be to give up the rational search itself. But this means 
that having adopted such a starting-point (or 'framework') we are, 
in a sense, rationally stuck with it - for we cannot give it up and 
rationally search for a new starting-point, since in giving it up 
we would have relinquished our very ability to rationally search 
(for we would have relinquished our ability to recognise that for 
which we search, and a rational search presupposes at least this 
ability). In other words, we land up in the Collingwoodian, or 
Kuhnian, view that 'rationality', 'knowledge', and the 'rational 
search for knowledge' are all relative to the acceptance of a 
framework (of either absolute presuppositions or paradigms) whose 
own claims to truth cannot be coherently discussed, and whose overthrow 
L, J ~ý 
and replacement by another cannot be rationally explained; but can 
at beet be explained by appeal to non-rational - for example, social 
or historical - 'forces'. In this way, an acceptance of the 
justificationiet's solution to the Meno paradox, coupled with a 
rejection of his 'epistemologically privileged', error-free 
foundation or starting-point, leads the relativist to conclude that 
we must give up the chimercal search for objectively true knowledge, 
and instead find happiness in the cultural or historical 'consensus' - 
which, non-rationally, somehow keeps changing. 
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It ought to be obvious that the justificationist can now 
structure another 'transcendental' argument in response to all this: 
since the rejection of an ? epistemologically privileged', error- 
free, foundation or starting-point has led us into such rationally 
incoherent relativisms, it follows that such a foundation simply 
must exist. But his debate has now shifted to one with these 
relativists, and so seemingly he is now in need of a new 
independent argument - namely, one against these versions of rei- 
ativism, and in particular against their claim that the starting- 
points in the search for knowledge are simply culturally or 
historically supplied . But this means that the justifica.. onist 
is in fact back at square onel For his initial appeal to the Merio 
paradox, and his own ability to solve it, was designed to provide 
an independent argument against the sceptic's denial of the 
existence of an adequate justificatory foundation or starting- 
point (a denial which was itself backed up by a whole host o7 
independent arguments against the adequacy of any proposed 
justificatory foundation). But it is now precisely the jusV_f_- 
cationist's achieved solution to the Neno paradox, when., coupler. 
with the relativist's own particular version of the scep %ic's der .! _-ii, 
zos 
which has led the justificationist back into the problem of 
providing an independent argument for the existence of his supposed 
foundation. In other words, the justificationist's achieved solution 
to the Meno paradox has not enabled him to make any progress - for 
now, in order to avoid relativism, he must do precisely what he 
hoped his achieved solution to the Neno paradox would do (namely, 
provide an independent argument for the existence of his supposed 
foundation, and thus an independent argument against scepticism). 
On the other hand, the position of the Socratic sceptic, like 
Popper, is quite different to this: he faces the problem of having to 
provide a non-justificational solution to the 1"Teno paradox. That 
is, a solution in which the rational search for knowledge does not 
require the existence of any justificatory foundation of knowledge 
(adequate or otherwise) - for remember that Popper not only rejects 
the possibility of successfully justifying our knowledge claims (and 
so rejects the possibility of an adequate justificatory foundation), 
he also rejects the fruitfulness of the very search for such 
justification (and so rejects the need even for an inadequate 
foundation). But this entails that if the Socratic sceptic can 
actually solve his problem then he will have produced an in- 
dependent means for avoiding the above versions of relativism! 
To see this, remember that the versions of relativism at issue 
(Collingwoodian and Kuhnian) have been seen to result from the 
justificationist solution to the Meno paradox (J) that the rational 
search for knowledge crucially hinges upon a foundation or starting- 
point of knowledge, since without such a foundation one has no 
ability to recognise that for which one searches; together with the 
rather plausible premise (RFP) that such a foundation or starting- 
point is simply culturally or historically supplied. It follows that, 
ZOG 
in this argumentative context, one has only u--'o ways of avoiding 
euch relativisms (R) - either reject 
(J) or reject the `R-PP). 
Justificationists clearly have to reject he (om'), but their only 
argument against it (so far, at least) is the 'transcendental' one 
that since (R) is false the (RPP) must be false, and so an adequate 
justificatory foundation must exist. On the other hand, if we 
accept the (RPP) - which is perfectly open to a sceptic - and 
instead reject (J) then we needn't land up in (R). But the Socratic 
or hopeful sceptic has to reject (J), for otherwise his position is, 
as we have seen, inconsistent. It follows that f such a sceptic 
can actually solve the Meno paradox in a way o theme than (7 j, and in 
particular if this solution can be shown indepeilder. tiy : ýýe question 
of relativism to be preferable to (j), then it will-. offer a, way ýf 
avoiding (R) which is not 'transcendental' - oiý ,. lie Sv:; ra' -ý < r7ý7eptic ts 
reason for re jecting (J) is not that it leads to lR), but rather that 
an acceptance of (J) would make his ow Uosition inconsistent. it 
follows that the Socratic or hopeful seer ti- iss peg naps p ar: d- -- 
""r 
ically, in a better position to avoid 7o ý ---n, Y-:,, ociar_ ari. d 
relativism than is the episteme-minded justificaý; ý. ýi st, ýý=, tc 
put this more perversely still, the best way to avoid 
is via the attempt to defend scepticism (ýn its 
hopeful, version). 
To sun up this section: Pyrrhoniar rý ties accept the justifi- 
cationist view that in order to rationally search f_jr : ow], edge we 
must have some foundation of knowledge '_rorr., wh 3Y peg r_ reject 
the existence of such a foundation; and so conclude . ra. t the 
rational search for knowledge is impos ei': "1. e. Socratic or hog-ceful 
sceptics, like Popper, also want to derby the n-_s-er e of sv(; h a 
foundation, but want simultaneously to assert the , ors _b 
"i , of 
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the rational search for knowledge; hence they must find a non- 
justificationist solution to the Meno paradox. Moreover, accepting 
the justificationist solution while denying the existence of a 
culturally or historically transcendent foundation of knowledge 
leads, as we have seen, to certain versions of relativism. So, 
the problem for the hopeful sceptic is: can we solve the Meno 
paradox in such a way that a) contra the Pyrrhonian sceptic, we 
can rationally search for knowledge; and b) contra the justificationist, 
we can search without a foundation of knowledge; so that c) we can, 
unlike the justificationist, deny the existence of a culturally or 
historically transcendent foundation without falling into relativism? 
4.5 : TDSK -A Socratic sceptical Solution to the Meno Paradox 
It is often said that a well-formulated problem is half-way to 
a solution. Now not only do I think this true, but in our particular 
case something stronger (and stranger) can be said: namely, a 
well-formulated problem is virtually all the way to a solution! In 
other words, I have already given (implicitly) a basis for a 
Socratic-sceptical solution to the Meno paradox. But I had better 
not run ahead of myself; so let's take things slowly. 
The position reached so far is that any Socratic sceptical 
solution to the Meno paradox must meet the following two requirements 
or desiderata: first, (D1 ) it must show (contra the Pyrrhonian, and 
in agreement with the justificationist) that we can rationally 
search for knowledge; and secondly, (D2) it must show contra, the 
juetificationist) that this can be done without assuming any 
foundation of knowledge - in that we are at least able to recognise 
that for which we search in the absence of any such foundation. 
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Moreover, any solution meeting these two desiderata will have, as a 
bonus, the unintended (or undesigned) consequence of enabling us to 
deny the existence of a culturally or historically transcendent 
foundation for knowledge without falling into Collingwoodian or 
Kuhnian relativisms. That is, we will be able to accept the rather 
palusible premise (RPP) that our starting-points in the rational 
search for knowledge are, indeed, supplied to us either culturally 
or historically without this entailing that our search is confined 
within the framework of such starting-points, so that we cannot 
rationally search for new, improved, and better frameworks. 
So far, so good. But notice what has happened: we began by 
generating the problem facing the Socratic sceptic. This problem 
resulted from the fact that the justificationist can offer a 
solution to the Meno paradox - the fundnmental problem of nethod- 
ology - but that an acceptance of this solution is impossible for 
the Socratic sceptic, since in accepting it he would render his 
own position inconsistent. But since such a sceptic (unlike the 
Pyrrhonian) wants to say, in agreement with the justificationist, 
that we can rationally search for knowledge, he too must solve the 
Meno paradox. Since he can't accept the justificationist solution, 
he needs to find a non-justificationist solution. But such a 
solution, as we have seen, needs to satisfy the following two 
desiderata: first, (D1 ) it must show that we can rationally search for 
knowledge; and secondly, (D2) it must show that such a search does 
not require the existence of any foundation of knowledge in order for 
us to recognise that for which we search. Now clearly any theory 
T satisfying (D1) and (D2) will be a Socratic sceptical solution to 
the Meno paradox - it will thus be what we are looking for. But at 
-), o "l 
present moment we do not yet have such a T, and so need to search for 
it. But this means that we have already explained how it could 
be possible at least to recognise that for which we search without 
assuming the existence of any foundation of knowledge! In other 
words, we have already explained how it could be possible to 
satisfy (D2 ). 
To see this, look at (Dý) and (D2): on the one hand, (Dj ) arLd 
(D2) enable us to recognise that for which we search - namely, a 
Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno paradox. But secondly, (D1) 
and (D2) do not yet constitute such a solution - they only lay down 
desiderata which any theory must meet in order to constitute such 
a solution. Thus we both need to search for such a theory and -ai 
search for it rationally - since (D1) and (D2) enable us to recognise 
that for which we search. Thirdly, (DI) and (D2) are no ounda. ion 
of knowledge, and this for at least two reasons: (a) we do not yeot 
know if any theory can satisfy (D1) and (D2) ; but more importantly, 
(b) (D1) and (D2) are not knowledge at all (and so clearly -. c 
foundation of knowledge), but desiderata on our search for it. in 
other words, since we are searching for knowledge it can only be the 
resultants of the search - the theories - wnich constitute 
contributions to our knowledge; not the desiderata on the search - 
these supply, not knowledge, but 'criteria' for recognising 
contributions to our knowledge. It follows that ! DY) and (D2) 
have the following three properties: (I) they enable us to rationally 
search for a Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno paradox in that 
they enable us at least to recognise that for which we search; (2) they 
allow such recognition in a way consistent with our needing to 
search for auch a solution; and `3) they do not constitute any 
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foundation of knowledge, since they are not knowledge at all. The 
reason for this is that they are not the resultants of our search 
for knowledge, but rather desiderata on the search itself. 
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So the situation is this: in generating the problem which the 
justificationist's solution to the Meno paradox raises for the 
Socratic sceptic, we have simultaneously generated desiderata 
which a Socratic sceptical solution to the problem must meet. But 
in generating such desiderata we have generated an ability to 
recognise that for which we search while nevertheless needing to 
search - in that we haven't yet found a theory satisfying these 
desiderata. But to do this, all we basically need now do is to 
generalise from our very search for a Socratic sceptical solution to 
the Meno paradox. That is, this search has been one which began 
by generating a problem, moved from the problem to desiderata on 
its solution, and thence to the present attempt to formulate a 
theory satisfying these desiderata. 
Well, here is the theory: (a) we begin (as good sceptics) by 
rejecting the assumption of any 'epistemologically privileged' 
error--free foundation or starting-point; from this at follows that 
(b) whatever our starting-point in the search for knowledge is, we 
cannot assume it to be 'epistemologically privi. eged' or error-free; 
since we assert (b) there is no difficulty whatsoever in equally 
asserting (c) the (RPP) - namely, that such a starting-point is 
merely culturally or historically supplied; but now (d) since our 
starting-point cannot be assumed to be error-free, and since 
knowledge involves truth, our starting-point cannot be assumed to be 
a starting-point of knowledge. Since our starting-point cannot be 
assumed to be one of knowledge, and since (e) we sersch for 
} 
knowledge (and so search for truth), it follows that (f we ought 
to try to expose whatever errors there may be in o-:;, r culturally or 
historically supplied starting-point. How can this be done? The 
answer is two-fold: first, (g) we can employ some substantive part 
or sub-set (S1 ) of our starting-point in order to show that it 
is inconsistent with some other substantive part or sub-set (S2) of 
our starting-point. Secondly, (h) on the assumption that we are 
here dealing with a starting-point that claims to be about the 
world, we can employ some substantive part or sub-set (S1) of our 
starting-point as a 'tool' for inter-acting with the world in 
order to empirically test some other substantive part (S2) of- our 
starting-point. In other words, we can employ S1 as the assumptions 
behind an empirical test of S2.16 
But, it will be argued, unless we already know the truÜr (or 
at least some part of the truth) the most that procedure gig) can 
ever accomplish is to show that S1 is inconsisterrt with IS 2; an? 
the most that procedure (h) can ever . ccomplish is to show that S1 
together with certain 'reports of observation' are insistent 
with S2" These procedures will thus never reveal the errors it 
our starting-point. Quite true - but °: "that they will reveal is that 
there must be some error somewhere, either in S,, or in :,., or in 
our 'report of observation' (or even, perhaps, in our reasoning). 
Now this means that (i) by such procedures we are able to uncover 
problems - either in our substantive etartinp--oin± c- in our 
'report of observation' (or even, perh. ý. rs in our reasoning) ; and 
as already shown (j) such problems wiL_. come with desiderata on 
their solution. In fact, they will come w'+r ,. _'_et 02 
dF, S4 J- ;i ýa 
on their solution. For example, if ',! q tirict oýLrsei re_ vo (g)-tjpe 
methods for uncovering error in our sta. rtmg-point, then any such 
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revealed problem (or inconsistency) can be formulated as, for 
ez ple, 'the problem of S1 (for S2)' or 'the problem of S2 (for 
Sý)' (or even, perhaps, as 'the problem of S1 and S2 (for logic)") 
- and each different way of formulating the probier. is equivalent 
to 
specifying different sets of desiderata on a solution to it. But 
as we have already seen (k) in specifying desiderata on a solution 
to a problem we are both able to recognise that for which we search 
(namely, a theory satisfying these desidea =: aj, and ret need to 
search for it. So in getting to (k) we have gotten -Vo a Socratic 
sceptical solution to the Meno paradox. 
What, then, is the basic message of the Socratic sceptical. 
methodology, or theory of rational inquiry, so far articulated in 
Basically it is this: wherever we Start from, we cannot 
asm ne it to be a starting-point of knowledge; therefore, we ought 
to try to reveal whatever errors there may be in our starting-point, 
this we do by applying to our startirr-point the ! critical. I m6'c ý. s 
(g) and (h); as a result of this we may e lucky enough to generate 
problems (or inconsistencies) ; these probi : r. s w-iI then Come with a 
variety of desiderata on their solution; and we then search for 
knowledge in the form of theories satidfy:: n., ý, these es -erata. So 
the above theory (a)-(k) might be dubbed 'the theory of the desid- 
orated search for solutions to problems in ours evarcing-point'; or, 
for short, 'the theory of the desiderated search for knowledge' 
(TDSK). For in searching for solutions to probier.,. an our starting- 
point we are searching for knowledge - in that we are searching for 
some replacement of, or modification to, our starting-point which 
can no longer be confronted with the same problem, and therefore 
within which the same error cannot be revealed. But if the same 
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error cannot be revealed in our new starting-point then there is 
some slight hope that our new starting-point is, indeed, a starting'- 
point of knowledge. 
Of course, TDSK entails that we cannot assume that our new 
starting-point is a starting-point of knowledge, so that we shall 
have to continue the search even given our new starting-point. But 
it is possible that our new starting-point is one of knowledge 
(that is, that it is one of truth) even although TDSK requires that 
we not assume so. So TDSK is not only a Socratic sceptical theory 
of the rational search for knowledge; it can, moreover, be made the 
basis of a Socratic sceptical theory of knowledge: for we have 
reached a starting-point of knowledge (K) when, and only when, however 
long we continue the rational search for knowledge in accordance with 
TDSK, we fail to reveal any problem in our starting-point which is 
such as to desiderate a search for a new starting-point. Of course, 
this theory of knowledge makes the notion of 'knowledge' highly 
non-effective (in the logician's sense) - since we can never know 
that we have reached a starting-point of knowledge, since however 
long we have actually conducted the search in accordance with TDSK. 
we haven't yet concluded the search - for TDSK itself entails that 
we not assume K to be a starting-point of knowledge. We thus reach 
a very surprising result: TDSK is sceptical pas exceilance, since 
it begins by rejecting the assumption of any 'epistemologically 
privileged' error-free foundation or startin. ý-poini ; on the other 
hand, TDSK is, in a sense, anti-sceptical, since it enables us to 
define a non-effective Socratic-sceptical notion of knowledge which 
is such that the attainment of knowledge is possible, althoug we 
can never assume that we've reached it and shall never know f 
we've reached it. 
18 
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This result explains, I suggest, a rather pezjilexing feature of 
Popper's writings - and that is his general aversion to calling 
his philosophy 'sceptical' coupled with his consistent sceptical 
rejection of the assumption of any error-free justificatory 
foundation of knowledge. More importantly, however, note that the 
notion of 'knowledge' implicitly defined by the above Socratic 
sceptical theory of knowledge (or SSTK) is quite different from 
the justificationist notion of knowledge as 'justified true belief' 
- for knowledge according to SSTK is (a) totally unjustified; 
(b) forever conjectural; (c) is the potential resultant of a 
rational search for knowledge in which no justificaJ onist methods 
are employed; and (d) does not even consist of beliefs, but of 
linguistically formulated theories - since these are the only 
resultants of the rational search (i. e., it is theories which 
satiety desiderata and which in turn are subjected to criticism, 
not beliefs). Note too that it is even possible to define a 
, 
weak 
Socratic sceptical notion of knowledge, one which doesn't even 
require truth. On this view we can call 'knowledge' whatever 
theories have been generated within, and have survived, the Socratic 
sceptical search for knowledge so far. Clearly, at any time t. 
such 'knowledge' may contain theories which are inconsistent with 
each other, and so such 'knowledge' will be unjustified, untrue, 
unbelief! Thus the notion of 'knowledge' which emerges from TDSK 
is a thoroughly 'Popperian' one (as specified in section L. 1). 
The, above method of proceeding will, I suspect, seem utterly 
perverse to most philosophers, for it reverses the intuitive ordering 
between epistemology and methodology. That is, one intuitively 
thinks that first one must specify a defensible notion of 
zi5 
'knowledge' (i. e., do epistemology), and only then proceed to the 
questions of methodology (i. e., how, given this notion of 
'knowledge', can we rationally search for it? ). My procedure, on 
the other hand, reverses this intuitive ordering - since I begin 
with the basic problem of methodology (i. e., the Meno paradox) 
and then proceed to define 'knowledge' as that system of theories 
which is the 'ultimate' resultant (or, in the weaker sense, the 
present resultant) of the application of the best solution to this 
problem (in my view, TDSK). In other words, for me methodology is 
prior to epistemology, rather than vice versa. Although this may 
seem perverse it has, in fact, an important consequence - and that 
is that the problem of diversity which, I have suggested, is the 
fundamental problem of traditional epistemology, can only be dealt 
with methodologically (rather than on the basis of some epistemological 
'foundation'). Thus, as we shall see, it is only by committing 
ourselves to inquiring in accordance with TDSK (or with one of its 
later variants) that we shall generate means for coping rationally 
with diversity. 
It may, however, be wondered whether my suggestion to implicitly 
define the notion tknowledge' on the basis of TflSK does not, in 
fact, conflict with my insistence, in Chapter 2, that we always 
work with an aim for science (and hence with a notion of 'scientific 
knowledge') which is specified independently of our proposed 
theories of method. In other words, it might be wondered whether 
the adoption of SSTK is not equivalent to a slide into the 'analytic' 
approach to methodology - since clearly the application of TDSK is 
guaranteed to result in 'scientific knowledge' if such knowledge is 
simply identified as that which emerges from the application of TDSK 
(this is particularly true of the weak version of SSTK). In 
2ýb 
response to this problem, I wish simply to make one brief point: and 
that ie, that according to TDSK the aim of scientific inquiry is 
not the production of 'scientific knowledge' (in the sense of SSTK). 
Rather its aim is to discover the truth. But since TDSK hopes 
to be 'Popperian' it must, in accordance with section 4.1, employ 
a notion of truth which is thoroughly objective, and thus a notion 
of truth which makes it above htiunan decision. Thus we cannot simply 
decide, 'analytically' as it were, that inquiry in accordance with 
TDSK will achieve the aim of inquiry. Of course, we shall hope that 
TDSK is not inconsistent with, and hence does not frustrate, the 
pursuit of this goal; but the goal itself remains specifiable 
independently of the proposed methodology. In other words, all that 
TDSK requires us to relinquish is what we had previously, in 
Chapter 2, taken to be an analytic or definitional truth - namely, 
the idea that in specifying a notion of 'scientific knowledge' we are 
simultaneously specifying an aim for scientific inquiry. But given 
that TDSK reverses the usual order between epistemology and meth- 
odology, this result should not really be surprising. For whereas 
the usual 'epistemic hierarchy' runs from the specification of a 
notion of 'knowledge?, to the specification of an aim of inquiry, 
and thence to methodology; the procedure I am recommending runs from 
the Meno paradox together with the specification of an independent 
goal of inquiry (i. e., truth) which is subject to that paradox (cf. 
note 11), to a methodological theory which both i.: orporates this 
aim and solves the paradox, and thence to a notion of 'knowledge'. 
Let me turn now, however, to one of the more important results 
which can be derived from TDSK: for TDSK not only solves the Meno 
paradox in a Socratic-sceptical fashion, it also enables us to 
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solve what Agassi (19711b) has called 'the second-order Mieno 
paradox'. To see this, recall first the conclusion of the ardent 
which led us to the Meno paradox. This was that we can search for 
knowledge only if we don't need to search; from which it followed that 
we can rationally search for knowledge only if we don't need to 
search. Now this is the fundamental problem of methodology, or of 
the theory of rational inquiry, precisely because any such theory 
would have to show (1) that we can rationally search for knowledge - 
so that methodology is possible - and yet that (2) we need to search - 
so that methodology is necessary (needed; required). But now apply 
all this to the special case of searching for a solution to the Meno 
paradox itself, of searching for a theory of the rational search for 
knowledge: then we get the rather plausible conclusion that we can 
rationally search for a theory of rational searching only if we 
don't need to search (since we must already have it, in some way or 
other - either explicitly or, at the very least, implicitly). 
A solution to this second-order problem would thus have to show 
(1t) that we can rationally search for a theory of rational searching, 
and yet that (2') we need to search for it. But TDSK does precisely 
this - for on the one hand, TDSK is a theory of rational searching; 
on the other hand, we needed to search for TDSK in that prior to its 
articulation we didn't already have it (all we had were the 
desiderata which it needed to satisfy). But on the third hand, we 
were able to search for TDSK rationally just because we were lucky 
enough to discover a problem which generated the desiderata which 
it needed to satisfy. To put it another way, the search for 'BASK 
was itself a search which (i) began by discovering a problem; (ii) 
moved thence to desiderata on its solution; and (iii) moved thence 
to a theory (i. e., TDS'K itself) which satisfies these desiderata 
-2- ýi 
(more on this below). But any search which proceeds in accordance 
with (i) - (iii) is, from the viewpoint of DSK, a Socratic- 
sceptical rational search for knowledgel Hence, TDS'K explains the 
search for itself as having been a rational search; and yet equall;; 
explains why we needed to search for it (since we didn't have it in 
any way at all, but rather had a problem in accepting the Juetific- 
ationist solution to the Meno paradox). Thus TDSK_ shows hcw we 
both (1') can rationally search for a theory of ra onai searching 
(i. e., for TDSK) and yet (21) need to search for such a theory. 
TDSK thus solves the second-order Meno paradox. 
Now this result is not trivial, and for a very : moo a n. 
reason: no justificationist solution to the Mono solve 
the second-order Meno paradox. To see th3 s, the following ßr ä ̂ . ýn 
will suffice. All justificationist so1utionc to the '? enc ;. ýLL^CLtiýc 
rest upon the idea that the rational search for knowledge a 
search from some foundation or starting--> ,:. ý ,ý : rioW1 e&e, some 
rules for conducting the search `deduct . ve, inductive, or 
to that for which we search. It follows that the attempt o r--. t Lon- 
ally search for the rules, from the foand t orn r "y area "T 
having the rifles, cannot be possible -f having the z es is as 
necessary a precondition for the rational ser ch as is ":, awing the 
foundation. Thus not only can the knowledge of this foundation not 
be the result of rational inquiry (of., for example, note , -, ; 
neither can be our knowledge of the rules of inquiring Lý- ý_zis 
foundation. It follows that no justificationist solution: L. o the 
Meno paradox can solve the second-order Meno paradox - for it 3. oLÜc 
never explain how we both could rationally search for the -ales of 
rational searching, or for the rules of rational inquiry, and yet 
ý. 1 ý 
need to search for them (since we don't already know them). 
The second-order Meno paradox may seem a rather recherche 
problem; but it isn't - for it is simply a generalisation, to all 
justificationist theories of method, of the traditional problem 
of induction. This latter problem is, in effect, precisely the 
problem that if we are to come to know the rules of inductive 
inference on the basis of experience we must employ these rules. But 
this entails not only that the justification of these rules on the 
basis of experience must be circular, but also that we cannot search 
for these rules from experience unless they are already available to 
us (in which case we don't need to search for them). Thus the 
traditional problem of induction is simply the second-order Meno 
paradox as it arises for justificational empiricism. But the second- 
order Meno is more general than this problem, for it applies to any 
justificationist theory of method, and thus to the non-empiricist 
theories as well. 
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Given that no justificationist solution to the Meno paradox can 
solve the seoond-order Meno paradox, we are able to derive an important 
result: for assume that the justificationist needed to search for his 
own rules of rational searching; and assume further that his search 
was a rational search (that is, that it satisfied (D1)); it then 
follows from the justificationist's failure to solve the second- 
order Meno paradox, that the search for these rules could not have 
been a justificationist rational search. So it must have been a 
non-juetificationiet rational search. But that there can be such 
searches is precisely what the Socratic sceptic requires in order that 
his second desideratum (D2) be satisfiable. In other words, if the 
justificationist needed to search for his own rules of rational 
2Z a 
searching, and if his search was a rational search, then it must 
have satisfied (D1) and (D2), and so was itself a Socratic-sceptical 
searchl 
This result is important for two reasons: firstly, take, for 
example, the programme of inductive logic - which aims to search for 
defensible rules of empirical justification, or of 'inductive 
reasoning', for science. It follows from the above result that if 
the inductive logician needs to search for these rules, and if he 
can search for them rationally, then his rational search mast be a 
non-induotivist one. But then whatever methodology characterises 
this search can simply be generalised to become one's tneory of the 
rational search for scientific knowledge itself; and this theory could 
not possibly include any rules of inductive reasoning. Since the 
seaxch for such rules could be carried out as a Socratic-sceptical 
searoh (this is the message of the above result), it follows that 
Socratic-sceptical methodology cannot possibly be claimed to be 
'tainted' with inductivist elements. Thus if a 4Popperian' theory 
of method is Socratic-sceptical, such a theory can not be induotivist 
(despite what many critics have tried to argue). 
Secondly, the above result has a further important corollary: 
for the inability of all justificationist solutions to the Keno 
paradox to solve the second-order Meno paradox shows that These 
solutions do not actually solve the problem of the Mene at alß; 
they merely shift it. The very same problem now arises in a new 
place - with respect to the search for the justifica. tionist's 
solution to the Meno paradox (J). So in the face of : gis failure to 
solve the second-order Meno paradoxe the iustificati ^-4 -t ?: rids 
himself impaled on one of the horns of the fei? owinF digeyna: 
either (1) we can rationally search for (J), in accor(-ance with (J). ) 
z-2-, 
only if we don't need to search for it; or (2) we can rationally 
search for (J), need to search, and so our rational search for (J) 
is not a I(J) - type' rational search. To admit 
(1) is to admit 
that (J) merely shifts the Meno paradox on to the search for it- 
self; to admit (2) is to admit the existence of non-justiiicationiat 
rational searches, and hence to admit the possibility of a non- 
justificationist, Socratic sceptical, solution to both the first- 
order and the second-order Meno paradox. 
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In other words, the 
justificationiet has to admit either that he can't solve the Meno 
paradox (in that he merely shifts it) or else that the Socratic 
sceptic can. (A not very palatable choice! ) But the Socratic 
sceptic is faced with no such dilemma - for TDSK, so far as we know, 
solves the second-order Meno paradox and so doesn't merely shift 
the problem on to the 'needful rational search' for itself. 
The failure of (J) to solve the second-order Meno paradox, in 
the face of TDSK's success in doing so, thus provides a powerful 
independent argument against (J). For the justificationist, if he 
is to solve the first-order Meno paradox must also solve the second- 
order paradox (otherwise he merely shifts the problem on to a 
special case of itself). But (J) cannot solve the second-order 
Meno paradox. So if the justificationist wishes to solve the firs1"- 
order Meno paradox he can only do so by clinging to some non- 
justificational solution. But the Socratic-sceptic need make no 
such concession to the justificationist - for he can have a unified 
theory of all rational searches. 
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Thus justificationism leads 
outside itself to non-justificationism, whereas non-justificationiem 
can be self-contained (or 'comprehensive'). 
Now remember that Collingwoodian and KuhniaaL relativism could 
be seen as resulting from an acceptance of (J) coupled with the rather 
ZZ s-- 
plausible premise (Rpp) that our starting'-point in the rational 
search for knowledge is not some 'transcendentally given' error- 
free foundation, but is merely culturally or historically supplied. 
Since TDSK's success in solving the second-order Neno paradox 
provides a powerful independent argument against (J), it equally 
provides an argument against the typical relativist claim that any- 
one who accepts the (RPP) must immediately embrace relativism. But 
in that case TDSK, which can accept the (RPP), provides an 
independent means for avoiding relativism - for the argument in 
favour of preferring TDSK to (J) is not that TDSK enables us to 
accept the (RPP) and yet avoid relativism. Rather it is that TASK 
enables us to solve the second-order Meno paradox, and so to solve 
(rather than merely shift) the first-order Meno paradox. 
This same point can be seen from a slightly different angle: 
for justificationism, since it necessarily leads outside itself, is 
itself a version of relativism (since justificationism must be 
relative to non-justificationism). This is true not simply from the 
point of view of methodology, but also from that of epistemology 
(i. e., from that of solving the problem of diversity) - for the 
justificationist can only accept any claims on the basis of just- 
ification if he is willing to accept some claims in the absence of 
such justification (this is the point of the infinite regress 
argument). But this entails that justification must always be 
relative - relative, that is, to a non-justifiable choice of the 
basis for justification. But non-justifica. iorai Socratic 
scepticism, and in particular TDSK, is not a versi3n of relativism 
- for since TDSK is self-contained (or 'comprehensive') it is not 
relative to anything, except, perhaps, itself. But to say that 
Zz3 
TDSK is only relative to itself is to say that isn't 
relative. 
How, then, does TDSK enable us to avoid relativism? The answer 
lies in the fact that according to IDSK the rational search for 
knowledge is not determined by our starting-point, and so need not be 
confined within this starting-point. Rather, the rational search is 
deter-mined by the problems we can discover in our starting-point, 
and by the desiderata on solutions to them which such problems 
help to generate. In this way, pace the relativist, we are able 
to rationally search for new, improved, or better starting-points. 
So although the rational search for knowledge clearly takes place 
within cultures, and at specific times, this does not entail that 
this search is relative to a culture, or relative to a specific 
historical period. In fact, it is only because the rational search 
for knowledge is not relative to a culture that this search, and in 
particular its results, can play such a central role in the evolution 
of culture. 
Let me ask, finally: does the theory of the desiderated search 
for knowledge (TDSK)., as it is contained in (a) - (k)) satisfy the 
desiderata (D1) and (D2) on a Socratic-sceptical solution to the Meno 
(D, ) 
paradox? To determine this, recall first (D1) and (D2):, requires that 
we can rationally search for knowledge; while (D2) requires that this 
can be done without assuming any foundation or starting-point of 
knowledge - in the sense that we are at least able to recognise that 
for which we search in the absence of any such foundation. Now TDSK 
clearly does not assume any foundation of knowledge. In fact, it 
begins (at (a)) by rejecting the assumption of any such foundation 
or starting-point, and then proceeds to (d) wherein whatever our 
.. 1 
starting-point it cannot be assumed to be a starting-point of 
knovledga. On the other hand, TDSK does explain how we are at least 
able to recognise that for which we search in the absence of any 
euch foundation or starting-point - for we can recognise it by 
seeing whether or not it satisfies the desiderata on a solution to 
a problem discovered in our non-knowledge starting-point. Thus TDSK 
clearly satisfies (D2). But what about ýD1 i? Well, so far as we 
know at present the only requirement on satisfying (D1 is just that 
we at least be able to recognise that for whicn we search - but TDSK 
meets this requirement. Therefore, il_ so far as no r'urther 
consequences of (Dj) can be drawn which 'T'DSK fats to satisfy, TDSK 
r 
can be conjectured to satisfy (D1). 
2 The result is that 
is, as far as we know, a Socratic-sceptical soli _'Lon to It eng 
paradox; and (2) we can only claim (1) in way consis'ýent 
Socratic scepticism itself. 
L. 6: Conclusion 
While the justificationist tradition insists that in -rder to 
rationally search for knowledge we must have some foundation of 
knowledge from which to begin our search, the Socratic tradition has 
been quite different to this - for Socrates stressed that he k: 
nothing (except, perhaps, for that hee! nothing) and vet 
1e 
reý. ýisa-tior, of his 
rationally searched for knowledge. in fact, hisAown (and especi_aT ly 
other's ignorance was itself the proauc v of his very search. 3ut how, 
given the Meno paradox, could one know nothing aru 1, -- - rationa&_'L; r 
search for knowledge? How could we be ignorant az-_ . ye`--, search y ýr 
that of Which we are ignorant? 
The Socratic-sceptical solution to the Meno paradox wric: r. A , ti-e 
presented clears all this up - for our &norance zatner tr, a. º_ brig 
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bliss, can actually be discovered and articulated; and in 
articulating it (in various ways, no doubt - for we are ignorant 
even here as to the correct way to articulate our ignorance! ) we will 
generate desiderata which enable us to recognise that for which we 
search - namely, contributions to our knowledge in the form of theories 
which can solve some of the problems which have been revealed in our 
non-knowledge starting--point. In other words, I want to assert, as 
opposed to Kuhn, Collingwood, and the justificationists, that it 
hardly matters where we start - for wherever we start we cannot 
assume it to be a starting-point of knowledge. What does matter 
is that we start - for in conducting the Socratic-sceptical rational 
search for knowledge (in accordance with TDSK) we can modify or 
transform our initial starting-point out of all recognition. Thus, 
rather than being rationally caught as 'prisoners t within -i, iie 
framework of our starting-point, we will be able to rationally 
transform it, and to rationally search for new, improved, and better 
frameworks. 
Finally, what about the initial problem from which our discussion 
began - that is, the problem of diversity? All along I have described 
this as the fundamental problem of the traditional. theory of knowledge; and 
have suggested that justificationism has maintained its philosophical 
glitter precisely because the problem of diversity appears to demand 
some sort of ? epistemologically privileged' foundation of knowledge 
to which we can appeal in order to adjudicate between competing 
claims. Does the Socratic sceptic have anything to say about the 
problem of diversity? The answer ib that he does - he suggests that 
it is the _prob=, in that it immediately begs for some sort 
of judtificationist answer, and that it ought to be replaced with the 
Meno paradox as the fundamental problem, not only of methodology, 
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but of epistemology as well. That is, the Socratic sceptic holds that 
it is the rational search for knowledge which is primary, and that it 
is out of the theory of rational searching that we will generate 
means for coping with diversity. For so long as all of the parties 
to a dispute are prepared to undertake a Socratic-sceptical rational 
search for knowledge, each from their differing starting-points, 
there is the possibility that some of the diverse lines of inquiry 
will find themselves effectively closed down. But how TDSK can be 
extended to yield a theory of the 'rational close down' of lines of 
inquiry is itself a matter which can only become clear given 




FOOTNOTES - Chapter 14 
1. In On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance', in Conjectures 
and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 
PP- 3-30. Popper considers Plato's solution to the Meno paradox 
- his theory of anamnesis, or recollection - to be an example of 
the mistaken doctrine that truth is manifest, or can be made 
manifest. Note, however, that although Popper's essay discusses 
Plato's theory, it fails to discuss (or even to mention) Plato's 
rop blem - that is, the problem of the search for knowledge posed 
by Meno at 80(d-e). Thus, despite Popper's repudiation of 
Plato's solution to the problem, Grene is quite right to suggest 
that 'Popper has paid no serious heed to Meno's question'. In 
fact, the only place I know of in Popper's writings where the 
Meno paradox is mentioned is briefly in footnote 120, p. 1190, 
of his 'Replies to my Critics t in P. A. Schilpp (ed. ), The Phil- 
osophy of Karl Popper (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974). But 
in my view the solution he suggests there (prompted by David 
Miller) is not acceptable - it isn't 'Popperian' enough in that 
it isn't sceptical enough. 
2. For a criticism of the view that creative thinking involves 
'novelties thrown up ... at random', see my 'Creative Product 
and Creative Process in Science and Art', Inquiry, Vol. 23, no. 1 
(Spring 1980), pp. 83-106; reprinted in D. Dutton and M. Krausz 
(eds. ) The Concept of Creativity in Science and Art (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), pp. 129-55" 
3. Popper himself has once referred to his viewpoint as that of 
'hopeful scepticism? - in his Objective Knowledge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 100. 
IL. Thus Anthony O'Hear is quite wrong to suggest, as he does in 
his book Karl Popper (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 
that Popper's motivation for introducing the idea of scientific 
theories as inhabitants of an objective, linguistically form- 
ulated, 'World 3' is that in it 'he perhaps finds a promise of 
the transcendent justification his scepticism is striving fort 
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(p. 207). In other words, along with many others, O'Hear sees 
Popper's sceptical anti-justificationism as a fundamental 
failing, and so he sees Popper's theory of scientific -theories 
- as inhabitants of 'World 3' - as somehow an attempt to put 
this failing right. But as I have suggested, this piece of 
speculation is badly mistaken. For Popper! scientific theories 
are to be thought of as inhabitants of 'World 3' - as opposed to 
being identified with the-subjective belief-states of 'World 2' 
- precisely because of the need to adopt a falsificationist 
methodology with respect to them. Thus the fact that, in 
Popper's later philosophy, scientific theories find their way 
into 'World 3' is not the result of some atavistic hankering 
after 'transcendent justification'. It is simp,., y of a piece 
with Popper's non-justificationist methodology. For criticisms 
of O'Hear's criticisms of Popper, see my review of OtHear's 
book in Philosophical, arterly, 22, (July, 1982), pp. 285-7. 
5. This way of putting the question makes clear, I hope, that the 
(traditional) epistemologist is concerned with rational 
acceptability, not social acceptability; and that the means of 
adjudication which he seeks aim to transcend (as it were) the 
merely social. If, following Gellner, we see the problem of 
diversity as itself becoming paramount precisely 'r -)n trad- 
itional, socially reinforced, belief systems begin to break 
down in the face of rival views, then it becomes clear that no 
solution to this problem can be found simply in the appeal to a 
social consensus, or to traditional social forces. To put this 
point another way, the question which interests the theorist 
of knowledge is a normative (not a descriptive/sociological) 
one: namely, how ought we to go about the business of adjudicating 
between rival knowledge claims given that what we want is only 
to believe the true, and not to believe the false? As we have 
already suggested, and as we will see at the end of this chapter, 
the Popperian 'epistemologist' proposes to shift this question 
on to methodology. But even his question remains normative, 
not descriptive/sociological. 
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6. Se% for example, the General Scholium to Book III of the 
Principia: Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to 
be called a hypothesis, and hypotheses ... have no place in 
experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propo- 
sitions are inferred from the phenomena and afterwards rendered 
general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, 
the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of 
motion and gravitation, were discovered. ' 
7. It might be thought that this is a crushing refutation of 
relativism, since the argument clearly shows that relativism, if 
true, can neither be intellectually superior to anti-relativism, 
nor can it be rationally defended against anti-relativism. But 
it does not follow from this that anti-relativism is intellec- 
tually superior to relativism. Since it is the anti-relativist 
who upholds the possibility of rational or intellectual 
superiority, and not the relativist, unless some version of anti- 
relativism can be intellectually superior to relativism, anti- 
relativism will be in the same intellectual boat as relativism. 
But this is precisely what the relativist position entailsi In 
other words, it seems to me that if we are to avoid relativism 
it is not enough simply to show that relativism is rationally 
incoherent; what we must also show is that the rationalist is not 
rationally forced into relativism. For if he is so forced then, 
since relativism is rationally incoherent, rationalism -,,: ýst be 
rationally incoherent; and thus, as the relativist maintains, of 
the same rational status as relativism. Thus the real challenge 
facing the rationalist is that of showing that he is not 
rationally forced into relativism; and this means that he must 
develop some theory of rational method which does not lead to 
such a relativism. 
8. I should perhaps make clear here that when I assert that 
scepticism is true, I do not mean to assert that we can have no 
knowledge in Popper's sense of 'knowledge' - that is, that we can 
have no tentative, fallible, conjectural and improvable theories. 
What I do mean to assert is that (a) there does not exist any 
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adequate, or self-evident, foundation of knowledge; so that 
(b) we can have no knowledge in the justificationistts sense - 
that is, of warranted, or grounded, or justified true beliefs; 
and moreover (c) that we can never hope to justify our explicitly 
articulated theories either - either by proving them or by 
probabilifying them. For an excellent analysis of the trad- 
itional debate between sceptics and justificationists (or 
'classical rationalists'), see William Berkson's 'Skeptical 
Rationalism', uY iFa, 22, (1979)> pp. 281-320. 
9. For an interesting discussion of the problems connected with 
the plausibility or otherwise of arguments, especially as 
relating to scepticism, see Joseph Agassi, 'Criteria for 
Plausible Arguments', Mind, 83 (197)4) , pp. 106-16. I might 
also mention here that Agassi has discussed the Meno problem in 
his 'The Logic of Scientific Inquiry', Synthese, 26 (1971), 
pp. 198-514. Although I have learned much from Agassits paper, 
he does not approach the issues in the systematic way in which 
I try to do here. 
10. These last two points are in fact related - for the fact that 
empirical or observational reports are themselves dependent 
upon prior assumptions itself reads to the possibility of 
dispute as to whether or not some particular proposition p is 
to be included as Armstrong-iaz tnon-inferential t knowledge. 
Thus, for example, where Priest ley repor' ed a glass , ar as 
containing 'de-phlogisticated air. ', Lavoisier would have 
reported it as containing 'oxygen'. If we say that Lavoisier, 
but not Priestley, had tnon-inferential' knowledge here 
(because his belief that the jar contains oxygen is itself 
caused by the very state of affairs which makes his belief 
true) then all we are really saying is that we are willing to 
accept Lavoisier's theory but not Priestley's. Thus if we 
want rational dispute to be possible between phlogiston chemistry 
And Lavoisian chemistry then we must acknowledge the possibility 
of rational dispute as to whose knowledge is 'non-inferential' 
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and whose isn't. But this means that a natuz'alistic 
'foundation-in-fact' cannot be unproblematically appealed to in 
order to settle disputes as to the facts claimed in the 
'foundation'. Moreover, it is important to realise that 
although I might not believe that (21): there is a pocket 
calculator on my desk, unless there actually was a pocket 
calculator on my desk (and thus unless 2 were true), this does 
not entail that may belief that p is causally determined by 
the state of affairs that makes P true. At best, the state of 
affairs plays some causal role in 'determining' my belief that 
J; it cannot play a sufficient causal role. If it did, then 
those who were completely ignorant of the existence of pocket 
calculators (like primal Aborigines) would also have to come to 
believe that p if they were suitably placed for the state of 
affairs that makes true to have a causal 'influence' on them. 
But clearly no primal Aborigine will come to believe that 2 
when so placed - for he lacks the required 'background knowledge' 
which will enable him to decode the physical signals which are 
causally acting upon his eye as a pocket calculator. But this, 
I suggest, is equally the case in all perception - perception is 
the decoding of signals transmitted in some physical medium 
(e. g., the visual spectrum) as something else (e. g., a physical 
object). Thus we never perceive light in the visual spectrum; 
rather we detect this light and decode it as external physical 
objects. But this means'that all perceptual 'knowledge' is 
'inferential' (and thus hypothetical) in that it always 
requires the use of stored 'assumptions' in the process of 
decoding. 
11. It is important to realise that the argument of the Meno can also 
be formulated, not in term of searching for knowledge, but in 
terms of searching for truth. Thus: in order to search for the 
truth we must know what we are looking for; but what we are 
looking for is the truth; therefore, in order to search for the 
truth we must already know the truth. But then we have no need 
to search for it. Alternatively, if we don't already know the 
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truth, then we don't know what we are looking for, and so can't 
search for it. So either we can search for the truth but 
needn't, or else we need to search but can't. Thus even if we 
forgot all about 'knowledge', aril simply made it our aim to 
search for the truth (as Popper, in effect, recommends), we 
would still have to solve the Meno paradox - for we would have 
to show how it could be possible that we both can (rationally) 
search for the truth and need to; how we can search for the 
truth when we are ignorant of -t. 
12. A propos of this, Descartes? Rule III (of his 'Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind' in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 
vol. 1, translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 1-77) is as follows: 
'In the subjects we propose to investigate, our inquiries should 
be directed, not to what others have thought, nor to what we 
ourselves conjecture, but to what we can clearly and perspic- 
uously behold and with certainty deduce; for knowledge is not 
won in any other way" (p. 5); and he adds (p. 10) that 'no 
science is acquired except by mental intuition or deduction'. 
Of course, the question naturally arises as to how, for Descartes, 
we- are to obtain clear and distinct intuitions in the first 
place; for it is only after we have done so that we can search 
for further knowledge by deduction from them. As far as I can 
see Descartes' view here (at least as presented in the Rules) is 
that clear and distinct ideas are always of ? simple natures' 
(of, pp. 40-1); that such natures tare known se and are 
wholly free from falsity' (p. 42); and that 'in order to know 
these simple natures no pains need be taken, because they are 
of themselves sufficiently well known. Application comes in 
only in isolating them from each other and scrutinizing them 
separately with steadfast mental gaze' (pp. 45-6). Thus, tin 
connection with simple propositions the only precepts we give 
are those which prepare our cognitive faculties for fixing 
before them any objects, whatsoever they are, and scrutinizing 
them with keen intelligence, since propositions of this type do 
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not arise as the result of inquiry, but present themselves to us 
spontaneously' (p. i8; my emphasis). It would thus appear as 
if, for Descartes, clear and distinct intuitions are not so much 
obtained, as given; so that we don't have to search for them. 
However, this doesn't mean that methodology is completely 
silent about such intuitions - for it gives us rules for 
breaking down 'complexes' into the already known 'simplest, as 
well as rules for helping us to keep such intuitions from 
getting confused or indistinct. 
13. A further quotation from Descartes' Rules (a-cit., p. L. 9) is 
apposite here: 'In every "question" there must be something of 
which we are ignorant; otherwise there is no use asking the 
question. Secondly, this very matter LI. e., that of which we 
are ignorang must be designated in some way or other; other- 
wise there would be nothing to determine us to investigate it 
rather than anything else. Thirdly, it can only be so des- 
ignated by the aid of something else which is already known' 
(my emphasis). This quotation shows clearly (a) that Descartes 
was aware of the Meno problem (compare it, for example, with the 
passage from the Meno (80e) quoted in the text); and (b) that 
Descartes' solution assumes that the search for knowledge, the 
search for that of which we are ignorant, can only rationally 
take place within an already given framework of knowleýM,. 
1t. See R. G. Collingwood's An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1940), especially p. L. 8 where, in an 
important long footnote, he suggests that absolute presuppositions 
change not as a result of conscious thought but rather as a 
result of being subjected to historical 'strains': 'if the 
strains are too great, the structure collapses and is replaced 
by another'. Kuhn tends to avoid such vague 'Hegelianising', and 
instead explains changes of paradigm with reference to the 
sociology of the scientific community. In the present context 
it is worthwhile noting that Kuhn'a theory of normal science 
(that is, of uncritical research conducted within the framework 
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of a socially supplied paradigm) is precisely his solution to 
the Meno paradox. He writes: 'Nature is vastly too complex to 
be explored even approximately at random. Something must tell 
the scientist where to look and what to look for, and that 
something, though it may not last beyond his generation, is the 
paradigm with which his education as a scientist has supplied 
him'. Kuhn fails to see that there may be something between 
exploring nature randomly and exploring it 'normal scientifically' 
(that is, by taking the paradigm as given); and that is exploring 
it by trying to critically test the paradigm. " Such a 'Popperian' 
exploration is not random; nor does it take the paradigm as 
uncritically given. Moreover, if we are to take Kuhn at his 
word here then, since it is the paradigm which tells the 
scientist 'where to look and what to look for', it follows that 
in crisis periods, when some scientists are looking for a new 
paradigm, not tells them 'where to look and what to look for'. 
But this means that not only is there no possibility of 
conducting a rational search for new paradigms but, moreover, 
there is no way of rationally reco rising a new paradigm as a 
potential way out of the crisis. No wonder, then, that Kuhn 
falls back on the sociology of the scientific community in order 
to explain the resolution of crises. (The quotation above is from 
Kuhn's important essay 'The Function of Dogma in Scientific 
Research', in A. C. Crombie (ed. ), Scientific Change (London: 
Heinemann, 1963), pp. 347-69; reprinted in Barry Barnes(ed. ), 
Sociology of Science (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 
pp. 80-104. The quotation is from p. 96 of the reprint. See 
also, of course, Kuhn's classic The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970)") 
I. An explanatory analogy might be in order here. I have recently 
been involved in a consideration of the Boundary Commission for 
Scotland's proposed new boundaries for the Lothian Region's 
10 parliamentary constituencies. The Boundary Commission does 
its work within rules laid down in a number of Acts of 
Parliament, and these Acts specify certain requirements (or 
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desiderata) on the Boundary Commission's search for new 
constituency boundaries. For example, the Boundary Commission 
is charged with trying to get each constituency as near as 
possible to an average size of electorate; and with doing so in 
such a way as to follow, as far as possible, the local authority 
electoral boundaries already in existence. Clearly these 
requirements are not themselves constituency boundaries, but 
rather desiderata on the Boundary Commission's search for such 
boundaries. Similarly in our case - (D1 
) and (D2) are not 
themselves knowledge (of a Socratic sceptical solution to the 
Meno paradox) but rather desiderata, on our search for it. 
16. Note that if we restrict our terror-revealing' methods to those 
specified by (g), then the position reached can be called 
'Socratic Sceptical Rationalism' (SSR). On the other hand, if 
we are willing (or able) to drop this restriction, and add the 
terror-revealing' methods specified in (h), then the position 
reached can be called 'Socratic Sceptical Empiricism' (SSE). 
Clearly, there are problems which may arise for SSE which cannot 
arise for SSR - for example, the 'problem of the empirical 
basis'. On the other hand, there may be problems for SSR which 
can only be solved by shifting to SSE - if, that is, these 
problems result precisely from SSR's claim to completeness; 
that is, from SSR's very restriction of the allowable 'error- 
revealing' methods to those specified in (g). 
17. I owe the idea that a problem (or inconsistency) comes with a 
variety of competing desiderata on its solution to Jagdish 
Hattiangadi's seminal paper 'The Structure of Problems', 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 8 (Dec. 1978), pp. 345-66; 
and vol 9 (March 1979), PP- 49-76. The methodological theory 
sketched in this chapter - which I will further develop in 
Chapter 6- shares much in coon with H. attiaangadi's theory. 
But there is one crucial difference: whereas Hattiangadi 
generates his theory from the historical structure of problems 
in science, I generate mine from the Meno paradox - the 
fundamental problem of methodology; and as we shall see later, 
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the method by which one generates one's methodology actually 
affects the problems one can solve with it. Yet it was 
Hattiangadi himself who first alerted me to the central 
importance of the Meno paradox. Thus, whatever my approach will 
be able to achieve must be seen as the result of a joint effort 
- an effort which includes contributions not only from 
Hattiangadi, but also from Agassi, Jarvie, Bartley, and Bill 
Berkson as well. In other words, a joint effort of what might 
be dubbed 'the sceptical left-wings of the Popper school. 
Feyerabend has moved even further to 'the left' - he has dropped 
Socratic scepticism altogether and moved into Pyrrhonian 
scepticism (hence, contra Hattiangadi, I would argue that the 
title of Feyerabend's book - Against Method - is no misnomer). 
For Hattiangadits excellent review of Feyerabend - in which he 
claims that Feyerabend's book would have been better entitled 
'Against Intellectual Standards' - see 'The Crisis in Methodology: 
Feyerabend', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 7 (1977), 
pp. 289-302. On the other hand, Lakatos moved very far to 'the 
right' - his Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is 
justificationist. Popper himself appears to me to occupy 
something like 'the centre' - wavering between a thorough- 
going scepticism and various 'whiffs of justificationism'. 
18. If one looks back at the criticism of Armstrong's 'causal 
foundationalism' raised in Section 4.3, one will see that that 
criticism rested basically on the fact that such a foundation 
would be non-effective (in the logician's sense), in that we 
could never know which jts were foundational, and so could never 
know which to appeal to in order to settle disputes. But the 
Socratic sceptical notion of knowledge which I have developed is 
also non-effective. Doesn't it follow, then, that my criticism 
of Armstrong hits my own theory? The answer is no: my theory 
is not designed to solve the problem of diversity - which is 
both the fundamental problem of the traditional theory of know- 
ledge and whose solution seems to require some sort of 
found. ationalism. In that context a non-effective foundation is 
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a disaster. Whereas my theory is a spin-off of my attempt to 
solve the fundamental problem of methodology, of the theory of 
the rational search for knowledge, in a Socratic sceptical 
fashion. Since the theory is designed to be sceptical it would 
be a disaster if it led to a notion of i owiedge which was 
anything but non-effective. This shows two things: first, that 
whoever desires a non-effective theory of knowledge can have 
one without embracing any foundational ism at all; and secondly, 
that whether or not a criticism hits a theory often depends on 
what problem it was trying to solve, and therefore which 
desiderata it was trying to satisfy. 
19. If this is correct, then one would expect to find in, for 
example, Descartes' theory of method an analogue to the problem. 
of induction. In fact, it seems to me that Descartes was aware 
of this problem - for he seemed to hold that we don't need to 
search for the rules of deduction from the intuitive foindat on 
since these rules are already immediately presented in intuition, 
and so are themselves part of the foundation. But if the rules 
are part of the foundation, then we need new rules in order t, -. 
move from the foundation to any 'mediate t knowledge. Thus, the 
Cartesian (or tdeductivist') analogue of the problem of induction 
is either the Lewis Carroll paradox of the Tortoise and Aral: es, 
or it is the problem of coming to know the rules of deduction 
by deduction. In other words, either the rules of deduction are 
part of the foundation or they aren't. If they are, then we 
have a Carroll paradox; if they aren't, then we can't search 
for them from the foundation by deduction unless we don't need 
to search for them. 
20 It might not be clear why the justificationist's admission of 
the existence of non-justificationist rational searches - in the 
special case of searching for a theory of rational searching - 
should be equivalent to his admitting the possibility of a non- 
juetificationist, Socratic sceptical, solution to both the 
first-order and the second-order Meno paradox. The reason is 
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this: for him to admit the existence of non-justificationist 
'needful rational searches' for his own theory of rational 
searching is, clearly, to admit the existence of a nor: - justific- 
ational solution to the second-order Meno paradox. But it is 
also to admit the existence of searches satisfying (D1) and 
(D2) ; 
and therefore to admit the consistency of (D1) and (D2); and 
therefore to admit the possibility of finding some theo7 which 
will satisfy both (D1) and (D2) . But to admit this is to 
admit the possibility of a Socratic sceptical solution to the 
first-order Meno paradox. 
21. It might be objected here that surely there do exist justific- 
ational (or tJ-type') rational searches for knowledge - for 
example, the search for theorems within a formalised axiomatic 
system; or Kuhn's normal science; or the use of 'local induction'. 
Thus even if the Socratic sceptic is not theoretically forced to 
admit the existence of such searches, he is forced to concede 
their existence nevertheless. Reply: The Socratic sceptic need 
not deny the existence of liraited J-type rational searches; what 
he does deny is the possibility that the assumptions upon 
which such searches depend can themselves be the resultants of 
tJ-typet rational searches (since this would lead to a regress). 
Thus, the assumptions upon which 'J-type' rational searches 
depend must themselves (in the end) be supplied as a result of 
a non-justificational rational search, if they are supplied as 
a result of a rational search at all. Of course, they need not 
be so supplied; but if the J-type search which depends on them 
is itself to be a rational search then we must be able to 
rationally inquire into these assumptions, and such an inquiry 
cannot be a 'J-type' one (since this again would lead to a 
regress). So the possibility of rational 'J-type' searches 
depends upon the possibility of 'non J-type' rational searches. 
22. Note that any consequence of (D1) which TDSK failed to satisfy 
would itself produce a problem for the claim that TDSK satisfies 
(Dý), and thus a problem within Socratic sceptical methodology. 
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In this way it becomes possible to search for improvements on 
TDSK itself in a manner which is consistent TDSK! Thus TDSK 
need not be the end of our search gor a Socr&ý',, c sceptical 
solution to the Meno paradox. In mace, in Chapter 6, we shall 
develop TDSK into a new methodological theory. rote, moreover, 
that if there is a claimed consequence of (D,, ) which TDSK fails 
to satisfy, the Socratic sceptic can choose one of at least three 
desiderata on a solution to this prociem: (i) he can try to show 
that (Dj) does not, in fact, have-his consequence; (2) he can 
admit that (D1) does have the consequence and then argue that 
this consequence is false. Hence it becomes a virtue of TDSK 
that it fails to satisfy this consequence, and this would then 
lead to a diaresis - or dialysis (:, ee ? oppel ('976), p. 32) - 
between two ways of interpreting (D one in w ý'ch it had is 
false consequence and should not º, e satisfied, and a ot:: er 
which it doesn't have this cons ., once and show ý. be sati eäj. 
But (3) he can admit the truth off ýýýe consequo_. ce ýn ý> c 
for a replacement of TDSK - one which does fully satisfy Lti 
and (D2) . Of course, finally, it may be the case that :zA 
(D2) can't be satisfied simultaneously - in w*Lc'-. case Soi rac: -. c 
scepticism is false. 
23 Earlier versions of this chapter were read to the . niLosophy 
Department colloquium at Dartmouth Hanover, New 
Hampshire in the summer of 1977; to the Dep? nner 
Edinburgh in February 1978; and to the Philosophy Club ý, 4 
St. Andrews University in May 1980. The pa z-c .ci. -ýa .ts on those 
occasions will undoubtedly testify that, at those times, ý Erz 
no way had TDSK - so that I did indeed need to search _c- it 
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CHAPTER 5: AGAINST 'TACIT KNO'? TING' 
It will be recalled that the initial aim of the previous 
chapter was to respond to Marjorie Grene's challenge (1966a, p. 32) 
that 'Popper has paid no serious heed to Meno's question', and 
thus to develop the outlines of a solution to the Meno paradox 
which was broadly 'Popperian'. In this chapter I want to critically 
investigate the kind of solution to the Meno paradox which Grene 
herself favours. That is, the solution of Michael Polanyi, 
according to which the Meno paradox is only solvable if we admit 
that our knowledge consists not only of explicit, articulated, 
assertions but also of a form of knowedge which is 'in-dwe'Lling' 
- or tacit knowledge. But before doing so, I want first to consider 
three questions which remain from the previous chapter, and which 
relate to the theory of the desiderated search for knowledge (TDSK) 
there presented. 
5.1s Three Questions Concerning TDSK 
The first question is this: is the theory of the desiderated 
search for knowledge 'Popperian'? Now this question might be 
thought to be trivial since, after all, TDSK was, on the face of it, 
designed to be 'Popperian'a But in fact the question isn't 
trivial, for at least two reasons. Firstly, since the best laid 
plans oft go astray, the fact that TDSK was designed to be 'Popper- 
ian' (if it was so designed) does not guarantee that it actually 
is'Popperian'o But secondly, TDSK was not designed to be 'Popperian'j 
it was designed to be Socratic sceptical, and thus to satisfy the 
desiderata (D1) and (D2). So the question remains as to whether 
or not TDSK satisfies the desiderata for a solution to the : ý,, eno 
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paradox to be 'Popperian'. 
In order to tackle this question, let us recall, in turn, 
the requirements which a solution to the Meno paradox must meet 
if it is to be 'Popperian' (cf. section 4.1). Firstly, such a 
theory must be 'pessimistic' (or sceptical), in that not only 
does it reject the possibility of successfully justifying our 
knowledge claims but, more importantly, it rejects the very quest 
for such justification. Thus a 'Popperian' solution to the Meno 
paradox must not make the rational search for knowledge dependent 
upon any justificationist methods.. Now clearly, TDSK satisfies 
these 'pessimistic' or sceptical requirements. On the one hand, 
by denying the assumption of any 'epistemologically privileged' 
error-free foundation of knowledge, TDSK denies one of the necessary 
pre-conditions for successfully justifying our knowledge claims. 
On the other hand, the only methods which TDSK condones as applicable 
to our starting-point are the 'critical' methods specified at (g) 
and (h). But since the aim of these methods is not at all to provide 
good reasons for believing our starting-point to be true, but is 
rather to discover problems jr our starting-point (and thus to 
discover that we don't know), TDSK rejects the very quest for 
justification. Thus TDSK does not make the rational search for 
knowledge dependent upon any justificationist methods, and so 
satisfies the 'pessimistic' (or sceptical) 'Popperian' requirement. 
Secondly, a 'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox must be 
'optimistic' (or Socratic), in that it allows for the possibility 
of rationally searching for objective truth. Thus a 'Popperian' 
solution to the Meno paradox must both employ an objective (or 
correspondence) notion of truth and, as importantly, must not make 
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the rational search for such truth relative to any given framework 
of assumptions - for if the search for truth must be relative to a 
given framework of assumptions then we cannot search for non- 
framework relative (or objective) truth. Now TDSK also s t;. sfies 
these 'optimistic' or Socratic requirements. Cn the cre hwii, 
TDSK does employ an objective (or correspondence) theory truth, 
since it would make no sense to employ the 'cri . ical' me Vr. ods 
specified at (g) and (h) if we adopted an 'epistemic' (or non- 
objective) notion of truth - wherein truth is identified with our 
current knowledge or starting-point. On the other . ar.. ý y lDSK ý. ýes 
not make the rational search for such truth relý_'. ive to any ven 
framework of assumptions. This is because, according to TDS , o, r 
ability to recognise that for which we search, and so to $esrc'_, Fýý 
it rationally, does not rest upon our starting-point of 
but rather upon the problems which we are able o discover Ir:;; ý 
with) this starting-point, and upon our choice of a so c" 
which solutions to these problems should satisfy. Thus, t _ýepea::, 
from the viewpoint of TDSK it simply does not mattar wh,: 2e z start 
(or what our starting-point is); what matters -s trtýlt we 7t,,, , -t 
(to inquire in accordance with TDSK). So TDSK both em, ioys an 
objective notion of truth and does not make the rational search 
for such truth relative to any given framework of assumpt__onc. 
Thus TDSK satisfies the 'optimistic' (or Socratic, `dop r<<_^ 
requirements. 
Thirdly, it will be recalled, a 'Popperian' sc, lut c_. cc the 
Meno paradox must be 'objectivist', in that the knowledge cl scovered 
as a result of the rational search for knowledge musi not consist 
of subjective belief-states, but of linguistically or: nula ýe 
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theories; and, as a generalisation of this, our theory of the 
rational search should itself only refer to that which can be 
linguistically articulated. As to the first of these requirements, 
TDSK clearly satisfies it - since according to TDSK the search 
for knowledge is the search for theories which satisfy a chosen 
set of desiderata on the solution to a problem which we have 
discovered in our non-knowledge starting-point. Thus, fromm, the 
viewpoint of TDSK, the resultants of the rational search can only 
be linguistically formulated theories, since it is only such 
theories which can be said to satisfy desiderata (i. e. the notion 
of 'satisfaction' is a 'logical' or 'quasi-logical' one; and 
subjective belief-states do not have logical, but rather psycho- 
logical, properties). 
As for the second (or generalised) 'otjectiv4, st' ýe; -_ i: -emrment, 
whether or not TDSK satisfies it is slightly more probýemat_c -- :t 
all depends upon whether or not problT-ns, and desiderata on their 
. solution, are linguistically articulable prior 
to our sears; -n, 
for, or finding, a solution. For according to DSK our ýz. ': ýance 
in the search for knowledge, and that which allows this searcn tc 
be rational (in the sense of enabling us to recognise that for 
which we search), consists precisely of such problems and, irsiderata. 
Thus unless these can be linguistically articulated prior to our 
searching for, and finding, a theoretical solution, TDSK wU. _l r_ct 
satisfy the generalised 'objectivist' requirement - since our theory 
of the rational search for knowledge will not then only refer to 
that which can be linguistically articulated. Now it is precisely 
this generalised 'objectivist' requirement which Polanyi's solution 
to the Meno paradox would, if true, require us to abandon - since 
1 y'i 
on his view this paradox can only be solved if we are able to appeal 
to essentially 'tacit', and hence unarticulable, prior knowledge. 
This, then, explains our interest in critically discussing Polanyi's 
viewpoint. To anticipate the results of this discussion: TDSK can 
satisfy the generalised 'objectivist' requirement, since prob-ems 
and desiderata can be linguistically articulated prior to our 
searching for, and finding, theories whit i solve them or satisfy 
them. If this is, indeed, the case, then TDSK sat. s its ,.,, ý 
elements of the 'objectivist' (or, as we might call it, ' Worj. l-, 
Three' 'Popperian' requirement. But s rce ý'DS: ý .1 as alre i jeer. 
shown to satisfy both the 'pessimistic' and ' op tiir. istic' requiý e- 
ments, such a finding would show that TDSK is, a we had hoped, a 
'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox. 
The second question I wish to consider is this: is ýTDS an 
instance of, and hence a contribution to, the normative al,: -,; r: )acr: 
to methodology? This question can be approached from wo co pie- 
mentary sides - negatively and positively. Negatively we seek to 
discover what TDSK is not. Now clear y TDSK a. s not an instance cf 
what I have previously called the 'transcenaenta3' approach to 
methodology. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, i do not simply 
identify 'rational scientific inquiry-' win e methods laid down 
in TDSK. Rather I identify it with that which is described in the 
best solution to the Meno paradox, the fundamental problem of 
TDSK is rational inquiry (or methodology). But , his means that 
'about' a 'subject-matter' which can itself be specified indepen- 
dently of TDSK (note that if the Meno paradox cou-ý_s not be specified 
independently of TDSK, the search for TDSK coL-a .. ot ue aescribed 
as the search for a solution to this paradox). But secondly, 
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TDSK works only with an aim of inquiry which itself can be 
specified independently of method, so that it is at least possible 
for someone to produce an argument to show that the application of 
TDSK is actually inconsistent with, and -o frustrates, the 
achievement and/or pursuit of this aim. In other words, TDSK 
is a 'synthetic' theory of method, and so is neither 'analytic' 
nor 'transcendental' (remember that the 'analytic' approach 
entails 'transcendentalism' - cf. section 2.1). On the other 
hand, TDSK is clearly no instance of the naturalistic approach to 
methodology, since even if science as actually practiced were 
consistently to violate the dictates of TDSK, this would not show 
that TDSK was not the correct theory of rational inquiry (and so 
of scientific method). To put this point another way, TDSK in no 
way aims to satisfy the naturalistic methodologist's desideratum 
of passing the 'test of congruence'; rather it aims to satisfy 
the Socratic sceptical desiderata (Dl) and (D2) on a solution to 
the Meno paradox. Theis TDSK's failure to pass ti it- 'test of 
congruence' would in no way impugn it as a solution to the Meno 
paradox, and hence a solution to the fundamental problem of the 
theory of method. Moreover, if we take it that science ought to 
be a rational inquiry after truth, and if TDSK provides the best 
theory of such inquiry (and hence the best solution to the Meno 
paradox), then if we find that science as practiced does -nog meet 
the dictates of TDSK this will constitute a criticism of science as 
practiced (considered as an inquiry after truth;. ýut i: ' : -c- nce 
as practiced can be criticised from the viewpoint of ten 




Thirdly, TDSK is not an instance of the 'normative natural- 
istic' approach to methodology either (cf. Section 2.4), and this 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, since TDSK is not naturalistic, 
it can't be 'normative naturalistic'. But secondly, and more 
importantly, TDSK does not assume that science (as practiced) 
has actually been successful in achieving its (i. e. TDSK's) goal 
of inquiry (i. e. in achieving truth). Quite the contrary, TDSK 
demands that we not assume that our current scientific knowledge 
(which is our starting-point in the search for such knowledge) has 
achieved this goal - for otherwise. `'DST' would not be a 'pessimistic' 
methodology. Moreover, TDSK does not itself assume even that science 
(as practiced) has made progress towards this gcs. -- ß. nä ±?: i:, ný; ün 
if science as practiced obeys the dicta , es of TDSK. For -f±. -: = nc, 
part of TDSK that the application of TDSK will read t; re:. ýýt rt 
(or theories) which progressively get closer to the truth, =''-. 3_s 
remains a supplementary conjecture, one which has tr, be ad `c ;_ 
TDSK, although TDSK does not rule it ou;, and, of c: ý, _. -rse, 
.t re. aair. s 
an open question as to whether or not any definite sense e=:. y. ee 
be given to this conjecture - viz. the ? rcblems of maki-ng ý-. eo 
the notion of 'Verisimilitude'). Thus TDSK is . L, )t ar i_--v-. - ce cf 
the 'normative naturalistic' approach to methodology, $i :ýi:; 
approach requires the assumption that science (as practiced) as 
been successful whereas TDSK does not require this assurni o. 
Of course, we hope, and indeed claim, that TDSK is ccnsdst.: L 
with this assumption; but to be consistent with an assumjpt-,.: -, - -ý_s 
a far cry from requiring it. 
Thus negatively, TDSK is neither an instance of t, i¬ ' rans- 
cendental' approach to methodology, nor is it an D the 
ýy? 
'analytic' approach (which entails the 'transcendental' approach), 
nor is it a version of methodological naturalism, nor even of 
'normative naturalism'. So unless someone can suggest an a;; }. roach 
to methodology which is none of these and which at the same time 
isn't an example of the normative approach, the fact that TDSK is 
not an instance of any of these entails that it must be an example 
of that approach. 
However, as indicated above, the question before us can also 
be approached from a positive angle. To do this, let us recall what 
the aims of the normative approach' to methodology have, traditionally, 
been. Firstly, this approach has hoped to contribute to the 
establishment of a genuine science, to getting such a science off 
the ground, by identifying (independently of current 'episternic 
practice' the best methods of rational inquiry. But TDSK can 
function in precisely this manner - since it takes the 'subject- 
matter' of rational methodology to be the problem of the Meno, and 
the critical comparison and development of solutions to it. But 
since the problem of the Meno is obviously available independently 
of science, solutions to it can potentially contribute to getting 
science off the ground. Thus mDSK., as a solution to the Meno 
paradox, can satisfy the first hope of the normative approach. 
Secondly, it will be recalled, the normative approach has 
hoped that even after science has got oaf the ground (as an 
historical enterprise), it would be able to contribute to the 
progressive reform of science's actual metaodologýcal practices 
via the independent critical discussion of normative methodological 
issues. But once again, the approacl, taken by the Socratic sceptic 
in developing TDSK can do this as well - for, as we lave aireuuy 
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seen, TDSK can be used as a platform from which to criticise 
science's current methodological practices. Thus TD3K satisfies 
the second hope of the normative tradition. 
Thirdly, the normative approach traditionally hoped to be 
able to explain the supposed success of science in attaining a 
knowledge of the world (i. e. ) the truth about the world) on the 
basis of its adoption of the best (or proEressively better) methods 
of rational inquiry. Now this hope of the normative approach was 
discussed, and rejected, in chapter 2. So it had better not be 
the case that TDSK enables us to achieve this hope - for if it did, 
then TDSK itself would have to be rejected. But, as we have seen, 
it doesn't - for TDSK does not entail that the continued application 
of TDSK will eventually produce resultants which either achieve the 
truth or achieve progress towards it. This, to repeat, is a supple- 
mentary conjecture; one which TDSK does not require us to make 
(and so does not entail), but which is, we hope (and claim) con- 
sistent with TDSK. In other words, we hope and claim that the 
application of TDSK does enable us to make progress (towards our 
'methodologically transcendent' goal of truth) but we claim tiffs 
not because we can establish that the application of TDSK will 
produce such progress, but merely because no one will be able to 
show that its application is inconsistent with this claim. 
Thus TDSK itself, and the method by which it was reached, 
enable us to satisfy the two defensible goals of the traditional 
normative approach while failing to satisfy its indefens äle goal. 
So TDSK is as good a theory within the normative aj,. )roach as we 
can hope to achieve. This, of course, is not 1o sa that TDSK 
is the best solution to the Meno paradox, or the best normative 
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theory of method, that can be found (in the next chapter we shall, 
in fact, find a better one). Rather it is to say that from the 
viewpoint of the defensible desiderata of the normative app roach 
to methodology, TDSK cannot be faulted. In other words, if we 
want to fault TDSK we shall have to make demands on an acceptable 
theory of method other than that it (a) enables us to solve the 
Meno paradox, and (b) satisfies the defensible desiderata of 
the normative approach to methodology. But finding such demands 
would not show that TDSK is not within the normative approach. 
Finally, I want to raise a third question concerning TDSK, 
and that iss how does TDSK relate to the general characterisations 
(proposed in Chapter 3) of those elements in the 'context of 
production' which are of genuine methodological significance and 
thus not merely of particular, or psychological, interest)? To see 
this recall, in turn, these charaterisations. According to the 
first characterisation, we take methodologLca standards of 
evaluation (from within the non-justificationist 'context of 
appraisal') and formulate them as maxims for action, and thus as 
rules governing the production of, or search for, new scientific 
theories and hypotheses. How does TDSK relate to this suggestion? 
Not very well, I think. The reason for this is that the viewpoint 
from which TDSK was developed takes the fundamental problem of 
methodology to be not that of the appraisal scientific theories, 
but rather that of the rational search for trat. (and where the 
appraisal of current scientific knowledge i-, seer, ýýs mereiy a 
part of that search). Thus this viewpoint does no;, admit the 
existence of 'free-floating' (or independent) evaluative standards 
of appraisal which can then, subsequently, be turned : ntomaxims 
250 
for action in the search for new theories. In other words, the 
fundamental 'context' of methodology becomes the 'context' of 
rationally inquiring after truth, and methods of appraisal are 
simply part of this 'context'. Thus, from the point of view from 
which TDSK was developed there simply are no independent methodo- 
logical standards of appraisal which can be turned into rules of 
searching for (and hence producing) new scientific theories. 
But what about our second proposal? This related, it will 
be recalled, to a distinction between 'considerations of maintenance' 
and 'considerations of entertainment'. That is, the basic idea was 
that negative 'considerations of maintenance' on prior scientific 
hypotheses could be turned into positive 'considerations of 
entertainment' on new scientific hypothesis; and thus into 
constraints, or limitations, on the production of such hypotheses. 
Now this proposal fits rather neatly into TDSK. For accordi; to 
TDSK, the first action to be undertaken if we search for knowledge 
is to inquire, critically, into our current scientific 'knowledge' 
(which thus provides the starting-point in our search for knowledge); 
and if this inquiry is successful, then we will discover i; roblems in 
our starting-point (which will thus have been shown not to be a 
starting-point of knowledge). But given such problems (or such 
negative 'considerations of maintenance' on our starting-point) 
we then proceed to formulate desiderata on an acceptable solution 
to the problem (and thus positive 'considerations of entertainment' 
on such solutions). But this means that TDSK is, in fact, a version 
of our second proposal as to how a general characterisati<;. -. of the 
methodologically significant elements in the 'context of , )rod. uction' 
can be achieved. For clearly the discovery of a rrotie, t in our 
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starting-point is, from the viewpoint of TDSK, of the utmost 
methodological significance, since it is only such a discovery 
which desiderates the rational search for new thPnries. r. oreorer, 
such a discovery then enables us to formulate various äets of 
desiderata on an acceptable solution to the problem, and so a 
variety of 'considerations of entertainment' on such solutions. 
In other words, TDSK incorporates our second proposal fog character- 
icing methodologically significant elements in the 'context of 
production', but not our first proposal. 
5.2: Against 'Tacit Knowing' 
I want now to turn to the chief focus of this chapter. That 
is, to a critical examination of the kind of so-Lation to -ci. e Meno 
paradox favoured by Michael Polanyi. To understand this position, 
let us recall the problem of the Meno. Begin with the common- 
sensical assertion that if we are to search fo_- something rationally 
we must know what we are looking for, otherwise we cannot know i, 
or when, our search has beer. successful. Thus, in ne e.. bsence of 
a knowledge of what we are looking for, our search for 'it' can 
only be a random flailing in the dark, without any possibility oi 
recognising that we have found what we are searchi, -ig for. But now 
apply these apparent truisms to the case of searching for knowledge, 
of searching for that which is currently nknown. Then apparently 
we can only search for knowledge ratio; ialiy if we know what we are 
looking for; but if we know what we are looking for then what we 
are looking for cannot be presently unknown. Thus, we can only 
rationally search for knowledge if it isn't presently unknown. But 
if it isn't presently unknown, then we have no need to search for it 
(since we already know it); while if it is presently unknown, then 
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we cannot rationally search for it (since we do not know what we 
are looking for). Thus, it would appear, in the absence of a 
knowledge of the unknown, our search for it must simply be a 
random flailing in the dark, without any possibility of recognising 
that for which we search; while in the presence of such a knowledge 
we have no need to search at all. 
Like Plato, Polanyi wants to uphold the possibility of a 
non-random, rational, search for that which we do not presently 
know; and also like Plato, he recognises the potential paradoxi- 
cality of asserting that the presently unknown is known. Thus, 
again like Plato, Polanyi concludes that what is presently ankh : -, wr. 
must, somehow, be known in some other manner. That is, Poianyi 
asserts that the presently unknown is only unknown at the 
of explicit or articulated knowledge; and that the ? eno paradox 
proves that there must be knowledge at some implicit, urrar-u-_cu1-: teo., 
ortacit level if the rational search for that which: is prese:: tly 
unknown is to be possible. As Polanyi puts it, the paradox of 
the Meno 
Shows conclusively that if all knowledge is expl cft, 
i. e. capable of being clearly stated, then we cannot 
know a problem or search for its solution. And the 
Meno also shows, therefore, that if problems never- 
theless exist, and discoveries can be made by solving 
them, we can know things, and important things, which 
we cannot tell. (Polanyi (1966), p. 22). 
Now as we have already stressed, Popper (cf. hic (1972 
holds emphatically that scientific knowledge is not to be identified 
with any subjective (or 'World Two') states, such as . e, -iefs or 
Polanyiite 'tacit knowledge'. Rather, he claims, scientific 
knowledge is to be identified with the world of objective mind, 
or of 'theories in themselves, and their logical relations; of 
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arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in themseves" 
(p. 154). Thus Popper must reject completely the Polanyiite 
solution to the paradox of the Meno, for according to Poianyi 
the Meno paradox proves conclusively that the recognition of 
problems, and the ability to search for their solution, cannot 
be understood if all scientific knowledge is objective or explicit. 
So any 'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox, which is what 
TDSK claims to be, must be compatible with the assumption that 
the whole of scientific knowledge, including our knowledge of 
problems and of the potential desiderata on their solution, can 
be both objective and explicit; whereas Polanyi holds that the 
Meno paradox can only be solved given the denial of this assumption. 
So a first step towards defending the claim that TDSK constitutes 
a fully'Popperian' solution to the Meno paradox can be taxen by 
initially investigating the Polanyiite solution. 
Why does Polanyi hold that the iýeno paradox can onl r be 
solved if we admit the existence of unarticulable tacit knowledge? 
What facts (or alleged facts) about the search for scientific 
knowledge require this admission? As far as 1 can see, Polanyi 
seems to think (cf. his (1966), p. 24) that such knowledge ýs 
required if we are to explain the followi-ig three facts (or 
alleged facts): Firstly, the knowledge of a scientific problem; 
secondly, the scientist's ability to pursue such a problem 'elaiced 
by his sense of approaching its solution' (i. e. the 'you're 
getting warmer' phenomenon); and thirdly, the 'valid anticil, ation 
of the yet indeterminate implications of the discovery arrived at 
in the end' (i. e. recognising that the discovery is a discrvery). 
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Let us, then, look at each of these i: -.;,: -rc,. 
trat the scientist's Take first the alleged first fact - n«ýue7 
of a problem requires the existence 3l aýil . knowing. 
Polanyi holds this to be true because he :. o'LLs that 'to see a 
problem is to see something which is hidaei. ' (i ý6, p. 2i) anu thus 
to see something of which there can be no explicit knowle ; e. 
this is a mistake - for, to see a problem is not to see some uf-LL L nj 
which is hidden; rather it is to see that there 2L3 sca . :ý . v'l-, -oh 
is hidden (or unknown), and this is quite a different ,. utter.. For 
example, take the following problem, which arose 2o ý_: e a vomic 
theory of matter at the beginning of this century - -ii.. vher ord, 
having experimentally refuted the Thomson, or 'plum uüa r. 'ý . rc, äE 
of the atom, suggested that the atom was a pia , atary 
minature with a nucleus consisting of protons i:. the c -n .c1- 
a minature sun) and the electrons circa ing : ur 
planets). But if this were the case ti. e ,- veºý ; ter; -, 
positively charged while the electron 
atom must involve electro-magnetic ir, , e, uc ticnc, 
an object to which Maxwell's theory of 1-1(i 
applicable. But if we apply Maxwell's 
'rie ry to ý.. u r. l _'ý1" . 
atom, then we find that such an atom will be Lnheren :,, 
(since the electron will radiate away into space ýjf 
within about one hundred-millionth of a second, and so rýýaý i. ito 
the nucleus). So if Rutherford's model is correct, . ý:: ý: axwe, 1' 
electro-magnetic theory is true, then there are no ýýýie atoms 
and so - given a few additional assumptions - no a cor.. s a': La L. 
But in that case, the atomic theory of matter must 'o( -false, since 
no atoms will exist for matter to be composed of. 
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Now here, undoubtedly, is a problem (for the atomic theory 
of matter); but is it the case that to see it is to 'see some- 
thing which is hidden'? If so, what exactly is one seeing? The 
solution to the problem? Now this undou »-dly is hidden. But 
if in order to see a problem one had to see its solution, then 
one could never see a problem - for as soon as we see its solution 
it no longer is a problem. In other words, to see the problem 
which arose for the atomic theory of matter at the beginning of 
this century is not to see something which is hidden; rather it 
is to see something which can be made fully explicit (in the form 
of an argument), but whose solution is hidden (i. e. unknown). 
Thus, to see the problem is to see that something is hidden or 
unknown; it is not to see something which is hidden or unknown. 
In fact, it is only because the problem itself can be made explicit, 
and so is not hidden or unknown, that anyone (like Neils Bohr) 
could have consciously tried to solve --It (by seeking for that 
which was then hidden or unknown). 
It is at this point that the second of Poianyi's alleged 
facts enters into the fray - for according to Polanyi a scientist 
can only pursue the solution to a problem if he --s 'guided by his 
sense of approaching its solution', and so can tell that he is 
'getting warmer' - for if he cannot tell this then, it would 
appear, his search for, or pursuit of, such a solution can only 
be a random 'flailing in the dark'. Now clearly the idea that 
one can tell that one is 'getting warmer' -,,,, hen one's aim is to 
discover the unknown is itself highly problematic. Thus, take 
the obvious case where this kind of information arises -I hide 
_. -W--- 
a boiled sweet somewhere in a room, and invite a visit-n6 Cý. yý 
(who likes such sweets) to try to find it. As he ovt5 ar,; )azui . 
the room looking, I tell him at various points 'you're getting 
warmer' or 'you're getting colder', and he adjusts hs search 
accordingly. But I am able to supply this information to the 
child only because the location of the sweet, although 
to him, is known to me. Clearly, if the location o ýhe swe t 
was unknown to me as well, then the best held, I co lt give . ýr 
would be to join him in the search; I could no longer dire--t 
or guide his search from outside his search. But now as3u... e t . at 
what we are searching for is new knowledge; then what we are 
searching for is presently unknown to everyone; and so nc "3r 
can supply, from outwith the search, any explicit in orrtatior. v ýc 
will tell us that we are ' getting warmer' . So, Polaryi 
the 'fact' that the scientist can know when he is 'getting rar e 
shows that he must have some tacit foreknowledge of the sc-1--t-or. 
he is pursuing. 
But is this the case? Let us assume it is the case and , 3ee 
what results. That is, assume that it is indeed a pact -tha. :, Le 
a 
scientist, in seeking a solution to a problem, can indeed , 
now 'ffien 
he is 'getting warmer' and so know when he is appr, --ýac 
h.,: qg 
solution rather than getting further away from t), and assume 
further, with Polanyi, that this can only be possible i the 
scientist has available to him some tacit foreknowleä e of tie 
solution he is seeking (a solution which shall only become 
explicit at the end of his search). Then presumahijjy if this tacit 
foreknowledge enables the scientist to recognise when he is getting 
warmer, then it must equally enable him to recognise when he has 
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actually reached the solution he is seeking - for seemingly when 
he has reached the solution the heat will be intense (1). So the 
scientist armed with tacit foreknowledge can hardly fail to 
recognise the solution he is seeking once he has explicitly found 
it. But in that case, Polanyi's solution to the Meno paradox 
faces a severe difficulty - for it has not been unknown in the 
history of science for those seeking currently unknown theories 
in order to solve currently known problems to actually articulate 
and make explicit their 'final solution' only to discard it. Thus 
Einstein, in 1913 or 1914, in fact articulated and considered 'the 
actual field equations (of General Relativity Theoryr7 only to 
discard them for what at the time seemed compelling reasons' 
(B. Hoffmann (1973), p. 119). If Polanyi's 'tacit foreknowledge' 
solution to the paradox of the Meng was correct, then how could 
Einstein possibly have made such a blunder? In other words, if 
Einstein's search for General Relativity was itself guided by his 
tacit foreknowledge of the equations of this theory - in order to 
explain the alleged fact of his recognising that he was 'getting 
warmer' - then how could he have failed to recognise that he was 
'red hot'? 
In a sense, then, Polanyi's solution to the Meno paradox 
explains too much - for in trying to explain the alleged fact that 
the scientist is capable of recognising when he is 'getting warmer',, 
this solution gets refuted by the actual fact that he can sometimes 
fail to recognise that he has 'hit the target'. In other words, 
Polanyi's response to the difficulties which the Meno paradox 
raises for the possibility of rationally searching for that which 
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is currently unknown makes that search altogether too easy - for 
if in order to rationally, and non-randomly, search for the 
solution to a problem one had to have available some tacit 
foreknowledge of the solution one will eventually reach, then 
how could failure to reach a solution ever be possible? Or, 
alternatively, any failed search for a solution to a probler., would 
ipso facto have to be seen as not having been a rational search. 
But why should we identify a rational search with a successful 
search? Why can't failure be rational too? Thus take the case 
of Einstein's search, over the last 40 years of his life, for a 
unified field theory -a search which ended in failure. Does it 
follow from the fact of its failure that Einstein's search could 
not have been a rational one?; or that it must have been a random 
search? The real problem, in other words, is to explain the possi- 
bility of rationally, and non-randomly, searching for that which 
is presently unknown without at the same time necessitating that 
such a search will have a successful outcome, and thus without 
assuming that the rational searcher alreacy has a' tac. 1-t f ;r e- 
knowledge' of that for which he searches. 
At this point it will, I think, be useful to introduce two 
important distinctions. The first distinction, already hinted 
at above, is that between a search which is directed or guided 
from outwith the search and one which is directed or guided from 
within the search. Now as we have already seen, if we are searching 
for that which is unknown - e. g. an unknown solution to a known 
problem - then we can only have an explicit 
knowledge that we are 
approaching this unknown if such information is available 
to us 
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from outside our search. For from within our search, this unknown 
is unknown, and so there is no way for us explicitly to know from 
within the search, that we are approaching it or getting closer 
to it. That is, it is only from the vantage point of the solution 
being already known that one can explicitly know which steps in 
the search were 'getting warmer' steps and which steps were 'getting 
colder' steps; and it is precisely because Polanyi wants to claim 
that the scientist can know this, prior to his reaching his soluti, _: n, 
that he is forced to hold that the solution being sought must already 
be known (tacitly). But this is equivalent to turning explicit 
hindsight into an allegation of tacit foresight, and thus turning 
the struggle to find what we are searching for into 'a matter of 
course'. Einstein puts the point nicely: 
In the light of knowledge attained, the happy achievement 
seems almost a matter of course, and any intell-gent 
student can grasp it without too much trouble. But the 
years of anxious searching in the dark, witn their 
intense longing, their alternation of confidence and 
exhaustion, and the final emergence into the IiCnt - 
only those who have themselves experienced it can 
understand that. (Quoted in B. Hoffmann (1975), P-124) 
Now this hardly sounds like the description of I search 
'guided by a sense of approaching a solution' - it is too 'up and 
down', too 'hit and miss', too uneven, to be described as such. 
In other words, if we do not want to fall into the trap of turning 
explicit hindsight into tacit foresight, and if we want to be able 
to understand the search for new knowledge with its 'alternaziur. 
of confidence and exhaus , -i' , then we must restrict the guidance 
available in that search to that which is available from within 
the search itself - for since from within the search the unknowr, 
is unknown, whatever guidance for the search is available from 
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within the search will not require the 'paradoxical' assumption 
that the unknown is known, and so will not guarantee that our 
search will be successful. On the other hand, if there can be 
such guidance or direction from within the search, then the 
search need not be merely a random flailing in the dark. Of 
course, this is not to say that until we emerge into the 'light' 
we do not remain in the 'dark'; rather it is to say that while 
we remain in the 'dark' our search for the 'light' need not be 
a purely random flailing about (or, as Grene put it in connection 
with Popper, merely a question of 'novelties thrown up ... at 
random'). 
These last remarks immediately lead to the second important 
distinction which I wish to draw - that between a search which 
is random and one which is blind. 
1 
These two ideas, although 
apparently similar, are in fact crucially different. A blind 
search is a search in which there is no foreknowledge of success 
. (and so, a fortiori, no Polanyiite 'tacit foreknowledge' of 
success). Thus, for example, the search for a solution to the 
problem of atomic stability for the atomic theory of matter was 
a blind search, in that Neils Bohr had no foreknowledge that the 
problem could be successfully solved (after all, the argument 
creating the problem might just show that the atomic theory of 
matter is false). But to assert the blindness of n search is not 
to assert its randomness, for it is perfectly possible for a 
search to be blind but not random. How? Precisely if we take to 
heart our first distinction - for if our search for the unknown 
can be guided from within our search itself then, since from 
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within the search the unknown is unknown, such guidance cannot 
guarantee success, and so such a searcri will involve no fore- 
knowledge of success (i. e. it will be blind). On the other hand, 
such guidance, by constraining the search, will er. bure that the 
search is not a random search. Thus any search for that which 
is currently unknown which can be guided from within he search 
itself will be a search which is blind but not random. 
How can this be achieved? TDSK provides a po: » ibie answer: 
for according to TDSK the search for that which is presently 
unknown is to be conceived of as the sears}t for cup rently unknown 
theoretical solutions to currently known problems which we have 
been able to discover in our non-knowledge starting-point such 
problems, incidentally, thus do not supl--, I-y u. - with any pos4tive 
substantive tknowledgel but only with the knowledge that re do 
not know). But according to TDSK, such problems carry alona WiL. I. 
them, or generate, sets of potential constraaý nts on anti own 
u-J onj and sucýi esJd. -ýrata solution (the desiderata on their so-L Uý aI 
axe thus supplied from within the search i-Gself, and ye,. -is 
to recognise that for which we search ýl. e. solutions to these 
-1 problems which satisf, the chosen desiderata). But th: Ls enta-Li-s 
that the search for such solutions will not be a random search 
(since it will be constrained). On the other hand, the search 
remains a blind search - since the constraints do not guarantee 
that we will be able to find a successful solution. This is so 
for at least two reasons. Firstlyý the existence ol" -. he c, )Istraints 
(or desiderata) do not guarantee that we will actually be able to 
find, or articulate, a theory meeting (or 
satisfying,; t'A . ese 
ý6ý 
constraints. But secondly, even if we find such a theory, this 
will not guarantee that the solution found will be able to stand 
up to the subsequent attempt at problem-finding. But if it 
doesn't, then the solution so found will not have been a success- 
ful solution. 
These last points raise two further questions. Firstly, 
t4 how exactly do problems generate --ets of poten -LaIL constraints 
(or desiderata) on their own solution? Secondly, how can the 
subsequent process of problem-finding lead to the rejection (as 
unsuccessful) of a found theory which meets, or satis. LI- Nies, the 
initial constraints? I wish to defer a discussion of this latter 
question until the next chapter; 3o : -. ere i only indicate my 
answer to the former question. 
To see this recall, if you will, the story of how a severe 
problem for the atomic theory of matter arose at the beginning 
of this century. The story began wit., ] -, ne discoverY by Ruther-ford 
Qf an experimental result which, if corr, ýýct, refuted t', -ie Thomson 
model of the atom (which was part of Rutherford's startine-pcint 
in the search for knowledge). Now this produces a problem, since 
it can't be the case both that the Thomson model is tr-je and that 
all of the theoretical assumptions behind 'Rutherford's experiment 
(coupled with the 'report of observation') are also true. This 
then is a problem - we have discovered or produced ar, inconsistency, 
and so have discovered that we do not know the truth. B, ut v,, Ihat is 
it that we have discovered that we do not know? The anower is: 
we d* not know (1), we can only guess. That is, v, e may nave 
discovered that the Thomson model is false; or we may have 
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discovered that there are no atoms (if, that is, the Thomson 
model is the only possible model of the atom); or we may have 
discovered that one of the theoretical assumptions behind 
Rutherford's experiment is false; or that some mistake is contained 
in hisIreport of observation'; or even that our 'Logical and 
mathematical techniques of reasoning are invalid. But to guess 
or conjecture which of these has been discovered not to be knowledge 
(i. e. not to be true) is equivalent to choosirg a set. of constraints 
(or desiderata v ,) 
on a solution to our initial problem. 
Thus, assume that we conjecture that there are atoms but that 
the Thomson model of them is fa-. "-se. Then our initial problem 
(which is simply the inconsistency) has been turned into Fj. new 
problem: namely, find a new model of the ator, which is con- 
sistent with the theoretical assumptions behind Rutherford's 
experiment, (b) consistent with the result of that -xneriment, 
and (c) consistent with the assumec-L val-LdIty of -)ur current logical 
and mathematical techniques. Now satisfaction o" a) - (C) 
constitutes the choice of a set of desiderata or., a solutior to our 
initial problems and thus a set of constraints within which the 
search for such a solution is to be carried out. ýote, ho-:! ever, 
that there is no guarantee that the initial problem, a-, so stated, 
can be solved - we simply may not be able to find a n, -ýw model of 
the atom meeting the desiderata. In this case, inquirers who 
had chosen this set of desiderata may begin to conjecture that 
they had chosen the wrong set, and this wil]. I-ead to an apparent 
'Problem-shift'. For although the initial problQm (i. e. the 
inconsistency) remains unchanged, the way in which we , -ýtate the 
Z6y 
problem. will change. For example, under the above set of 
desiderata the problem could be sta'Ued as Itl-ie probiem. of 
the Thomson model for atomism and Rutherlord's result' (since, 
having decided that the problem resides in the Thomson model, 
our problem is to find a replacement for it which is consistent 
with atomism and Rutherford's resullt). But under a different 
set of desiderata the problem may be formulated quite differently 
- for example, as 'the problem of Rutherford's result for 
''Thomson atomism''' (wherein, having decided that the probler. 
lies somewhere in Rutherford's result, our aim is zo defend the 
existence of atoms, as described by Thomson, against that result). 
'L 
Thus the discovery of a problem in (ai, ., v-Lth) o-, -Ar 
lstaTting- 
I point' enables us to generate jets of potenzý%--L' constra-'ý-nts ýor 
desiderata) on a solution to this problem, and such constrairtý; 
then function both to make our search for a solution a non-random 
search and to enable us to recogrise z-at fo-- we . 3earch. 
. But although the search is thus not random, it nevertiielesý; 
remains blind - since there is no foreknowLedo-E; of success tD 
in particular, no foreknowledge that. we have ci-iosen the correct 
constraints. Notice, moreover, that the -ýonstrain-, s themselveý- 
are indeed available from within the search - for since t-, ': ic- 
problem arises within the search, and since the problem itself 
suggests potential sets of constraints on its solution. z-e 
' 1' , guidance on the search which such constraints supply 
is itse.. 
V4 -, 
available from within the search. And, as we have Pre I_OL.,,, _L IJ 
seen, it is precisely this which is required in order for a 
search to be simultaneously blind but not random. 
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These last points bring me to the third alleged fact whi-ch 
Polanyi thinks the introduction of tacit knowledge is required 
to explain. As we have already seen, Polanyi holds that the 
search for new knowledge in science (or for scientific discoveries) 
is the successful search for problem-solutions, and he maintains 
that tacit knowledge is required in order (a) to have a knowledge 
of a problem in the first place, and (b) to pursue its solution 
rationally since, for Polanyi, such a pursuit requires that the 
scientist be 'guided by his sense of approaching its solution'. 
The third role which Polanyi envisages for tacit knowledge is 
this: having achieved a knowledge of a problem, and pursued its 
solution rationally, the scientist must stili be able to recognise 
that the solution so reached is a di., -, covery - that if-, that it JLs 
true. But here we appear to face a further in-stance of the Meno 
paradox - for if a statement is true then all of its consequences 
must be trueg including those of its consequences which are presently 
unknown. Thus once again we appear to come up against the para- 
doxical 'fact' that the unknown must be known - for otherwise the 
scientist can never know that his proposed solution is true. In 
other words, to recognise a discovery , is a discovery J-s, according 
to Polanyi, to Irecognise that a statement is true by appreciating 
the wealth of its yet undiscovered consequences' and, he argues, 
this would be 
non-sensical if we had to know (, xplicitly wha-'(-. was 
yet undiscovered. But it makes sense if we admit 
that we can have a tacit foreknowledge of yet 
undiscovered things. This is ndped tho kind of 
foreknowledge the Copernicans must have meant to 
affirm when they passionately maintained, aE; ainst 
heavy pressure, during one h-ý--r, -Ired and for-L-. y years 
before Newton proved the poJ-nt, that the ne-iiocentric 
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theory was not merely a convenient way of computing 
the paths of the planets, but was really true. It 
appears, then, that to know that a statement is true 
is to know more than we can tell... (Polanyi (1966), 
p. 23)3 
Now it must be admitted that Polanyi is at least beinj7, honest 
here - much more honest than those inductivists who somehow believe 
that it is possible to justify the claimed truth of a scientific 
theory through coming to know (via observation) the truth of a 
sub-set of its consequences. Thus, taking seriously the logical 
problem of induction, Polanyi concludes that since we can have no 
explicit knowledge of a scientific theory's currently unknown 
consequences 'there can also be no explicit justification of a 
scientific truth' (Polanyi (1966), p. 23). But instead of concluding 
that therefore there can be no justification at all of such a truth, 
Polanyi in effect manufactures a new form of justiffication - namely, 
tacit justification (or justification based on tacit foreknowledge). 
Exactly how this is supposed to solve the problem is except lJn, -i'L.. L-y 
unclear to me - especially as Polanyi himself admits that Ithe 
anticipation of discovery, like discovery itself, may turn out 
to be a delusion' (Polanyi (1966), p. 25). But if this is the 
case then we had best forget about 'tacit justification' altogether, 
and instead direct our inquiry toward trying to aiscover whether 
our 'anticipations of discovery' (i. e. our conjectures that we have 
made a discovery) are, in fact, delusions. So rather than relying 
on admittedly fallibleltacit foreknowledge' in order to know that 
onc'uding a scientific theory (or 'discovery') is true - and thus -I I 
with Polanyi that to know the truth of such a theory is to 'know 
more than we can tell' -I prefer to conclude, vvil-ý! -u', 'Ie sceptLc, 
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that to know that such a theory is true is to know more than 
we can know. 
To conclude this section I want to point oult. that although 
in one sense Polanyi's solution to the Meno paradox makes the 
search for scientific knowledge too easy, in anotner sense it 
makes that search too difficult - for Po. Lanyi Uoe.,, not believe 
that the kind of tacit foreknowledge wh-i-ch is, for him, required 
in order to make scientific discovery possib-L le, is the common 
possession of all scientists. Quite the contrary, -*LT, is possessed 
only by the select few - the scien'tific men of genius. Thus, for 
Polanyi, the possibility of scientific discovery is highly 
restricted - restricted to the scientif-L-c elite - but for 
and them alone, it is not only possible, 'but virluually 
In this way Polanyi's theory of scientific discovery coý., ý,: -, -1, -)ser 
to the elitist theory of knowledge containeCL in Flauu-ýý 
(e. g. the Myth of the Cave), than it does to the more egaliitaxian 
view contained in the Meno dialogue itself. 
5.3: Conclusion 
It is, I hope, clear from the above discussion that PolaxiLri's 
solution to the Meno paradox creates no probleu. for TDSKts claim 
to be fully 'objectivist' - for the 'facts- I which 111o]-anyi thirucs 
'tacit knowledge' is required to explain can either be shown to 
be no facts at all, or else are facts but do not req-, ýire tne 
introduction of 'tacit knowing'. Thus, for example, tnat 
scientists are able to have a knowledge of a proble. -.. 
is, inu, ýeu, 
a fact. But what isn't a fact is that this 
fact can only be 
explained by an appeal to tacit knowing. 
For a proble-, -,, we `ave 
argued, is an inconsistencyq and thus can be made perfectly 
explicit in the form of an argument. Thus iL -*L'. simply not the -J
case that, as Polanyi holds, 'to see a problem 
is to see something 
which is hidden'. 
Nevertheless, Polanyi does have a point here - for not only 
is the solution to the problem hidden but, moreover, we do not 
N 
know what is the correct set of constraints (or desciderata, ) : or, 
a solution to the problem. Thus the correct set of constraints 
is also 'hidden'. But as we have seen, in choosing a set of 
constraints we are in fact effecting the manner in which the 
ex licit problem is to be formulated. Thus the correct formula- P- J- 
tion of the problem is also 'hidden'. In other words, what. can 
be salvaged from Polanyi's mistaken view that 'to see a problem 
is to see something which is hidden' is the correct view that 
1, 'to see the correct formulation of a problem is to see 
But in order to rationally purs-, e c. : -c, - which is hidden'. 
to the problem we do not need to see its correct Lormulation; 
we only need to guess at its correct formulation, --, nce given our 
gpess we can pursue a solution rationally. 
Moreover, it is indeed a fact that the rational pursu--t of 
problem-solutions can be non-randorr,; and it, is a'-s, --; a J"act -that 
if such a pursuit wasn't blind then it would be non-random. But 
Polanyi's mistake here is to think that such a search can only be 
non-random if it isn't blind; while we have shown that TDSK 
enables us to understand how the rational searci,, for problem- 
solutions can be simultaneously blind but not random. 
Thus the 
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non-randomness of the search does not require for its explanation 
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any appeal to 'tacit foreknowledgelg and thus does not req,, ire 
that the search fails to be blind. 
Thirdly, Polanyi is right to think, in effect, that the 
logical problem of induction entails that there can be 'no 
explicit justification of a scientific truth'. But what he fails 
to see is that an appeal to 'tacit knowing' will not make good 
this fact - for if our 'anticipations of discovery' can ti, emselves 
be delusions, then what after all is the point it-, appealing to 
'tacit justification" How much better simply to admit that 
our 'anticipations of discovery' are simply conjectures, and thus 
assumptions to which we should apply the sceptical (and critical) 
methods of TDSK. Thus Polanyi's inference from the actual fact 
of 'no explicit justification' to the alleged fact of 'tacit 
justification' is pointless. The correct inference is to the 
actual fact of no justification at all. 
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Chapter 5- Footnotes 
On this distinction)see Donald Campbellts 'Evolutionaxy 
Epistemology' in P. A. Schilpp, ed. (1974). PP. 413-63; as well 
as Popperts 'Replies to my Critics', ibid., pp. 1061-2. See 
also Campbell's 'Blind Variation and Selective Retention in 
Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes', TsycholoEical 
Review, 67 (1960), PP. 380-400. 
21 might just point out here that, for me, the general expression 
'The problem of A (for B)I always takes B as given, and thus as 
the stand-point from which the problem arises. Hence, tthe 
probli.. r-, m of A (for B)I is the problem of what shall we do about A, 
given B. But it is important to realise that there are a number 
of possible ways in which such a problem can be solved. Firstly, 
it can be solved simply by showing that A is itself false, and 
thus eliminating it as the cause of a problem for B (since it is 
only A's assumed truth which creates the problem for B). On the 
other hand, it can be solved by replacing A with some alternative 
assumption A* which is (a) inconsistent with A and (b) consistent 
with B. In this case the problem '. s solved by A*, which both 
replaces A and yet produces no problem for B. Thirdly, 'the 
problem of A (for B)t may actually depend upon some further 
Ohidden') assumptions (0) which are required in order that Ats 
truth entails B's falsity. In this case, the expression 'The 
problem of A (for B)I is in fact elliptical for tThe prob-I-em of 
A and, C (for B)f and this problem may be solved in a way which 
maintains both A and B (by showing, for example, that a 
modification of C elimina es the problem). 
I leave it, as an exercise for the reader, to figure out exactly 
whatl point Newton succeeded in proving. Certainly he didn't succeed 
in proving that the centre of the universe coincides with the centre 
of the Frun; nor indeed did he even prow, that the centre of the 
solar system itself coincides with the centre of the sun (as 
Copernicus held) - since according to Newton's theory the sun and, 
say, the earth both revolve around their common centre of gravity 
which, it is true, lies within the sun, but which cannot be the 
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Footnote 3 contd. 
the mm's centre (unlese the mass of the earth is zero). 
Moreover, Newton certainly did not succeed in proving that the 
planets revolved around the sun in perfect circles, or even 
in perfect circles around perfect circies (Copernicust theory 
still incorporated epicycles). Finally, one would nomally have 
thought that a proof (at least in its epistemic sense) requires 
trae premisses; whereas as fax as we now know, Newton's theory 
is false. 
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Shapter. 6: BEYOND TIDSK 
In this, the final chapter of the thesis, I want to show how 
it is possible to develop a Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno 
paradox which goes beyond that which is contained in TDSK. In 
particular, I want to raise some possible objections to this theory, 
and then to show how the theory itself can be modified so as to 
take account of these objections. Fina-lly, 1 hope to show how the 
theory as modified can supply the basis lor a Socratic scepticalv 
and hence methodological, solution to the probIem of diversity 
which, it will be recalled, is the fundamental problem of 
traditional epistemology. In Sot T doing A- aim to make good my cla-L -* m 
that methodology is, in fact, prior to epistemology; as we'. 1 as to 
answer a question which was left outstanding both in the last 
chapter and at the end of chapter 4- namely, how can the 
subsequent process of problem-finding 'Lead to the reýpction k, ýs 
unsuc-nessful) of a theory which has been found to meet, or satisll'y, 
an initial set of desiderata? 
I shouldt howeverg explain here one of the fundame-Atal 
motivations for pursuing the Socratic sceptical solution to the 
Meno paradox beyond that which is contained in TDSK. T-. -s can best 
be explained as follows: recall that in chap,. er 21 tried to ievelop 
method - which I called the method of strengthening demandn - for 
rationally inquiring into metbodology. Recall, on the other hand, 
that TDSK, which aims to b- a Socratic sceptical theory of the 
rational search for truth, not only solves the firs*ý-oraer Meno 
paradox but also, it was claimed, the second-order Meno paradox. 
But this latter paradox is prpcisely the problem of Pxniain, r, ý7 now 
it can be nossible to rationally inquire into the theory of rational 
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inquiry, or into methodologyv while nevertheless needing to inquire. 
So if TDSK solves the second-order Meno paradox it must it., -,, elf be 
a theory of methodological inquiry (just as a soluton of the first- 
order Meno paradox is a theory oA I inquil-j in general). But in that 
case TDSK and the methodology of strengtheninr demands ought to be 
identical theories! 
'Unfortunatelyg as far as I can see, 
4. 
-h.; j. s is simpl. y not the case. 
And so the problem arises, for my Socra-,, ic scepticism, as tt. ) how 
this non-identity is to be handled: do we rell. -cl, -. ýisn TDSDK as our 
theory of the rational search for trutK ýin gene-ral) oy we 
relinquish the methodology of strengthening Q'. ý! mands as our 
the rational search for methodological truth (in Y, -nce 
the motivation for going beyond TDSK - so aýý to develop 
sceptical solution to the Meno paradox more -L. 
0"Ply 
method of strengthening demands (and so to solve what m-i,; n" 
'the problem of TDSK for the method of strengthening ýeToi. ancs"). 
My strategyq theng in this chapter is designec... -v, - ! ý, 
this. I shall proceed as follows: 
first. T A.. L 
L sha7 cons-,, der 
apparent objections to TDSK; second, I will use thesf- tr- 
generate further desidera, ta. which a Socratic 
sceptic, -ýL s. -)lk. 
A 
Meno paradox ought to meet (further, that is, to kD 
thirdly, I then develop a new methodological theory - which -0ý 
call the method of strengthening desiderata - whicn no-, J, ,,, s 
ý-' -rhese (D 1) and 
(D2), and so is Socratic sceptical, but also sat*-ý, Irje.  
0 further desiderata; fourthly, I show that this new metho, 
theory continues to solve the second-order Meno paranox; aLý, 
finally, I argue that this methodology is identical to ti-ýe I. OF7 
of strengthening demands. If this claim is correct, then t1re 
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methodology of strengthening desiderato. solves the above problem 
of TDSK for the methodology of strengthening demands. F-I*Lnally, I 
BU99eSt hOWkSocratic sceptical solution of the traditional 
problem of diversity (or of what iijight be called 'Feyerabend's 
problem for Lakatos') can be derived from this new methodology. 
The Kuhniam Objection 
I want to begin with exploring an objection to TDSK which I shall 
call 'the Kuhnian objection'. The aim of* this objection is to show 
that,, contrary to the claim of chapter 4. Socratic scepticism is 
perfectly compatible with relativism, so that such a scepticism 
cannot provide a means for avoiding relativism. This objection 
proceeds as follows: according to what has been said in chapter 
a Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno paradox must satisfy the 
t4 two desiderata (D1) and (D 2 According to 
(D the ra onal 
search for knowledge must be possible; while according to (D 2) 
foundation or this search must be possible in the absence of any . 
starting-point of knowledge. But, the Kuhnian now objects, 
theory of the rational search for knowledge satisfies (D, ), and (D )l 
12 
and so is Socratic sceptical; but it is also r! -lativistic; hence, 
Socratic scepticism cannot provide a means for avoiding relativism. 
Let us explore this objection in a little more detail. 
Remember (cf. footnote 149 chapter4)that Kuhn's solution to the Meno 
paradox is just his theory of normal science - for according to 
Kuhn (1963) 
Something must tell the scientist where to look and what 
to look for, and that something, althouirh it may not last 
beyond his generation, is the paradipm with whi ch his 
education as a scientist has supplied him. 
(in Barnps, ed. 
(1972), p. 96) 
But this theory of normal science can be claim-d to be 3ocratic 
sceptical. For on the one hand, according to the theory we can 
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rationally search for knowledge - in the sense that we are at 
least able to recognise that for which we search. This is 
becaui3e the paradigm itself provides us with criteria by which to 
recognise that for vhich we search (which, for Kuhn, is knowledge 
in the form of solutions to normal scientific 'puzzles'). Thus 
Kuhn's theory of normal science satisfies (D 1 
). On the other 
hand, the paxadigm, although it supplies the starting-point in the 
search for knowledge, is not itself claimed to be a startirqý-point 
of knowledge; and this for two reasons. First, since we search for 
knowledge it can only be the resultants of the sear--'- - that is, 
the normal scientific 'puzzle-solutiorts' - which can be considered 
to be contributions to our knowledge. But the paradigm itself is 
no nox-maJ scientific 'puzzle-solution', since al"L normal scientific 
'puzzles' depend on it. But secondly, the paradigm is claimed, not 
to be a starting-point of knowledge, but', rather to be a startine- 
point of socially, or educationally, indoctrinated commitments. 
Thus Kuhn's theory of normal science satisfies (D 2)1 since the 
rational search for knowledge (i. e., for nomal scientil. Cio 'puzzle- 
isolutionst) is explained as being possible in the absence of any 
foundation or starting6-point of knowledge. But if Kuhn's theory of 
normal science satisfies (D 1) and 
k) then it raust be a Socratic 
sceptical solution to the Meno paxadox; and so such a scepticism 
cannot provide a means for avoiding relativism (assuming, of course, 
that fthns theory of norma-1 science is relativistic). 
Now this 'Kuhnian objection? is interesting, since it shows 
how (D I) and 
(02 ) are open to a variety of intexpretations. In 
particular, it shows how the undefined terms 'knowledge? and 
'foundation of knowledge' can be given quite different glosses. 
Clearly,, howeverg the way in which the Socratic scep-IL-Pic interpreted 
the term lknowledgefg as it appears in 
(D 
1 
)9 is quite clifferent to 
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how the Kuhnian interprets this term - for whereas according to the 
Socratic sceptic the knowledge for Vn: Lch we search involves the idea 
of objective truth, for the Kuhnian it doesn't. Bearing this in 
mind, let us see if any avenue is open to the Socratic sceptic by 
which he can discriminate his view from the Kuhnian one. 
Begin by recalling the justifical. -. ionist solution to the Meno 
paradox (J): namely, that the rational search for new -'<nowledge, 
ox for that which is presently unknown (K*'), is or, --,,,, possible on 
the basis of some foundation or starting-? oint of a! --eady given, 
or achieved knowledge (K f)- since it is only by its r: ýlation to 
f that we are able to recognise any ;:: laim as belonging 
T-0 K*. 
It immediately follows from this thatt, it rm--g, -i br- Im-oossible, for any 
such search to have as its resultantF! any cla-im, whiclh is, 21, ncor. ý--: st(ýnt. 
wi th K for such a resultant would force us to 'a-0 X But to f 
L gLve up K is, according to J, to g-Lve up the very ol the f 
,-I sý rational search for knowledge - for it wou"M be to -, oiý-. 
very ability to recognise that for wý, ich we search. n -. tlher wordE, 
f 
(DI the possd. "-, Lý. It. to give up K would entail our giving up -`-Jy the 
rational search for knowledge. Now on the as! 3, Umption that Klf, cc) ns, i c, ils 
I 'I 'P-, -C' f rfýý- of the justificationist's 'epistemo'loPicnily P'riViLeý7(n-'.. 
foundation or startingýpoint, such a requirrment maký--s ensp 
MUS. A. - for if K is known to be true then any K* inconsistent f 
be false. But given that what we are searchiniz for- is knowledge, 
' truth, any sucn K* and given that knowledge involves the idea o. 
f0r. (inconsistent with Kf) would have to be not what we w(ýre 1ooking L 
is In other words, J's requirement of the consistency of K* wAth K, ý 
completely understandable if we accept the justificationist theory 
of Kf itself. 
2Z? 
But now assume that rather than conceivne, ý-: Jr".. in the 
justificationist manner, we instead conceive of -t . ýr, accordance 
with the (RPP) - that is, as merely some culturally or historically 
supplied starting-point, with no 'epistemologically privileged' 
error-free status. Then the demand that K* be consistent with 
f would lose all rationale - if, that is,, we desired to se,,: irch .r 
knowledge, and knowledge involves trulrji. For such a demand would 
simply guarantee that we would forever be rationally imprisoned 
within our error-filled (or at least potentially error-filled) 
starting-point, and so could never rationally fc)r a starting- 
point of knowledge. But this would mean g4ving up "D, ý, j ý::, f -Ieasý- 
as an, unlimited desiderati-m. That is, as the desAeratiin, that not 
only must the rational searen for knowledp,, e be iz rriuct 
also be possible without restriction, in the senee that theý7iý oe n-, 
part of our present Iýnowledgel which is beycn6 the scope of t6F, 
rational search. 
rle Let us designate as 'D h-'s ulnlimi-tced, 3a- ur. rel7tk,, r-3 
version of (D Then the above axgument shows 
J, and conceive of its Kf in accordance w-t, t-fte (RPP) then, give, -, 
that we desire to search for knowledge in 2. semse o! lknowledý--' 
which involves truth, we mus-k. give up 
(D. ). So if we 'Lnsis-t- on, 
couple it with the (RPP), and desire to search ffor knowled, -,, - -n a 
+ -i 9 1ý .4r sense of 'knowledge' which -', -nvolves "u--- 1-1 P f, We MU trPC, ,0- 
the justificationist solution to the Meno BU tJ 
is to reject the claim that thp rational searcri ', c-r 
sense which involves truth) is only possJlble , -,, n J C-1 
Therefore, if we insist on 1DJ - that the ra-. iona'L 
%J on of knowledge is possible then we must, from 
the reject- 
conclude to our 
(D 
2) since such a search must 
be poFsi-, -A. -- 
being based on any Kf 
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To innnarise the above axgument, and simplify it, let us simply 
assume (as a kind of 'background assumption') that we desire to 
search for knowledge in a sense of 'knowledge' which involves 
truth. Thusp for example, let us simply asmme that we desire to 
search for truth (which is, trivially, a sense of knowledge in 
vhich knovledge involves truth). Then the above argiment runs 
is follows: J, together with the (RP-P), entails thp rejection 
of (D 3 
). Hance (D 
-3 
), coupled with the (RPP) entails the rejection 
of J. But the rejection of J, coupled with (I)I), entails (D2). 
Hence, the conjunction of (D 3 
), the (RPP), and (D, ) entails (D 2). 
But clearly (D 3)- the possibility of the unlimited, or unrestricted, 
rational search for knowledge - itsOlf Pntails (D I)- which 
simply reauires the possibility of the rational search. Conclusion: 
(D 
3) and the 
(RPP) entail (D, ) and (D 2). 
The above reel-ilt has a crucially important corollary. "F or 
notice that since (D ) and the (PPP) oý,. mtail (D and (D an7 3 
theory which manages to satisry (D 3) and the 
(RPP) npast eoually 
datisfy (D I) and 
(D 
2 
). But any theory which satifies 'kD, ) and (D 2) 
Z1 `ß 
is a Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno paradox. It 
follows, then, that any theory satisfying (D 3) axid the 
(RPP) mist 
also be sueh a solution. 
Now this corollary enables us to pax: ry the IKuhnian objection'. 
For it gives us, In effect,, a means for discriminating between 
the relativistic and non-relativistic Socratic sceptical solutions 
to the Meno paxadox. The relativistic solutions are those which 
satisfy (D 1) and 
(D 
2) but fail to satisfy the conjunction of 
(D 
3) 
and the (RPP) - in particular, they fail to satisfy (D 3 
); whereas 
the non-relativistic Socratic sceptical solutions satisfy (D 1) 
and (D 2) by in fact satisfying the strongerdesiderata of 
(D 
3) 
and the (RPP). But this means that the Socratic sceptic does indeed 
have a means for avoiding relativism - for he can choose to be an 
twxrestricted Socratic sceptic', and thus demand that any aoceptable 
solution to the Meno paxadox 
N 
satisfies (Dj) and (D 2) only via its 
satisfaction of (D 3) and the 
(RPP). And any such solution will 
continue to provide a means for avoiding the typical relativist 
olaim that anyone who accepts the (RPP) must immediately embrace 
relativism. 
-o satisfy (D That Kulm's theory of normal science fails -1.3) 
ought to be fairly obvious. For according to the theoryq the rational 
sea=h for knowledge is indeed restricted, or limited - it is 
restricted by the paxadigm. For if, as Kuhn says, it is the 
paradigm which -ýells the soientist 'where to look and what to 
look for? then it must be the case that, in 'Crisis' periods, 
vhen soientists are looking for a new paradigm, nothing tel-s them 
'where to look and what to look fort. But in that case theywill 
not be able to recognise that for which they seaxch, and so cannot 
j8u 
isearch for a new paradigm rationally. Of course, from Kubnts 
vievpoint, this fact does not show that the rational search for 
knowledge is limited - since for Kuhn, knowledge consists of normal 
scientific tpuzzle-solutions'. and the rational seaxch for these 
0 
is not shown to be limited by the fact that we cannot rationally 
search for paxadigms (since these, for Kuhn, axentt knowledge). 
But from the viewpoint of Socratic scepticism, which shares the 
classioal idea that Imowledge involves truth (axid, indeed, simply 
identifies the knowledge for which we search with truth), such an 
inability to rationally seaxch for new pax-adigms does show that 
Kuhn's theory of nomal science fails to satisfy (D 3 
). For since 
paxadigms include ammptions which can be objective-ly trae or 
false, our inability to search for new paradigms entails that the 
Ino=al scientific' seaxch fo= knowledge (in that sense in which it 
involves truth) is limited, 
On the other hand, the desiderated seaxch for knowledge, as de- 
scribed in TDSK,, does satisfýr (D 3) and the k=) - so that TDSK 
is an unlimited, or non-relativistic, Socratic sceptical solution 
to the Meno paxadox. That TDkjj', . 3atisfies the 
'RPP iv ) J's a triviality 
- since the (RPP) is included (at (c)) as one of the asm=ptions of t" C 
theory. And that TDSK satisfies ýD ) is shown by the fact that ý3 
according to TDSK our ability to rationally search for knowledge 
(in the sense of truth, and thus in a sense which involves truth) is 
not at all determined by our startirqý-point but is, rather,, 
determined by the problems which we are able to uncover in O-ur 
starting6-pointl, and by our choices among the set of potential 
desiaerata on their solution which such problems generate. To pvt 
the point succinctly: Kuhn's theory of no3mml science is at best 
Socratic sceptical not because it denies that the rational sea_rc -ror L, I 
Jill 
knowledge is dete3mined. by our starting-point, but only because -it 
denies that this startirig-point is a start injgý-point of I-mowledge; 
vheream TDSK is Socratic sceptical because it denies not only the 
is a starting-point 
aammption that the starting-point4of Imowledge, but also that the 
rational search for knowledge is determined by our startizW-point. 
Thus Kuhn's Socratic scepticism might be called Isceptica-1 
Juntificationism' (i. e. 9 the epistemology is sceptical but the 
methodology is justificationist); whereas TDSK is 'sceptical non- 
Jmgtificationismt. But since, as we say in chapter 4. it is 
precisely justificationist methodology which leads to relativism, it 
should not be too auxprising that Kuhn's seepticiLsm is relativistic, 
vhe: reas TDSK's scepticism isnft. 
To sum up: the Kuhnian objection claims that Socratic scepticism 
cannot provide a means for avoiding relativism since Kuhn's theory 
of normal science is Socratic sceptical and yet simultaneously is 
relativistic. But I have shown that the Socratic sceptic does 
indeed have a means for avoiding relativism, for he can decide to 
be an 'unrestricted Socratic sceptic' and thus demand that (D 
and (D 2) only be satisfied via the satisfaction of 
(D 
3 and the 
(RPP). But any theory which satisfies these is both Socra-.. ic 
seeptioal and yet non-relativistio. Thus 'unrestricted Socratic 
scepticism' provide a means for avoiding relativism,, and so (2ace 
the Kuhnian objection) Socratic scepticism can indeed provide a 
means for avoiding relativism. Moreover, we have seen that TDSK 
itself satisfies (D and (D ) via satisfying (D ) and the 23) 
But since TDSK was initially designed only to satisfy the -Lomer 
desiderata,, it follows that it not only provides a means for 
avoi relativism, but also an independent means - for the 
Sooratio sceptical need which led to TDSK was not to avoid relativism,, 
l0 2- 
but rather to defend scepticism. So the claim of chapter )t remains: 
TDSK provides an independent means for avoiding relativism as a 
consequence of the atteMt to defend sceptj(,. Jqm. 
6.2: The Problem ofContent 
I now want to move on to discus-s what t, may amear to be a r4-vere 
difficulty (or problem) for Socratic scePt, icism - and this is, the 
I arisev; for TDSK. problem of content (or of ttrivialisation') as ii, 
This problem may beat be p-ut as follows: according to TDI. 7K, tho, 
rational search for knowledge (in a sense which involves truth) 
initially proceeds by attempting, via the use of critical methods 
of argument and empirical testing, to discover -oroblemq in our 
starting-point (which, it will be rAcalled. is not assmed to be a 
startir4.; ý-point of knowledge). MoreoveT, we have seen that such 
problems consist of inconsistencies, or contradictions, and that 
they generate a variety of sets of potential desids--. -rata on their 
solution. The search for knowledge is then seen as the search for 
problem-solutions meeting a chosen- se-ý of such deriderata. But 
as it appeared in the last chapter, -(-. he choice of -, -uch a se-, of 
desiderata is, in effect, the choice of a qub-set of the ansArtions 
which lead to the problem (or inconsistency'ý% coupled witr, 'ý-, he demand 
that any solution sought be consistpr-ý with this sub-set.. But III i '. q 
entails that the rational search for tnitl- is mere child's play - 
for all we need do to 'solve' a problem. -and. pr a chosen se-, of 
desiderata, is to delete from our startinp-point that (or those) 
assertions which we have conjectured are týie cause ol' the Droblem. 
Such a 'new' starting-point will, Quite --r-A-viall-1/r, 'bF- one in which 
the original problem can no lonCer be detected; and moreover, it 
will be consistent with the chosen set of desidera',, a. But arLy 
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problem can always be 'solved' by mich a trivialising, or content- 
decreasing, strategy; and so the 'Socra--ic sceDtical search for 
knovledge (as described in TDSK) is a -E. rivially uninteresting 
. nterprise 
So the problem Of cOntP-r'l,, (for Socratic sceptie-i-M) 
is this: can ve find a vay of avoiding guch Itrivialising' strategies 
which is consistent with Socratic sofroticim" 
It, ip important. to realise herr- two 'r, irstly, +. nt- 
problem of content for Socratic sceptin. ism is a kind of vArsion 
of the problem of providing a sceptical rationale for Popner's 
methodological rulf-s barring ad hoc-nppr, or 'convcrntio-nalist, 
strategemal (of. Pompr (1959), cham+wr : fo-r -!; iich qt-ra-ý#ýP,, s-mq 
,7 or. I r _q. pcý d., Y, arp 'Promnisely content-decreasing, o- -n 0., 
it in e. rucial to re. alise that the solution rougb k, t hi--rf, must op a 
sceptical one - for otherwiqe it voiddn't be a '. 7oc-ratic. sc, --ntinal 
solution to the problem of content (and so 'would no-ý-, be what, , vye are 
looking for). This last point is important, for there are readily 
available non-sceptical solutions to the problem of content (it seems 
to me, for example, that Maxwell (1974) takes Drecisely this kind 
of line). For example, asmme that we already know -t2'wlt the -truth 
is highly 'contentfull - in the sense that it is not 94 hoc, or 
that it can be captured in logically powerful 'systematic' theories. 
Then we would know that the methodological rule 'Dont trivialise. 11 
was a good rule to adolpt in the rational search for truth. But 
such a solution cannot be accpptpd by the Socra-11-Ac scpl)tic - since 
it vould, in effect, violate (Dp ). That is, it would make the 
rational search for truth dependent upon a 'foundation of knowledget 
(namely, the knowledge that the truth in non-ad hoc). So the 
prblem for the Socratic sceptic is to find a genuinely sceptical 
solution to the problem of con-tent, and thus a solution vhich does 
zýý 
not require us to assma that ve already know, prior to inniii-rj, 
vhat the truth is like. 
To begin, then, let us see what are the consenuences for our 
'knovledgel (in -the sense Of our starting"Point in the search for 
knowledge) if we adopt the trivialising, or content-decrea&491, method 
of solving problems. Now remember that such a strategy proceeds as 
follows: having discovered or produced a problem (i. e., a contradic- 
tion) in our startirig, -point, and having chosen a se-t, of dpý--t', P-ata 
on a solution to this problem, we then simply delpf. eý from our 
starting-point that (or those) assertions whic6 we have conjectured 
are the cause of the problem. As a result of this we produce a 'new' 
starting-point, one with the following properties: (a) it is a 
proper sub-set of our original start, ing-po int; but (bj -. 11a original 
problm. can no longer be detected or produced in it; and 
(0) it satiafies our choser, set of "j-q 
the orginal aseertions satisfying ther, arf- . *. -,:? 
f', l antouch--ýGll our 
problem 'solution'). Now notice that wn; en ever -, te ;- --- a 
new by such a deletional method we are, in efý'ect, shifting I- 
- -: -I - starting-point which has the following degree of 
'potential problematicity', as compared our ir! itial 
point, has been reduced, in tha-1. it will -harder to di-scover or 
produce a problem in our new starting-point -'-. han it var to discove-r 
or produce one in our initial starting-point. is f, -e, 
if one realises that any problem discoverablp or , -oduc-; L-., Ie jr, 
new at&-rting-point will also have been discovera'oi-4 3r prou-, -A, -ýi-ble 
in our old at&rting6-point; but that there w-L 
11 be a- +, )-- cý ,, 
discoverable or producible in our old start, ing-po in; 
be discovered or produced in our new --stari. inT-point 
problem which the new starting, -point Isolves'). 0 P"t noint 
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another vay, a relentless pursuit of a deletional method will sim-DlY 
result in a starting-point with no conten'. at all (or with minimal 
content), and so a starting, -point within which no problems can ei`her 
p be discovered or produced. But since ve search for knowledgpe (in 
a sense which involves truth), and since our search for knowledge is, 
according to TDSK, dependent upon our being able to dip-cover or 
produce problems in our starting-point, such a de]-ational strategy 
will progressively close dovn the possibility of rationally searching 
for knowledge in accordance with TDSK. For it wilý make that search 
harder and harder to Implement, and finally close it dovr, a: Ltogetlner. 
Now this means that the delational, or content-decreasing, or 
'child's play problem solving', method in in fact inconsistent with 
a version of (DI) - namely, that version in which the rational search 
for knowledge must not only be ponsible. but mus+ renain as possible 
however long we have been conducting the rat. ional search. Let us 
call this new desideratim I tl.; p i, eMpOT-8. 'Jý, r (DI) and I invariant k 
designate it as (D 4 
). We can now also pene-ra,, e a further desideratum 
(1) 
5)- namely, the tunrestricted temporally invariant 
(D, )' 
according to which the rational search for knov1F--dp,, e mu-. ,-ý, (a) be 
poseible, (b) be unres+ricted (of., sqction r. 1), and (c) be 
temporally invariant (in the above sense). TTow (D 5) clearly en-ýails 
(DI), (D 
3 
), and (D 4 Moreover, as we : mw in, the last section, (D 3 
and the (RPP) entail (D and (D Since (D ) entails 5 
f (D 
and the (Rpp) trivially entails (D 3) and 
(RPP)' and so, by our 
previous result, entails (DI) and (D ). 2 'BU-11" 
t1jig -7ý-), S4 -Lf -#7p 1-1 , 
can now develop a methodological theory which SatiSifi-e--q and 
the (RPP) then such a theory must . natisfy 
(D 
I) and 
(D. ), and -,,, io .ý 
a Socratic se4uptical solution to the Mi-no im-mdoir. Tqo-rpover. 
Zý b 
since (D 5) entails 
(D 
3 
), such a Rolution vill continue to be a 
nori-relativistic Socratic sceptical solution to the T-Teno -Paradox. 
So if we can find some theory which sat, isfies (1) 5) and the 
(RPP), 
then truch a the-orj will be (a) a Socratic scerptical soluicion to the 
Meno paradox, (b) non-relativistic or InnreFi+, ricted. ard (c) 





)). But since, the rr-nu--'; -rPmo-nt or of 
'temporal invariancel is, as we have wi-I" 
16hild's play Droblo 1.1, -L ., m solving' me-Lhod of 
dp, 14-, -ýion. aý- 
(D 
5) and the 
(PPP) Twis+ also providr, a f-- qolvirý, 7 i, lif- problerý 
of content (for SocT-atic scepticism), 
6-3: A Plausibility Argiment for 4" 
Before proceeding to search for a theory vhich 
and the (RPP), it is vorthwhile asking iiho! ýther any ralio-. -,, L ---ý car be 
ý n- given for the Socratic scept-LaTs adopt. ý- g 0-" that 
in so adopting it we can, if we are lucky anough to a, tner, -, 7ý 
satisfying it, solve the Problem CC Fr. i, 9'IMeF'7 triat wp- can. 
-to MIST,, and Soc-mt---'L-,, scep Remember that according ý, L. m- -, L n 
general, the knowledge for which we searcý. and viioh -'L,, s the C-4-: 77 of 
our rational inouiries. in talcen -to invo-LVR 7-j- fant, il-, Sj_T,, Tr, 1. v 
in identified vith truth, so, that w1lat, ", FRIF-arOll for i! ý TTow 
notice that this aim can itself be ýsub-divided in+G two, ra-, ', wr 
distinct, sub-aims: fi". tly, if we search -for 
that, at the lend' of our search, the v#, w4_11 
not contain any assertions which are false. On the o -8-rd, 
ve search for truth we will also desire that the 
reach does contain. eveyýy assertion which Is true 
(fo- i: - 
h Z-_ " truth, then every trut will give us more of what we , i- an merely 
Zý 1 
some truths). But in fact there is a +. en-sion, or Itrade-off', bp. tveen 
these tvo sub-aims: for the most effective way of guaranteninF that 
our starting-point does not contain any assertion waich is false is 
by making sure that it contains no assertions. at all. In other words, 
if you only vant to avoid asserting falsehoods,, then avoid assertirid 
anything. But if one achieves the first anb-aim (of avoiding flasehoods) 
in this manner, then one has totally relinalaisbed the second sub-aim 
- for if one avoids asserting art,.,. -thing then one emially avoids asserting 
any truths. So vanting or desiring to search for truth cannot be 
identified with vanting or desiring merely to detect and eliminate 
falsehood. 
Now the deletional mell. -bod for solvirpý problems in our 9, tarting-- 
point is precisely a method which, inTolicitly, works anly thp- 
'avoiding falsehood' sub-aim of the aim of seeking truth - fo- the 
Me4- continued application of this hod will simpl- produce a starting- 
poin+ which in progressively free from (conjectured) falsehoods (nompared, 
that in, to our earlier starting-points What it won't do, however, 
in to emially enable u-sr to pursue the otl-, e-r smb-aim of t. 'ho aim of 
seeking truth - namely, that sub-aim in which we desire that our 
tu%, Ily contains Prrsbrl, y- truth. So i 'L, as Socratic ritarting6-point? even 
sceptics, we take the aim of o-ur inouiries as that of truth, then we 
will equally vant to pursue b_o 1, r, sub-aims of this aim. Since the 
deletional method of problem-solving- only, at best, enables us to 
pursue the 'avoiding falsehood' mfo-aim, we have a perfectl-,,, r mod 
rationale for trying, if vre can, to avoid a total Teliance O-n this L 
method (that we will have to rely on it to some e3r-o-n I; t r- obvious, 
since a problem, considered as a contradictior., 
/vne aeje-, ý-. ion of 
B-ut t something -for othervise the problem remair, n) o show 
'Rely that the Socratic scep+if,. car., avoid mie'l a j.., q preci. 
Iva 
to show a Socratic sceptical means for solving the problwa of content. 
So there is, indsn-ýedq a perfpctly good Socratic 
sceptical desideratum - namely, that we desirf-- to rationally search 
for trutb - vhich seems to recuire us to adopt. (D)., ), and tbis 
independently of any direct desire to solve the problem of content. 
ý. h: Beyond TDSK 
Now remember that in the face of the problm. n of contp. n+, we 
generated the desideratum of temporal invariance (D 4) which a 
Socratic sceptical solution to the problem of content must meet. 
We argued, moreover, that this desicleratum could itself bp incorporated 
as part of a stronger desideratum (D 5 which includes the dAmand Of 
unrestrictedness incorporated in (D, ) as well as that Of UeM00ral t 
invariance incorpora! -. ed in (D r7lis new, stronge-r, desideratim, 4 
if oonjoined vith the (RPP), must therefore enta-, 7, (D 'ý and 
(RPP), and so entail (D I) and 
(D 
2- 
). So any tlleory WýIic. "- Sati-Sifies 
and the (RPP) must itself be a no---ri, ý, a. iviqt-Lc, a--. r -vial i si, 
-1 -nf -i 
'Socratic Sceptical sollition to the 'Meno , paradox. '-, - -., - find Prich a 
_r ve solution, all we need now 
do is to 1e fror 's-'- 
for a non-relativistio, Socratic -sont. 
ical 1,3021. -1 I-io,, ) to '. 'he Of 
content. For this searob started from thp discove7yof a wroblen (the 
problem of content for Socratic sceroticism" , movp. cl -'rpncp tO 
strengthened deside-mta ((D ) and tT-,;, "Rp"P)'ý on i L-, r s-01'. 1tion" MOVA 5d 
thence to the present attPmpt to formulatf, a Mheo-r 
desiderata. 
Well, here is the thpo-r7: basicail', r, it is TDSK with a twiqt. 
That is, take TDSK, drop its implicit claim -, -, o be a comp"el-e thf.. 017,,. 
-. L 11 
, he of the rational search 
for knowledge, or a complets? soju-ýion -1-, 0 j- 
Meno pamdox, and add to this theory a new ru-l*m I; o 1-1-sm 
Zg1 
effect - namely, that vhp. never one has man&ged to discover or produce 
a problem (or inconsistency) in onefs starting-point by the critical 
methods of TDSK, rather than simply choosing a so-, ý-. of deýsideral-. 
_a 
on 
a solution to this problem which can already be I found' (so to speak) 
in one's starting, -point, see if one can employ the p: roblem itself 
to generate oev, or further, desiderata on a solu-', ion to it, and 
the, 6, et 6, P 
then proceed to search for a solution meeting ý desidera-ka by 
not merely deleting some element of our starting-point (iýiich has to 
be done if one is to solve the pToblem) but also by adding some new 
element to our starting-point (which has to be done if ve are to 
satisfy the new, or at-reng-then6d desiderata). In ot, her words, we 
, -. A modify TDSK by dropping its implicit claim to COMP10-1 nf, "SS, thPn 
adding the above rule - which renuirs: ý, s that `, he rational search fo-r 
truth not/mnploy a trivialising or content-denro-. a., i-r_,, - P-trateg-r - 
and then we close this new theory up by adding a new claim to 
completeness for it. 
Now notice what has happened: having generated, in chapter 
the Socratic scePtic's laroblem concerning the Meno paradox, t', ie 
desidersta ((D I) and 
(D 
2 
)) which a Socratic sceptical solutio-- -r, 
the problem must meet, and a theo-rr of the rational search for knovIdi-r- 
satisfying these desiderata (i. e.,, 7T)7'r', i, we then proceeded, i- 
Jection -o ri-TMS. Now this ob-e, -, or, 6. ij to consider the Kuhnian obi 1 . 11 r -L 
was to the effect that Sooratic scepticism provides no mean. ý-. . -: )r 
avoiding relativism - and we shoved, in rp. ". onse, that a non-relativ-, 'Lp-, JC 
Socratic sceptical sol-ution to the Meno paradox ir, irdeed, 
All it need do is satisfy (D and (D via, il. s -saý', -I the 
desiderata (D ) 3 and 
the (RPP) which en tail (D, ) &. 1d 2)- 
we then saw that TDSK, althou& irtroduced -ý o Satir'7 ., L., - : )I ý a:, -, rl 
ronTe: r in fact did so by alrefoy satisfying the st 
Z9 1L) 
had no need to go beyond TDSK in or,; --r to &nsvpr the Kuhnian ol-jection.. 
But when we came to the problem of content, things were. rather 
different. For the problem of content can only be solved, in a 
Socratic sceptical fashion, if we introduce a fur-'uher desideratim 
(1) 
4)- the x*quirement that the rational search for knovledge be 
'temporally invariant? - but = does not satisfy this desideratum - 
for if it didg we could have solved the problem c.,. content in an 
exactly analogous manner to the vay in vhich we answered the Kuhnian 
objection. In other vords, TDSK is perfectly consillstent w--L--Iv-h the t-4AAl 
adoption of aI trivialisingt method of problem- solving; lciit since 
the problem of content for Socratic acep-Iticism is prec-ý; ý-,, "Ly to show 
tiftt taut 04%rit"00 G-V 
liow it can. avoid/such a method of prob*1em-solving, we had to introduce 
a theory which goes beyond TDSK, and yet vý,. -'Lch remains .a --C, I- 
relativistic Socratic sceptinal solution to -ý. Iie Meno paraZox 
satisfying (D 3) and tht RPP,,,. 
Now our new methodological --Luheo-r7,,  -alcep ovpr fron, 'D7K the idea 
that we must not asmme our sta k -L ýj , r-' in. --poi-it -o be a of 
;, 
4+ .1 knowledge (otherwise there would be no poinT, in a-, )-D-'L, vinp, M- A--Leal 
problem-finding methods to it). But. in rejec-I tiný7, t-his o-, -; -r 
new theory, like TDSK, can happily accept the .. 7o iý, -, accepts it. 
Moreover, since the rational search fOr imOviedge P-, ill depends,, 
in our new theory, not upon the start in jr-po in% j but -rather wpon 
-7 mus-L, problems &nd 
desiderata on their solution, this t"neoj A- 
satisfY (D )- and so satisfies (D ) and ), &-id so ll? ý,, 31ý2 
relativistic Socratic sceptical solution to T, Tenc 
our new theory is also a solution to the problem of 
Socratic acepticimn. For this probl m-n is to f ind a vý, 
out,, in a maxi-ner consin-t. ent lith Socratic a L , liwice 
on the Itrivialising? method of p robl em- solving. -c, I-, we saw, 
2A ý 
our now theory has to satisfy (D sinco,., (D, ) is both a Socratic 4"t 
sceptical desideratum (of. se-etion. 6-3) and is inconsistent with a 
total reliarice on Itrivialising' methods. B,,.,, t oiir , -iev 41.1heory must emomm 
fo: r iL be inconsistent with nuch a total reliance inco-rpo-rates a 
rule vhich rules out such a reliance, Thus, an ' a- as vp know a'-. 
Present, our new them7 satisfies 
know of for satisfying (D 4) is j 
0ý tatok an 
Out /'tr- ivialising' methods. But 




ust thall, the th, 
our new theory 
our new theoT7T 
only condition we 
eo-t7, r produced -rules 
dr) es ru-I e thi. S oli-'-. 
satisfies (D (D. J, 
and the (RPP) - and so is a non-relativistic Socratic solu-', _, ion to 
the Meno naradox which also solves the problem of content for Socratic 
scepticism. 
Now notice a peculiarity about how this new theory vaý7 reacYed. 
--,, )Tr For it was reached by first producing a problem, for , 1, - th e 
problem of content- then usinp this problem -t', - ra lim o dircover, a , ýPw deride + 
((D 4 
)) which. was not part. of our addi-np, - tl-ds 
desideratum to the previous "'D ard the -,, 'nU,. q 
producing a strengthened set of On the 
set for a r, - basis of the strengthened U_ Socratio semtical 
solution to the problem of contAnt- ard a t'aeo-y 
modifying TDSK in the follovIng manner: (a'! delettLn.: 7 -TSIC Ia claim to 
completeness, (b) adaing the now rUe enjoir. ing t-he -. 1i er, inp j _, of wwre 
desiderata and thus outlavi-_-ýg/ldeletion without '- ri-placemen-1-Y, 
adding a new completeness claim for new -ýheory. PL 
probl em- solving method is prAcisely a-, examin of myýllod jaie, Olown 
in our new methodological theory! 7or not only does i4l-, procep --), r L 
employing the problem itself to generaý-A-_ new dpsiderata on a 
to it (desiderata vhich were not part of our startinT_poin,, -, ). 
2112. 
moreover, the new theori reachea ws. reached precisely by modifying 
our starting-point (i. e., TDSK) by tn. f- vp. -. r-j --method of 'de-letion T)lus 
replacement' (or 'deletion plus addition o---! " new methodological 
theory enjoins us to solve problems L-, our staxt]--Lg-point. For we 
reached our nev theory by first deleting 7, D'F)'KIs -L, 'D! iC-L', ClaiM +0 
rAVIS, 
coMleteness, then adding our nev rule bannin. 9/1 del e-'t. ion vithout 
addition', and then 'closing up' ariew witIa a now (, ut this time, 
explicit) claim to completeness. So our new methodologiced theory 
explains the search for itself as having been a ra-, L. - -ýal search (s. A ce 
our new theory is a theory of rational searching, and o'l-r, for 
while, or., tine ot. -ar this theory vas an ins-I-Ance of thist theoT-, -) 
it also explains why we needed to search foT it (since beffnre we had 
0 it we had, not it, but, rather a problpm with TDM - the pý,, I- 7r.. 0j'. 
content). In other vords, our new methodo" og-ic>ý! t. , 
7f ý- A' 
")SK 
, 
. 1. -', oo --,  I '*. -e7 
continues to solve the second-order paradox. 
Wat shall we call this new metnodc"Logical 
to call it the method of apn-f-dArp-ta or 7, n T 
notice that mad -vms not ori. -L-- reached a 
io -ý . -4 en, -o o solving method (which involved addit or-3 . 
as del et ions), but morpover 11hat a mripial Laýý, 'Or 
such a method vas precise--y tha-z, -ý, he r, cvv had -. c 
strengthaTied set of deýsiderw. a (beyond 5,,, a. % and 
the (RPP)). Thus it is mscL's insistence, that vF, - alvay. -, for 
4- 
strengthening of desiderata which nece,,,, ýsita, es, 
Lem total reliance on ltriviali-s-A.: me,, ho,, s of 
f,. - Now recall that any solution to f irý. 
'P"-, O 
I is also a solution to the second-order ". pa-, -- - 
be a theory not only of rational inquiry (in generrCL,, ,, It )_ 
rational methodological inquirv, or of inquiry into 
lcý 3 
particular). 'But in chapter 2 we developed a method, the metlfjoa- of 
strenrbhening demncls (or MD) 9 for incra-l-ring into methodolog-7, or 
into the theory of rational scientfic method. 'So q7. mstio- 
naturally a-rises as ý-, o how TMD in -related to TrAsd. "Ie arxvrer. 
Suggest, in that M is simply a special caqP of -LfýA as i- avplips to 
methodological 
/inquiry 
- and vhere, in effec' ,I, ý 18-L -A. 
the addi C1 
propose to discriminate bet . I'A L ween rival theoriip, -.. )f becomýý, '-r- 
3 .. - 'S Wr; ýL ;I or. mad, generalised ink. o the notion of st (. 4'. ýl ej re 
an accfrptable solution to a probiftm we onco-anter -3-ýO 1-1 
our prpvious solutions to t'nese problems. 'Moreover, like IDSK, is 
clearly within the nomative approach e war Pven -o k, 
generated in accordance vith TIM. one of aLis of section 6.3 
-"- -trivial is-", rig' problem- was to show that TDSK, in beirg corj, -, Ris., L, 1, ý- -L ' pmt wi 
solving methods, in fact. puts at risk 4-Ine possibill-ý-, -7 of our achieving 
the Socratic sceptic's independently r-n-A-cifled aini of 
But according to TISD such &,, - argumemt, --'Lf is a truth). 
decisive criticism of any pronosed r thodol Io gi S0 TITS D 
would have itself enjoined us -o seEte, a replacerierc- Thus, 
I want to Fruggest that the method of strnnp, -*ý!, -Pning demand:! ý and the 
method of strengthening doýsidprata a-r- fandw4a TitaU v name "neory. 
a' "I'le. of But if this is righl-, as I mtgg-Rq. -1kA "I 
f 4- 




Finally, I vant briefly to suggest how, on 31- x. .-, 9 ve 
can offer a Socratic rp. eptical solut on to the -oo-- - 
,. -r- . ý-a-ýoFjt - This problem could also be called 'Feye-mbobrid's i)--, c, ')lPTr --o 'jp'., 
for Feyerabend pointed out -that Lakatos' ms--ýhodoj, -,, ---- n(-. - T-. ý--L-L-LC 
research programmes was Fruch tha+ no res. emrch A. vb 
rationally eliminated (since no matter how 1'q developmo--nt-, 
2ý4 
had been up until now, there -vss a1i-ra:, rs poiýnibility - as !, ýat0n- 
himself admitted - that fnrtber wo-, ý-. on the progrramme could reverse 
its fortunes - so that middenly it would start -,, -.o 'ýP, 
. 1. progressive'). Now renember that from the non- jr-st -ý, 
f 
ii ca-, viewpoint 
developed eaTlier in tTlis thesis(and paTticularly in cl-a-, 'ý- 
acceptable iolution ,. --c. he pro7cierr, of must both for 
the possib-5.1it-y of ra-. ý, Lo-al klor -ational elisagreement),, &nd 
L J- must at least enable us to elimina-':. e s-ach dilvers-? ty Jn a p-: Iece- 
meal fashion , for if it, didn't tc-ari, from a rat-? A-ons6-ý- of view, 
Feyerabend' s slogar, of 'Anyti, ng Goes! I wwAd iave to '-P- acce, Ie 
-cL,. tiel7, r 
But msd enables us to -ander-stand pre 
For on the one hand, -n,; d -, ýD -A o3- 
diversity. In fact, ii-, alio-, m. for p: - , nn Xft O-L 
ment - for different thi. raers can ar7eo, 
solution to a problem must 
-7 d beat theory for satisPying -thesp- rlpr "nCompati"-ý]Le, 
In 
this theories can in fact sat Anf-ýýIr Of iA -. 
----. 
- 
case, the tvo thinkers mmst, if they are 'o their 
disagreement,, agree to inquire fram thei-ý- star-: -'-, -,,. ý-points 
in accordance with msd. For by doi--iý --oy oýne C' 'lie theories may 
be discovered to face a problem who-.,, ýe -solution requires a strengthening 
of desiderata in such a vay that the resulting set of desiderata nov 
becomes internally inconsiqt, -nt. -, Put if a set of are 
f inconsistent, t-hen they ca-runot be satisfied by an, 
is, the theory is consistent). But if, by the me', 'ýodl o. - 
srach a sistpn-ý- aesiderata,, we actually es, -n incon,. 
problem can only be solved by veakeni--Z desidera-ýa. 
we are no longer inqpiri-v- in accordance V -0 
to inquire in accordance with msd entails tha-L- 
2-1 ý 
is now closed dovn. 
Alternatively, different thinkers may noý-. o-il, -,. - disagremp-, muite 
rationally, as to the best solution to a problem under a given, or 
agreed, set of. desiderata, they may even onite rationallY disagree 
as to the correct desiderata on a solution to a pT. -oblem (for remember, 
that we are even ignorant as to how to articulate our ignorance; and 
that ve can only gLiess vhere our ignorance lies). But now what happens 
if different thinkers make different such guesses? Well, the same 
situation applies as in our previous case - for so long as each of 
them agrees to incuire in accordance with med it may turn out that 
one of them comes to face a problem vhose solution requires a 
strengthening of desiderata in such a vay that the remmilting set of 
desidersta in internally inconsistent. But this then closes down his 
'line of inauiryl. 
So. I submit, msd can solve the problem of diversity in a way 
which is both non-justificationist and methodological. If this in 
correct, then methodology is indeed pr. 'j-o: r to episte=1097, and tha-'i- 
the old Platonic problem of the Meno which is, I have claimed, the 
fundamental problem of rational methodology, must now be seen ap also 
the fundamental problmn of epistemology. For if the fu-ndamental 
problem of epistemology can only be given a methodological solution, 
then the fý-mdamental problem of epistf-mology must just bf, them 
fundamental problem of rational methodology - that is, it must be 
the Mono paradox. 
In this thesis I have smight to innuire into the thqor-y of 
rational incuiry, and in particular to shov Tb!. ýj tha+. infr2iry 
can itself be a rational inouiry, and to devo-lop tiýeý beginni-rig-ý, q of 
a Socratic sceptical theory of incuiry. Such a theory, j-, qo far 
ý- Cý I. 
as it is 'Popperian', thus refutes Popper's explicit asseT-tion that 
methodology can only focus on the post hoe 'context' of appraising 
theories once they have been explicitly articulated, and cannot at 
all have anything interesting, or instructive, to sa, .7 about 
the 
ismaes which arise with res-pect to producing such theories. But 
if I am right, then such theories can be the resultant of a rational 
thi 
search for knowledge, so that oizr theories of / search can indeed 
shed light on the 'process of production'. But I would not wish it 
to be thought that msd is necessaril7 thp Pnd of our search for, a 
Socratic sceptical solution to the Meno paradox. Por it may verT 
well be the case that, like TDSK, Nre may be able to di-scover a problem 
for mad whose nqv desiderata thpmpelvcý--? canno' bp, sati-fied b-,! - msd. 
But in that caseq they would desideratp -thp sparch for a renlacemont, 
to med. Such a search would, crAte clearl, r, be an '-n-d - search, 
and so msd has the ability to explain the further progrress of our 
Socratic sceptical Iline of innuir:,, '. -3ut, in 1-. ýiat case, &It, -, o 
explains how this 'line' can itself be . -, -, Lored down. Thus lt. 'here is 
still everything to play for (methodologically speaking). perhaps 
ything it has not cuite everrthing, for if this thesis has shovn an., 
shovn the utter devastation for ratlonality, and the theory of 
rationality, of the justificationist arproach. -1hus, in Ti-y viev, 
the real choices before us are either some. version o oocratic scepticic.,, m 
or an utterly ir tionalist relativiesm. FOT mY Pa-rtv I PrPfer 'DrOblems 
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